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Abstract 
By' reviewing the literature, we find a clear gap in studying the direct relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance from the 
perspective of capital structure theories, and whether debt plays a mediating role in 
such a relationship-if it exists-in the UK context. Accordingly, the main objectives 
of this study are to investigate the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and a firm's performance, and to test the mediating role of debt level for this 
relationship. 
This study has been classified into four parts. First, we investigate the relation 
between determinants of capital structure and debt level to identify the most important 
determinants of the capital structure. The second part examines the relationship 
between the debt level and a firm's financial performance. The third part investigates 
the direct relation between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial 
performance. In the fourth part, debt level is employed to examine if it has any 
mediating role for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and a 
firm's financial performance. 
The study sample includes 425 non-financial UK firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The sample is taken from the FTSE All-Share Index, which is considered 
the most recent constituent list; it is the aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and 
FTSE SmallCap Indices, and it represents the performance of approximately 98-99% 
of the UK's market capitalization. We use panel data analysis over a period of fifteen 
years from 1992 to 2006. This relatively large panel data set allows us to construct 
and test more complicated models than purely cross-sectional or time series data. This 
set gives confidence to the results revealed by this study. Additionally, panel data 
techniques reduce the model specification bias or the omission of variable bias. The 
panel data has been used to test the above four relationships targeted in this study. 
Due to the unavailability of data of ownership structure, remuneration, and economic 
value added (EVA) for the panel analysis period, the cross-sectional methodology is 
Un1S xv' 
employed to test the inclusion of these factors. Remunerations and ownership 
structure are important variables in the context of agency problems and a firm's 
performance. Data for these variables are collected from the annual reports as cross- 
sectional data. In addition the maximum annual reports available are found in the year 
of 2005, therefore this year has been chosen for the cross-sectional analysis. 
The results can be classified into four main groups. First, assets structure, growth 
opportunities, profitability, firm's size, liquidity and industry are important 
determinants of capital structure. We find that assets structure and firm's size have a 
significant positive relation with the firm's debt level. Growth opportunities, 
profitability, and liquidity have significant negative relation with the firm's debt level. 
Nonetheless, the study shows conflict results for a firm's risk and non-debt tax shields. 
In addition this study also finds that industry has a positive and significant relation 
with the debt level. 
Second, results reveal a significant negative relation between debt level and financial 
performance. Also, we find that remunerations have positive and significant relation 
with a firm's financial performance. Nevertheless, a firm's ownership structure is 
revealed to have a positive but highly insignificant relationship with financial 
performance. A firm's size has a positive and significant relationship with financial 
performance, but industry has an unclear role. 
Third, results confirm that assets structure, growth opportunities, firm's risk and 
liquidity have significant positive relations with a firm's financial performance. On 
the other hand, non-debt tax shields have a significant negative relation with financial 
performance. However, the study shows contradicted results for a firm's size and 
industry sector relations with financial performance. 
Fourth, debt has a significant mediating role for the relationship between determinants 
of capital structure and financial performance; this role is weak but highly significant. 
There are several important features of this study that the researcher believes advance 
the knowledge in the area of capital structure and performance both theoretically and 
empirically. 
UNS XVII 
First, this study is the first-to the researcher's knowledge-that investigates the 
mediating role of the debt level for the relationship between the determinants of 
capital structure and the financial performance. However, this research finds that there 
is a highly significant mediating role for the debt level but this role is weak and the 
relationship is partially mediated. 
Second, there is no study-again, to the researcher's knowledge-that investigates the 
relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial 
performance under the perspective of capital structure theory. 
Third, although the first and second relationships have been investigated before, this 
is the first study - to the researcher's knowledge- that use three methods in panel data 
for fifteen years for the UK firms using all industries to prove the expected 
relationships assigned for these two relationships. There are no previous studies that 
investigate the above relationships using the large data set used in this research. This 
gives confidence to the results revealed by this research. 
Fourth, choosing a performance measure that represents the shareholders' value 
represents a real challenge; this study picks four performance measures which are 
closest and represents the point of view of the shareholders. In addition, using 
economic value added (EVA) gives important results compared with other 
performance indicators. 
Fifth, this study gives an evidence for a general homogeneity of using book or market 
values measures to represent the debt level. 
UniS XVIII 
CHAPTER ONE. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The trade-off theory suggests an optimal mix of debt and equity for a firm to achieve 
the minimum cost of capital structure. There are reasonable numbers of empirical 
researches on the determinants of capital structure which imply that certain factors 
influence the capital structure that lead to the minimum cost of capital; clearly, 
financial managers should devote their time and effort to those determinants. 
However, there are no research studies to show whether the expected minimum cost 
of capital also reflects the maximum financial performance and maximum welfare of 
shareholders. As a result, there is lack of empirical research to investigate whether the 
determinants of capital structure directly affect the financial performance and 
shareholders' wealth. This is important for financial management in that, if the 
determinants of capital structure do not lead to the increase of a firm's performance 
and at the end the shareholders' welfare, there is no need for financial managers to 
search for those determinants. This research attempts to fill in this gap by 
investigating whether the link between the determinants of capital structure and a 
firm's performance exists in the UK context, and whether debt level plays a mediating 
role in such a relationship if it exists. 
The relationship between debt level and a firm's performance is a focal point for most 
of the capital structure theories especially agency theory, signalling and asymmetric 
information theory, and trade-off theory. 
The agency problem is considered an important issue in most industries due to the 
separation of ownership and control. This may result in insufficient work efforts by 
managers and make them more interested in their personal perquisites, or choose 
policies that suit their own preferences, and as a result fail to maximize the firm's 
performance. Debt is used to control the managers' opportunistic behaviour by 
reducing the free cash flows in their hands and constrain or encourage them to act 
more in the interests of shareholders. Debt prevents the investment in negative 
projects by committing the management to pay fixed interest payments. 
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However, managerial ownership and compensation systems are considered good 
mechanisms that align the interests of managers and shareholders. This motivates 
managers to take actions that maximize the firm's performance and maximize the 
shareholders' wealth. 
The asymmetric information model assumes that managers generally have better 
information about their firm's than outside investors. Well-informed insiders tend to 
convey the firm's positive information to the poorly informed outsiders to enhance the 
firm's performance. According to signalling theory, managers have clear incentives to 
use signals to differentiate their firm from weaker competitors. One of the important 
signals employed in this concern is the use of debt. Debt signals good news and 
means that managers are confident about the future which is to be followed by the 
firm's superior performance. However, equity signals bad news and possibly means 
that earnings will fall in the future which indicates the firm's poor performance. 
Trade-off theory by (Miller 1977) states that the firm has an incentive to use debt and 
will continue to do so until their additional supply drives up interest rates to the point 
where the tax advantages of interest deduction are completely offset by higher rates. 
In other words, the firm will use the debt until the optimal level of debt is reached, 
which occurs by the trading-off between benefits and costs of that debt. Theoretically, 
the appropriate capital structure mix minimizes a firm's cost of capital which 
consequently maximizes the firm's performance. Managers who are willing to 
recognize and maintain this appropriate mix minimize financing costs and improve 
their firm's performance. 
1.2 Motivation of research 
The role of debt level as a focal point in the capital structure theories is an important 
unsolved issue in the financial field. Trade-off theory suggests an optimal capital 
structure to achieve minimum weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Financial 
managers should devote their time and effort to these determinants. However, there 
are no studies to show whether the expected minimum cost of capital also reflects the 
maximum welfare of shareholders. Consequently, there is lack of research to 
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investigate whether determinants of capital structure directly affect shareholders' 
value. This is important for management in that, if the determinants of capital 
structure do not lead to increase shareholders' value, there is no need for financial 
managers to pay attention for those determinants. This research attempts to fill in this 
gap by investigating whether the link between the determinants of capital structure 
and a firm's performance exists in the UK context, and whether debt level plays a 
mediating role in such a relationship if it exists. 
Nevertheless, managers in practice may not pay attention to these determinants even if 
they have theoretical effects on the financial performance. Therefore, in this research 
we test the effect on the shareholders' value which reflects the performance of these 
managers. 
According to the above discussion, the importance of this study comes from many 
aspects. First, this is the first empirical study investigating the direct relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance in the 
UK context from the perspective of capital structure theories. 
Second, this is the first study testing the mediating role of debt level in the above 
relationship. Theoretically, the optimal mix of capital structure minimizes a firm's 
weighted average cost of capital; this maximizes the firm's financial performance in 
terms of shareholders' welfare. Consequently, debt level can act as a bridge between 
the determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance. 
Third, there is little evidence about the relationship between debt level and a firm's 
financial performance. The reason for considering this relation depends on the 
important role of debt as a control mechanism on the managers' behaviour, and the 
expected role of debt to align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Fourth, measuring a suitable financial performance which represents shareholders' 
value is considered one of the unsolved issues. This study considers four measures to 
reflect the shareholders' wealth. Additionally, the economic value added (EVA) as an 
important indicator is included in this study, which comes closer than any other to 
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capturing the true economic profit and the shareholders' value creation. To the best of 
the researcher's knowledge, no research has yet used this indicator in this concern in 
the UK capital market 
1.3 Research questions 
This study aims to answer these questions empirically: 
1. What are the most important determinants of a firm's capital structure in the 
UK capital market? 
2. What is the relationship between debt level and a firm's financial performance 
in the UK capital market? 
3. What is the relationship between the determinants of capital structure and a 
firm's financial performance in the UK capital market? 
4. Is there any mediating role for the debt level for the relationship between the 
determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance in the UK 
capital market? 
1.4 Research objectives 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this study are to investigate the direct relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and a firm's performance, and to test the 
mediating role of debt level for such relationship. 
To accomplish the above main goals, this study has targeted four objectives. 
The first objective is investigating the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and debt level to identify the most important determinants of the capital 
structure. The second objective is examining the relationship between the debt level 
and a firm's financial performance. The third objective is investigating the direct 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial 
performance. 
Investigating all previous three relationships is important to go further to achieve the 
fourth objective. Accordingly, the fourth important goal of this study is to test the 
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mediating role of debt level in the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and a firm's financial performance. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two discusses the theoretical literature of capital structure; it explains the 
background of capital structure theories which are concerned with the optimal mix of 
debt and equity in the financing structure. 
Chapter Three presents theoretical and empirical studies in the study field classified 
by subject. Under each sub-title, we present the available studies which support and 
contradict the results of this study. Theoretical and empirical justifications are offered 
for these results according to the capital structure theories and the previous studies. 
This assists the researcher in analyzing and justifying the results of this study which is 
explained extensively in the results discussion chapter. 
Chapter Four contains four sections that explore the process of developing the 
research hypotheses depends on the theoretical background in order to deal 
statistically with the study objectives and to answer the study questions. 
Chapter Five explains extensively the different measures for all variables in this 
research. For each variable, we discuss alternative measures used in previous studies 
and explain the justifications for such use. At the end of each section, we choose the 
most suitable factors supported by reasons and motivations to be selected in this study, 
The last section of this chapter presents how these variables are measured. 
Chapter Six describes the criteria to choose the study sample and period and describe 
the characteristics of the selected sample. Also it reveals the importance of selecting 
the sample firms and the study period. Additionally, we describe the importance of 
Stata as a data analysis and statistical software package and compare it with other 
software packages. Moreover, this chapter presents in detail the trends of variables 
and the descriptive analysis for the study variables. Furthermore, the transformation 
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process for the study data is explained extensively in discussing the importance of this 
process for this research. 
Chapter Seven presents the regression models, the reason for using cross-sectional 
and panel data statistics, pooled (OLS), fixed effects (FEM), and random effects 
(REM) models, panel data specification tests. Additionally, a detailed discussion for 
(Baron & Kenny 1986)'s method of testing the mediating role of a variable in a 
relationship; i. e., the mediating role of debt level for the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance. 
Chapter Eight discusses the regression results of static panel data and cross-sectional 
models including all regressions in the four stages mentioned above. All the above 
regressions are presented firstly without including the control factors followed by 
testing the effect of these control variables to see if it has any significant effect. 
Based on the regression analysis, Chapter Nine presents an extensive discussion for 
the study results including testing of the targeted hypotheses. Moreover, to organize 
this chapter properly and to get organized results, the researcher pulls all regression 
results together according to the related relationship and hypothesis. Additionally, the 
results' discussion of panel and cross-sectional analysis are also pulled together 
according to the related relationship and hypothesis. 
Finally, Chapter Ten summarizes all these chapters and presents the upshot of this 
study, findings and conclusions, theoretical and empirical contributions, implications 
and limitations of this research and finally offers recommendations and suggestions 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE 
REVIEW ON 
CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
THEORIES 
UniS 
2.1 Introduction 
The issue of capital structure is concerned with the optimal mix of debt and equity in 
the capital structure. This mix results in minimum weighted average cost of capital 
and this consequently maximizes the firm's financial performance in terms of 
shareholders' value. The optimal capital structure in the real world can be explained 
by the trading-off between the gains from debt and different related costs such as 
bankruptcy, financial distress and agency costs (Scott 1976) (Copeland & Weston 
1992). 
( 1958) leads the way to the theory of capital structure. They demonstrate that in a 
perfect world (no taxes, perfect and credible disclosure of all information and no 
transaction and agency costs), the level of debt in a firm's capital structure would 
have no impact on the firm's value and performance, as well as shareholders' value. 
After this initial work, capital structure mainly depends on theories which include 
corporate taxes, financial distress, agency costs, trade-off and signalling. In their later 
work, (Modigliani & Miller 1963) focus initially on the advantages of debt finance 
through the effects of corporate tax. Debt is useful through the trading-off between the 
benefits of tax reduction on interest payments and the costs of financial distress. 
(Miller 1977) continues their work and states that the firm has an incentive to use debt 
and will continue to use it until their additional supply drives up interest rates to the 
point where the tax advantages of interest deduction are completely offset by higher 
rates. 
Given the existence of the agency problem, (Jensen & Meckling 1976) demonstrate 
that the optimal capital structure mix will be at a level which results in minimum total 
agency costs. Consequently, this will continue up to the point where the agency cost 
of additional dollar amount of debt exactly equals the agency cost of the dollar 
amount of equity retired. 
An important issue related to the agency problem is the existence of information 
asymmetry between a firm's outsiders and insiders. Internal managers know better 
than outside investors about their firm's prospects, risks and values. This difference in 
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information between these two groups will affect the financing decisions. This leads 
to the pecking-order hypothesis of (Myers & MAJLUF 1984), who suggest that firms 
have a particular preference order for financing choices. They state that firms prefer 
internal finance (retained earnings and depreciation) over external finance (debt or 
equity). This is for the reason that inside finance will provide more information about 
the firm than would new equity holders. Therefore new equity holders will expect a 
higher rate of return on their invested capital, which would make it more costly for the 
firm to finance new projects than internal funds. Additionally, the pecking order 
hypothesis explains why equity issues reduce stock price but debt issues do not 
(Phillips & Sipahioglu 2004). 
Agency theory for free cash flows by (Jensen 1986) suggests that debt is used as a 
control mechanism. Debt can reduce the free cash flow and solve the over-investment 
behaviour or the investment in negative projects by committing the management to 
pay fixed interest payments. Signalling model developed by (Ross 1977) based also 
on the information asymmetry suggests that managers use debt to signal the firm's 
prospects to poorly informed outside investors. At the same time, debt issuance for 
poor prospects firms will result in a high probability of bankruptcy. 
The objective of this chapter is to present capital structure theories and their important 
role in determining the optimal mix of capital structure, and explore the background 
of the relationship between debt and a firm's financial performance according to the 
capital structure theories. 
2.2 Modigliani and Miller theory 
The theory of (Modigliani & Miller 1958) assumes that financing decisions do not 
matter in perfect capital markets. They demonstrate that in a perfect world-with no 
taxes, perfect and credible disclosure of all information and no transaction and agency 
costs-the level of debt in the firm's capital structure would have no impact on the 
firm's value, performance and shareholders' value. 
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2.2.1 Modigliani and Miller proposition one 
(Modigliani & Miller 1958) assume that the composition of the firm's capital 
structure is unimportant on the market value of all firms' securities, and consequently 
the firm's performance and shareholders' value. 
"The market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is 
given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate appropriate to its class. " 
This model depends on two keys, arbitrage and homemade alternative (borrowing on 
personal account). Arbitrage is the process that ensures that two firms differing only 
in their capital structure must have the same performance. At the same time the 
homemade alternative describes that an investor holding an equity stake in a levered 
firm can sell his stake, raise a personal loan equal to the share that he held in the 
levered firm, spend the proceeds in a firm that is not levered and increase his income 
without additional cost. They assume that the shares of the firms within a given class 
both have the same expected return and the same probability distribution of expected 
return, and therefore can be considered perfect substitutes for each other. 
2.2.2 Modigliani and Miller proposition two 
This proposition is derived from the first one and it concerns the performance of a 
common stock in companies whose capital structure contains some debt. The 
expected rate of return of a stock of any company belonging to a class is a linear 
function of the firm's leverage. 
"The expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate for a pure equity stream in the same risk class, plus a 
premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-equity ratio times the 
spread between the capitalization rate and the cost of debt. " 
Proposition two explains that the firm's assets will generate a stream of cash flows or 
profits, and the assessment of the firm's value will be the discounting of this stream 
using a discount rate appropriate to a company in a degree of business risk. In other 
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words, the firm's performance and value is derived solely from the stream of profits 
generated by its assets (Megginson 1997). The following graph represents proposition 
two of Modigliani and Miller: 
2.1 Modigliani and Miller proposition 2 
Rates of return 
Re=Expected return on equity 
Ra=Expected return on assets 
Rd = Expected return on debt 
Risk-free debt ` Riskv debt, D/E = debt/equity 
Source: Brealev and Mvers (2000) 
As shown in the figure above, as debt-equity ratio increases, the expected return on 
equity will also increase as long as the debt is risk-free. Nevertheless, and because 
leverage increases the risk of debt, the debtholders also require more return on their 
debt and this will cause the increase in the return on equity to slow down. 
Even (Modigliani & Miller 1958) theory seems to be irrelevant in practice but it leads 
the way to the theory of capital structure, and tells us a lot about the market 
imperfections which make a difference in the financing decisions like taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and so on. 
2.2.3 Modigliani and Miller proposition three 
Modigliani and Miller have expanded their work to correct their 1963 work and they 
include corporate taxes to the model of corporate valuation. They assume that the 
value of a levered firm equals the value of an un-levered firm plus a premium derived 
by discounting to perpetuity the stream of tax savings which is applicable so long as 
the firm has sufficient taxable capacity. 
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Because interest expenses are tax-deductible but dividends are not, this encourages 
firms to use more debt, and the value of the levered firm will equal that of an un- 
levered firm plus the present value of tax shields provided by debt (Modigliani & 
Miller 1958). 
In addition, the required rate of return by shareholders of the levered firm will have 
an addition to the required rate of return by an un-levered firm plus financial risk 
premium related to the corporate tax rate and the ratio of debt: equity. (Solomon 1963) 
states that the optimal point of using debt is the point at which the marginal cost of 
more debt exactly equals the company's average cost of capital. 
The relation between cost of capital and debt is shown in the following graph. 
2.2 Cost of capital and debt: 
Rates of Return Re=Expected return on equity 
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
(1-Tc)*r debt = after-tax expected return on debt 
Debt-Equity Ratio D/E 
Source: Brealey et al (1999) 
Depending on the work of (Modigliani & Miller 1958), (Miller 1977) modifies their 
theory by introducing both corporate and personal taxes. He states that the firm has an 
incentive to use debt, and will continue to do that until its additional supply of debt 
drives up interest rates to the point where the tax advantages of interest deduction are 
completely offset by higher rates. This will be the point at which the marginal 
investor's personal tax equals the corporate tax rate. Additionally, the advantage from 
using debt is zero if the income tax rates for stocks and bonds are equal, and the 
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firm's performance and value is independent of the method of financing, which is 
consistent with Modigliani and Miller's proposition one. 
In addition, (DeAngelo & Masulis 1980) depend on Miller's personal tax theory; they 
introduce accounting depreciation and investment tax credits. They state that these 
non-debt tax shields are sufficient to overcome the irrelevance of capital structure 
theory and will lead to the market equilibrium, and the optimal capital structure for 
the firm is the interaction of personal and corporate tax treatments of debt and equity. 
2.3 Financial distress costs 
In the real world, financial distress costs are likely to play an important role in 
defining the optimal mix of debt and equity. Financial distress is defined as the firm's 
inability to meet its financial obligations, which can lead to bankruptcy. In the case of 
financial distress, any firm is exposed to certain direct and indirect costs. Direct costs 
include expenses related to courts, lawyers, experts, accountants and administrative 
expenses of bankruptcy proceedings. Indirect costs are the economic losses that result 
from bankruptcy but not cash expenses spent on the process itself. These include: 
1. The diversion of management's time while bankruptcy is underway. 
2. The loss of sales volumes during and after the bankruptcy period. 
3. Constraints on capital investment and research and development expenditures. 
4. the loss of key employees after the firm becomes bankrupt (Megginson 1997). 
The probability of financial distress increases as debt increases, while the benefits of 
debt tax shields increases as debt increases. Firms should have a balance between tax 
benefits from debt and the risk of bankruptcy. The optimal capital structure will 
minimize the total cost of capital and then maximize the firm's performance and its 
market value (Baxter 1967) as shown in the following graph. 
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2.3 Cost of capital and the optimal capital structure: 
Cost of Capital 
:: 
itge 
r ""------------ "ý " cost of capital 
(WACC) 
...... .. -.......... _. -....... -.... _........ -------- Cost of debt 
Free- 
risk 
rate 
A Debt/Equity % 
Optimal capital structure 
Source: (Copeland & Weston 1992) 
The optimal capital structure (at point A above) is determined by increasing debt until 
the gain from debt is equal to the present value of the expected loss from bankruptcy 
costs (Copeland & Weston 1992). 
2.4 Agency costs and capital structure 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976) define the agency relationship inside the firm as: 
"A contract under which one or more person (the principal) engages 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent, " 
The agency problem will exist here because the agent will not behave perfectly in the 
interest of the principal. (Jensen & Meckling 1976) discuss agency costs as the key 
tool in evaluating alternative designs of principal-agent relations. They describe the 
agency costs as the sum of monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by the 
agent and the residual loss which is the reduction in the principal welfare as a result of 
the differences between the agent's and the principal's decisions. 
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2.4.1 Agency cost of outside equity 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976) observe that when the entrepreneur owns 100% of the firm, 
there is no separation between ownership and control. In this case, the entrepreneur 
bears all the costs and reaps all the benefits. Once a fraction of a of the firm is sold to 
outside investors, the entrepreneur bears only 1- a, and this will create an agency cost 
of equity. 
Another important conflict is that between managers and shareholders. Managers may 
avoid investing in profitable projects when their ownership inside the firm decreases, 
also they may reduce their efforts in searching for these profitable projects, and this 
will decrease the firm's performance and encourage managers to concentrate for their 
benefits rather than the shareholders' benefits. This behaviour can be eliminated by 
spending some of the firm's resources in different ways. This may include auditing, 
formal control systems, budget restrictions and incentive compensation systems. The 
main goal of these methods is to align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
2.4.2 Agency cost of debt 
Jensen and Meckling suggest three reasons preventing large firms from being 
financed with a large portion of debt. First, incentive effects related with a high 
portion of debt in the capital structure. Second, monitoring and bonding expenditures 
creation by the debt-holders and the owner-manager. Third, the existence of 
bankruptcy costs. 
First: managers with an entirely debt structure will have a strong incentive to 
undertake investments which promise high payoffs, keeping to themselves most of the 
gains. However, if these investments are unprofitable, debtholders will be charged 
most of the costs. Debtholders will grant a competitive debt cost that motivates 
managers not to transfer wealth to themselves or to shareholders. 
Second: debt-holders can limit the managerial behaviour through the conditions that 
have taken place in the legal contract between debtholders and the firm. This will be 
by including some conditions (provisions) that impose constraints on the 
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management's decisions such as future debt issuance. On the other hand, from the 
managers' point view these costs will directly affect the future cash flows of the firm 
since they reduce the market value of their claims. 
Finally, the probability of bankruptcy costs occurs when the firm cannot meet some 
current payments or obligations. In this case the stockholders have lost all claims on 
the firm, and the remaining loss is borne by the debt-holders. As a result, firms will 
use debt to the level of bankruptcy costs that make this usage of debt indifferent. In 
other words, managers will trade off the tax-related benefits of increasing debt against 
the bankruptcy and agency costs. 
2.4.3 Optimal capital structure 
Jensen and Meckling's model predicts that the manager of an individual firm, starting 
from an all-equity position, will substitute bonds for stock in the capital structure in 
order to reduce the agency costs of debt. As this process continues, the agency costs 
of equity begin to rise at an increasing rate. The optimal level of debt-equity ratio 
(value-maximization) is reached at the point where the agency cost of additional 
dollar of debt exactly equals the agency cost of the dollar of equity retired. 
2.4 Total agency cost and the optimal capital structure 
Agency 
Costs 
Total agency costs 
Minimum 
agency ............................. 
costs 
Debt agency 
Optimal Equity costs 
capital agency 
structure costs 
0 
Fraction of outside financing obtained from equity 
Source: Jensen and Mecking (1976) pp346 
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2.5 Trade-off theory 
The preceding arguments led to the development of the trade-off theory of capital 
structure. This theory states that the optimal capital structure is the trade off between 
the benefits of debt (i. e., the interest tax shields) and the costs of debt (i. e., the 
financial distress and agency costs) (Brigham & Houston 2004). The figure below 
clarifies the idea of this theory. 
2.5 The trade-off theory of capital structure: 
Firm value 
Firm's value in a perfect world 
Present value of 
interest tax shelter 
.,, Expected present value of 'ý., 
" 
financial distress 
.............. .................. ... ......... ..... Firm's value with bankruptcy 
ýT,, . costs: Actual 
firm value 
Firm value with no 
financial leverage 
0AB 
(Optimal amount of debt) Debt 
Source: (Brigham & Houston 2004) 
From the figure above, the straight line represents the firm's value in a world without 
bankruptcy costs; the curved line represents this value with these costs. The curved 
line rises as the firm moves from all equity to a small amount of debt toward point (A) 
in the figure. At this point, the expected present value of distress costs is minimal 
because the probability of distress is immaterial. Beyond point (A), the bankruptcy 
costs become increasingly important and the present value of these costs rises at an 
increasing rate, and they reduce the tax benefits of debt in an increasing rate. Between 
the points (A) and (B), bankruptcy costs will reduce but not offset the tax benefits of 
debt so the firm's value rises (at decreasing rate) as its debt ratio increases. At point 
(B), the rise of the present value of these costs from an additional amount of debt 
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equals the rise in the present value of the tax shields. This level of debt is the optimal 
level which maximises the value of the firm represented by (B) in the figure above. 
Beyond this point, bankruptcy costs exceed the tax shields and this implies a 
reduction in the firm's value for further leverage. So the firm's value of the levered 
firm will be the value of the un-levered firm plus the value of tax savings minus the 
present value of the expected costs of financial distress (Brealey & Myers 2000). 
Because interests are tax deductible, debt will be less expensive than other financing 
resources like common or preferred stocks, and then debt provides tax shelter benefits. 
Consequently the more debt a company uses, the higher its value and stock price. 
(Damodaran 1997) summarises the advantages and disadvantages of borrowing as 
shown in the following table. 
Table 2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of borrowing 
Advantages of borrowing Disadvantages of borrowing 
Tax benefits: Bankruptcy costs: 
1 Ii her tax rates = higher tax benefits Higher business risk = higher the costs 
Added discipline: Agency costs: 
Greater the separation between managers Greater the separation between managers 
and stockholders = greater the benefit and lenders = higher the costs 
Adopted from (Damodaran 1997) 
2.6 Pecking-order hypothesis 
The pecking-order hypothesis suggested by (Myers 1984) is based on four 
observations and assumptions about corporate financial behaviour: 
1. Firms prefer internal finance (retained earnings and depreciation) over external 
finance (debt or equity). The inside equity holders will have more information 
about the firm than other new equity holders, therefore new equity holders will 
expect a higher rate of return on capital invested which will be more costly for 
the firm to finance new projects than internal funds. 
2. It' external finance is required, the firm issues the safety security first, starting 
with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then 
equity as the last choice. 
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3. Firms adopt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment 
opportunities although dividend policy is sticky. Also the target payout ratios 
are only gradually adjusted to shifts on the extent of valuable investment 
opportunities. 
4. Sticky dividend policies and fluctuations in profitability and investment 
opportunities mean that internally-generated cash flows may be more or less 
than investment outlays. Managers try to offer consistent dividend payments 
regardless the profit changeability. 
Pecking-order theory states that the equity ratio will increase if the retained earnings 
are available to cover the proposed investment opportunities. On the other hand, the 
debt ratio will increase if the company takes the refuge of borrowing instead of 
issuing new common stocks. Also it presumes strict market imperfections (high 
transaction costs, uninformed investors, and managers who are completely motivated 
by the incentive of the firm stock market valuation) that are hard to accept as accurate 
portraits of modem capital markets as they are. 
In summary, pecking-order theory argues some important points. First, it is better to 
issue safe securities than risky ones, starting with bond markets from external 
financing, but raise equity by retention if possible. Second, firms whose investment 
opportunities exceed operating cash flows and have spent their ability to issue low 
risky debt, may forego good investments rather than issue risky securities to finance 
them. Third, firms can build up financial slack by restricting dividends when 
investment requirements are poor, and the cash saved is held as marketable securities. 
Finally, the firm should not pay dividends if it has to get back the cash by selling 
stock or other risky securities. 
In line with pecking-order theory, (Myers & MAJLUF 1984) state that the 
management's objectives under asymmetric information can choose any of these 
positions: 
I. Management acts in the interests of all shareholders, and ignores any conflict of 
interest between old and new shareholders. 
2. Management acts in old shareholders' interest, and assumes they are passive. 
UNS 20 
3. Management acts in old shareholders' interest, but assumes they are rationally 
rebalancing their portfolios as they learn from the firm's actions. 
The first two points according to (Megginson 1997) are the most important. This is 
because the asymmetric information assumption implies that managers could not 
convey information about their new positive investment opportunities. 
Managers have an incentive to announce remarkable new projects in order to bid up 
the firm's stock price, so they can sell shares at a high price. Investors are unable to 
verify these claims until long after the fact, and they will assign a low average value 
to the stocks of all firms. Then they will buy new equity issues only at a large 
discount from their equilibrium values without information asymmetries. Managers 
understand these problems, and in certain cases will refuse to accept positive net 
present value projects if this will require the issuing of new equity, since this will 
transfer the benefits to the new shareholders at the expense of the old. 
Pecking-order theory explains certain aspects of observed corporate behaviour better 
than other models. However, it fails to explain all the capital structure regularities 
observed in practice. For example it suffers in comparison with the trade-off theory to 
explain how taxes, bankruptcy costs and security issuance costs influence the firm's 
actual debt level. Furthermore, it ignores significant agency problems. 
2.7 Signalling and information asymmetry theory 
Many large successful firms, such as Intel and Microsoft, use far less debt than the 
theory suggests; this point led to the development of signalling theory (Brigham & 
Houston 2004). 
Managers generally have better information about their firms than do outside 
investors; i. e., asymmetric information. A Signal is defined by (Megginson 1997) as 
an action that imposes deadweight costs on the signaller in order to convey value to 
the poorly informed outsiders (investors). This signal is credible if it is prohibitively 
costly for a weaker firm to attempt to mimic. 
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The signalling model developed by (Ross 1977) provides a theory for the 
determination of the financial structure of the firm based on the asymmetric 
information problem between well-informed managers and poorly informed outsider 
shareholders. This model is based on the idea that managers have clear incentives to 
use signals to differentiate their firm from weaker competitors. One of these signals is 
using debt in the capital structure composition. Well-informed insiders according to 
this theory tend to convey the firm's positive information to the poorly informed 
outsiders to enhance the firm's performance. 
However, managers cannot simply announce that they have good news because every 
other manager has the same incentives to do so. Also shareholders will be doubtful 
about any self-serving statement which can be proven as time passes. One solution for 
this problem is for managers who have "good news, " i. e., those of high-value firms, 
to signal it to the investors by taking some action that is costly for managers who 
have "bad news, " i. e., those of low-value firms, to mimic. 
(Ross 1977) shows that high value firm managers can design an incentive-based 
compensation contract that encourages them to use high level debt in their capital 
structures. For less valuable firms it is hard to have the same strategy because it is 
more likely for these firms to fall in bankruptcy. So the equilibrium is established 
when high value companies depend on more debt financing and less value companies 
rely more on equity. 
(Megginson 1997) states that the signalling model explains the market responses to 
the different types of security issues. Debt issues signal good news and mean that 
managers are confident about the future which is followed by the firm's good 
performance. However, equity issues signal bad news and could mean that earnings 
will fall in the future and this is followed by the firm's poor performance. 
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2.8 Free cash flow theory 
Following the main agency theory as advanced by (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and the 
existence of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, (Jensen 1986) 
expanded the work to highlight an important problem, the free cash flow. 
"Free Cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have 
positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital "... (Jensen 
1986). 
Substantial free cash flows in the hands of managers can be used in increasing 
dividends or repurchasing stocks and thereby pay out current cash. Otherwise 
managers will invest in low-return projects. Debt is used to control the managers' 
opportunistic behaviour by reducing the free cash flows. This will prevent 
overinvestment or investment in negative projects by committing the management to 
pay fixed interest payments. 
Additionally, free cash flows can be used in issuing debt in exchange for stock. 
Managers are bonding their promise to pay future cash flows in a way that cannot be 
accomplished by simple dividend increases. Jensen calls this the "Control hypothesis" 
for debt creation. Debt creation without holding the proceeds of the issue can make 
managers bond the promise to pay out future cash flows, while debt provides a means 
of bonding managers' promises to pay out future cash flows rather than investing in 
wealth-destroying projects. 
2.9 Summary of chapter two: 
Chapter two discusses theoretical literature of capital structure. The issue of capital 
structure is concerned with the optimum mix of debt and equity in the financing 
structure and its expected role to affect the firm's value. 
Modigliani and Miller theory provides the background for the subsequent theories. 
They start their 1958 work assuming a perfect world. However, financial distress 
costs in the real world are playing an important role o in defining the optimal capital 
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structure. Agency problem is appeared since the agent will not behave perfectly in the 
interest of the principal and this includes the agency costs of debt and equity. Also, 
the existence of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders has a main 
role in determining the optimal capital structure. 
The preceding arguments led to the development of the trade-off theory of capital 
structure. This theory states that the optimal capital structure is the trade-off between 
the benefits of debt (i. e. the interest tax shields) and the costs of debt (i. e. the financial 
distress and agency costs. 
In addition, pecking order hypothesis assumes that it is better to issue safe securities 
than risky ones, starting with bond markets from external financing, but raise equity 
by retention if possible. Moreover, firms whose investment opportunities exceed 
operating cash flows, and which have spent their ability to issue low risky debt, may 
forego good investments rather than issue risky securities to finance them. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
LITERATURE 
REVIEW ON 
EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two introduced the capital structure theories which extensively discuss the 
process of determining the optimal capital structure, and the relationship between debt 
and performance. This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical studies in the 
capital structure determinants, debt and performance fields. 
The importance of determinants of capital structure is to find out the optimal mix of 
capital structure; this minimizes the firm's weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
The optimal capital structure mix affects the firm's performance in terms of 
shareholders' value. Consequently, debt can act as a bridge between determinants of 
capital structure and financial performance, and then determinants of capital structure 
can be important to the financial management. 
This chapter contains three sections: the first section presents theoretical and 
empirical studies investigating determinants of capital structure. The second section 
presents theoretical and empirical studies considering the relationship between debt 
level and performance. The third section presents the few available studies that 
investigate some factors in the direct relationship with the corporate performance. 
3.2 Empirical studies in the determinants of capital 
structure 
The determinants of capital structure selected in this research are due to the consensus 
in most of the previous studies. These previous studies suggest that leverage is a result 
of various firm attributes. The most important of these variables are asset structure, 
growth opportunities, profitability, size, effective tax rate, risk and liquidity. 
Theoretical and empirical studies show that specific characteristics of firms have a 
significant role in forming the capital structure decision. (Harris & Raviv 1991) 
summarize many studies in this context suggesting that most studies are sharing the 
flowing variables; tangibility of assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, 
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firm size, volatility, advertising expenses, research and development expenditures, 
probability of bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of the product. 
To prevent redundancy, the theoretical background of each variable is explained in 
details in the hypotheses development chapter. However, it is reasonable to refer 
briefly to the expected implications of these theories for each variable in the following 
section. 
3.2.1 Assets structure 
Although the theories anticipate a positive relationship between debt and the 
tangibility of assets, the effects in the empirical studies are different due to the use of 
different measures of debt and asset structure. 
Those who find a positive effect support the trading-off model, pecking-order 
hypothesis in terms of assets mispricing or under-investment, and agency theory due 
to the fact that assets act as a guarantee for debt and also have more liquidation value. 
These studies include (Rajan & Zingales 1995), (Thies & Klock 1992), (Dessi & 
Robertson 2003), (Colombo 2001), (Chen 2004), (HUANG & SONG 2006), 
(Krishnan & Moyer 1997), (Chung 1993), (Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis 
2004) and (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal 2008) using international data. 
Additionally, (Akhtar 2005) asserts that positive effects vary due to the firms' type 
(i. e., domestic or multinational corporations. (Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 2005) 
find a positive effect but depend on the level of debt (i. e., low, medium or high values 
of debt ratios). (Wald 1999) finds that in the UK the positive effect is less important 
than in other countries; this may indicate that the UK capital markets are effective at 
reducing moral hazard. 
On the other hand, (Ferri & Jones 1979) and (Balakrishnan & Fox 1993) strongly 
confirm a negative relationship with the debt level due to the use of intangible assets 
(R&D expenditures). This supports the fact that intangible assets are not redeployable, 
and this limits the borrowing capacity of the firm. Also, (Titman & Wessels 1988) 
state that firms with specialized or unique products face more costs in the terms of 
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liquidation, therefore they are likely to be less levered. These results have been 
supported by (Harris & Raviv 1991), (Bhaduri 2002), (Kochhart & Hitt 1998), 
(Ghosh & Cai 2000) and (Wald 1999) using international data. 
However, (Cassar & Holmes 2003), (Bevan & Danbolt 2002) find contradicted results 
depending on the debt measures used. (Panno 2003) also has contradicted results 
justifying that if a company has more fixed assets, this can be an indication of less 
current assets or liquid assets and that might lead to a negative relationship with extra 
debt. 
Finally, (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004) find insignificant relationship for 
Asian countries (except Australia) due to two reasons, the concentrated ownership 
structure and the close relationship between firms and lenders which minimises the 
need for collateral. 
3.2.2 Growth opportunities 
Those who find a negative effect support the trade-off theory, Myers' under- 
investment hypothesis and agency theory. These studies include (Rajan & Zingales 
1995), (Titman & Wessels 1988), (Harris & Raviv 1991), (Akhtar 2005), (Chung 
1993), (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004), (Ozkan 2001), (Ghosh & Cai 2000), 
(HUANG & SONG 2006), (Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002) and (Antoniou, Guney, & 
Paudyal 2008) using international data. 
On the other hand, some studies find a positive effect supporting the signalling model 
and the pecking-order theory. These include (Chen 2004), (Colombo 2001), (Cassar & 
Holmes 2003), (Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis 2004), (Michaelas & 
Chittenden 1999) and (Thies & Klock 1992). (Dessi & Robertson 2003) also find a 
positive effect confirming that growth rates do not clearly reflect the profitable growth 
opportunities, especially that these opportunities are not likely to be the same during 
all periods. 
Studies which depend on many countries reveal different effects among these 
countries. For example, (Wald 1999) finds a positive effect for France, Germany, 
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Japan and the UK, but negative for the US. This corresponds with the results of 
(Bhagat & Welch 1995), who find a negative effect for US and a positive for Japanese 
firms. 
Those who show contradicted effects include (Bevan & Danbolt 2002), who find a 
negative relationship using market value for debt, but insignificant using the book 
value. Also, (Bhaduri 2002) finds that growth has a positive relationship with long- 
term debt but is insignificant in the short term. (Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 
2005) find a positive impact for low values of debt ratios, but a negative effect with 
high debt levels. Furthermore, (Singh & Nejadmalayeri 2004) reveal negative effect 
for domestic firms but insignificant effect for the multinational. 
Finally, (Titman & Wessels 1988), reveal that expected growth has no effect on 
leverage, and this result is supported later by (Krishnan & Moyer 1997). 
3.2.3 Profitability 
Most of those who find a negative effect support the pecking-order theory and agency 
theory. These studies include (Harris & Raviv 1991), (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & 
Pescetto 2004), (Bevan & Danbolt 2002), (Titman & Wessels 1988), (Akhtar 2005), 
(Allen & Mizunot 1989), (Chen 2004), (HUANG & SONG 2006), (Voulgaris, 
Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis 2004), (Ghosh & Cai 2000), (Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua 
2002), (Cassar & Holmes 2003), (Dessi & Robertson 2003), (Thies & Klock 1992), 
(Baker 1973c) and (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal 2008) for both capital market- 
oriented (UK and US) and bank-oriented firms (France, Germany, and Japan). 
Also, (Wald 1999) finds a negative effect for all countries but less significance in the 
UK, Germany and France. He attributes these results to the following reasons; first, 
the institutional features for these countries. Second, these countries are successful in 
reducing the asymmetric information problem. Third, the usage of debt as a 
management discipline device. These findings are in agreement with (Rajan & 
Zingales 1995) for the UK justifying that the dominant source for external finance in 
the UK is equity. They also find the same results using book and market leverage for 
all G7 countries except Germany and it is insignificant in France. 
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Those who show contradicted effects include (Bhaduri 2002) who finds a negative 
relationship with short-term borrowing, but positive with long-term borrowing 
following the trade-off model. These findings are similar to (Ozkan 2001) who reveals 
negative effect consistent with pecking-order theory. However, he finds that the 
lagged profits have a positive and significant effect with leverage supporting the 
trade-off model. Meanwhile, (Panno 2003) finds a negative effect, and his study 
reveals some evidence of a positive effects consistent with trade-off model. 
Finally, (Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 2005) and (Krishnan & Moyer 1997) 
cannot prove that profitability is an important factor in the leverage decision. 
3.2.4 Firm size 
Those who find a positive effect support the agency theory in terms of the need for 
debt to monitor the managers' behaviours. Large firms' ownership is more 
widespread and owners are too far away to take the primary role in controlling 
activities. The positive effect also supports the trade-off theory which assumes that 
large firms are stronger to face bankruptcy and financial distress. It also supports the 
asymmetric information theory that size reflects the amounts of information outside 
investors have. 
Those studies include (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004), (Krishnan & Moyer 
1997), (Colombo 2001), (IHUANG & SONG 2006), (Voulgaris, Asteriou, & 
Agiomirgianakis 2004), (Chung 1993), (Maxis & Elayan 1990), (Singh & 
Nejadmalayeri 2004), (Cassar & Holmes 2003), (Dessi & Robertson 2003), (Bhaduri 
2002) and (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal 2008) using international evidence. 
Those who find a negative effect include (Titman & Wessels 1988), who find a 
negative effect on short-term debt reflecting the high transaction costs for small firms 
in the case of issuing long-term securities. Also, small firms use more short-term debt 
than large firms. 
Those who show contradicted effects include (Ozkan 2001), who shows double 
effects. He supports the trade-off theory for a positive effect, and the asymmetric 
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information for a negative effect. Also (Bevan & Danbolt 2002) find a positive effect 
for the gearing book value, while using the market values reveals an insignificant 
effect, claiming that no theory can provide clear expectations for such a relationship. 
Additionally, (Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 2005) find a positive impact at low 
values of debt ratios, but a negative effect at high levels of debt ratios. They suggest 
that as firms become highly levered, they might no longer be able to use debt at 
favourable terms regardless of their size. Also, (Chen 2004) finds a negative effect on 
long-term leverage but positive on total leverage, justifying that for two reasons: the 
ease for large firms to access to capital markets and the low bankruptcy costs due to 
the ownership structure in Chinese firms. 
Studies which depend on many countries have different effects among these countries. 
For example, (Rajah & Zingales 1995) find a positive effect for all countries except 
Germany, which reveals a negative sign with no strict reason for such a relationship. 
Also, (Akhtar 2005) finds a positive effect for both multinational and domestic firms 
supporting the trade-off theory. However, he finds that the diversification coefficient 
for multinational firms is negative suggesting that foreign geographical diversification 
is an advantage without increasing the firms' default risk. 
Additionally, (Panno 2003) reveals a positive effect for Italy but negative and 
insignificant for the UK, justifying that small firms are weaker to face the liquidation 
risk in case of financial distress. Moreover (Wald 1999) find a positive effect on long- 
term debt for all countries except Germany firms which reveal a negative effect, and 
insignificant in France, these two countries having less developed debt markets. 
3.2.5 Risk 
The reasons of those who find contradiction or insignificant relation between a firm's 
risk and debt level-as suggested by Cassar and Holmes 2003-may be due to their 
risk proxies. (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004) state that if the liquidation cost 
is low; firms may ignore the volatility of earnings. Those studies include (Allen & 
Mizunot 1989), (Titman & Wessels 1988), (HUANG & SONG 2006; Maris & Elayan 
1990). Additionally, (Thies & Klock 1992) find a negative effect on long-term debt 
but a positive one on short-term debt. (Wald 1999) finds a negative effect on leverage 
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for US firms but a positive one for Japan, France and UK. Finally, (Ghosh & Cai 2000) 
find a quadratic relationship between debt level and a firm's risk, first increasing and 
then decreasing. 
Those who find a negative relation between risk and debt level support the trade-off 
theory in that high-risk firms find debt less attractive. This theory assumes that costs 
of bankruptcy and financial distress reduce the firm's incentive to use debt, because 
firms may not be able to fulfil their debt commitments. These studies include (Panno 
2003) and (Cassar & Holmes 2003). 
Studies which find a positive effect supporting the agency theory and the managerial 
risk aversion include (Dessi & Robertson 2003) and (Chung 1993). 
3.2.6 Non-debt tax shield 
Those who find a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt support 
the trade-off theory that the major motivation of using debt over equity is the 
avoidance of corporate tax. Higher non-debt tax shields reduce the potential tax 
benefits of debt. Those studies include (Ozkan 2001), (Allen & Mizunot 1989), 
(Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004), (HUANG & SONG 2006), (Wald 1999) and 
Kahle and Shastri (2005). 
In contrast to the trade-off theory, (Titman & Wessels 1988) find a reverse (positive) 
relationship due to the use of the operating income in the dominator instead of total 
assets. Non-debt tax shields scaled by operating income have a strong negative 
correlation with the operating income scaled by total assets. Moreover, (Bradley, 
Jarrell, & Kim 1984) justify the positive relation due to the omission of an important 
variable in their analysis which may have a relationship with the non-debt tax shields. 
(Krishnan & Moyer 1997) show contradicted effects; they find that tax rate is 
significant using total debt but insignificant using long-term debt. Others reveal that 
non-debt tax shields have no effect on debt level, including (Akhtar 2005) and 
(Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002). 
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3.2.7 Liquidity 
Those who find a negative relation between liquidity and debt level support the 
pecking-order hypothesis and agency theory. The pecking-order hypothesis states that 
high liquidity firms use internal resources instead of external to finance their projects. 
Those who support the pecking-order hypothesis include (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & 
Pescetto 2004) and (Panno 2003). On the other hand, relying on the agency theory, 
(Ozkan 2001) justifies the negative effect by the potential conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders. He states that liquidity of a firm's assets can be taken as 
evidence to show the extent to which these assets can be manipulated by shareholders 
at the expense of bondholders. 
3.3 Empirical studies of debt and performance 
The relationship between debt level and a firm's performance is a focal point for most 
of the capital structure theories especially agency theory, asymmetric information 
theory and trade-off theory. 
The agency theory for free cash flows by (Jensen 1986) suggests that the use of debt 
can reduce the free cash flow available to managers and constrain or encourage them 
to act more in the interests of shareholders. Debt is used to control the managers' 
opportunistic behaviour by reducing the free cash flows in their hands. This will 
prevent the investment in negative projects by committing the management to pay 
fixed interest payments. 
The asymmetric information model assumes that managers generally have better 
information about their firm's than outside investors. Well-informed insiders tend to 
convey the firm's positive information to the poorly informed outsiders to enhance the 
firm's performance. According to signalling theory, managers have clear incentives to 
use signals to differentiate their firm from weaker competitors. One of the important 
signals employed in this concern is the use of debt. Debt signals good news and 
means that managers are confident about the future which is followed by the firm's 
superior performance. However, equity signals bad news and possibly means that 
earnings will fall in the future which indicates the firm's poor performance. 
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The trade-off theory by (Miller 1977) states that the firm has an incentive to use debt 
and will continue to do so until their additional supply drives up interest rates to the 
point where the tax advantages of interest deduction are completely offset by higher 
rates. In other words, the firm will use the debt until the optimal level of debt which 
occurs by the trading-off between benefits and costs of that debt. The appropriate 
capital structure mix minimizes a firm's cost of capital which consequently 
maximizes net returns for the firm. Managers who are willing to recognize and 
maintain this appropriate mix minimize financing costs and improve the firm's 
performance. 
The next section will present the available studies which reflect empirically the 
relationship between debt level and performance. 
Those who find no significant relationship between debt level and performance 
support Modigliani and Miller's (1958) theory which states that capital structure has 
no effect on the firm's value. Also it supports the argument about the optimal capital 
structure by (Miller 1977) model which states that the advantages of corporate tax will 
be offset with the personal income tax and then leverage is irrelevant. Those 
researchers include (Phillips & Sipahioglu 2004) for UK hotels, (Krishnan & Moyer 
1997) for Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. However, they find that 
performance and capital structure are affected by the country of origin. 
Additionally, (Murphy 1968) finds that long-term debt has no significant relation with 
a firm's performance using rate of return on common equity (ROE), growth of sales 
per share, net income before taxes, cash flows, growth in price, price to earning P/E 
and dividend yield. 
On the other hand, those who find a negative relationship between debt level and 
performance support Myers and Majluf s (1984) argument that because external 
finance is more costly than internal funds, highly levered firms may forego positive 
net present value projects which may affect performance adversely. Also they support 
the agency conflicts because firms employ more than appropriate level of debt in 
capital structure, thus negatively influencing performance. These include (Singh & 
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Faircloth 2005) using the growth rate of earnings per share, future growth 
opportunities, net profit margin, and operating cash flow. They find that more debt 
leads to lower long-term capital investments and that in turn leads to lower corporate 
performance. Also, (Forbes 2002) finds that firms with higher debt ratios tend to have 
lower net income growth. Also, (Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur 2000) test the 
interrelationship between culture, capital structure and performance for 14 European 
countries. They confirm a significant and negative relationship between capital 
structure and financial performance return on assets, profit margin and growth in sales, 
but a positive and significant relationship with the sales per employee. Finally, 
(Chang Aik Leng 2004) studied the effect of corporate governance practices on a 
firm's performance, and found that borrowing ratio has a negative effect on earnings 
performance using return on equity. 
Using Tobin's Q as a performance measure for UK firms for the period 1967 to 1989 
unbalanced panel data, (Dessi & Robertson 2003) find that debt has a highly 
significant positive impact on expected performance. 
(Thompson, Wright, & Robbie 1992) find contradicted results depend on the 
performance measure used. Although, they find no evidence that leverage produces 
improvements on returns to total capital, but they find a positive and significant effect 
in explaining the excess returns to equity investors. Also, (Campello 2006) finds 
mixed effects; he finds that debt increases sales performance until a specific point, 
and then additional debt leads to sales underperformance, as well as affecting the 
product market performance negatively. 
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3.4 Empirical studies of determinants of capital 
structure and performance 
To the best of the researcher's knowledge, there is no comprehensive study between 
determinants of capital structure and financial performance. Meanwhile, size- 
performance and risk-performance relationships are well investigated in previous 
studies; however, few studies have highlighted the relationship between firm's 
characteristics and its financial performance. The following section summarizes all 
available studies in this concern. 
3.4.1 Assets structure with performance 
(Shergill & Sarkaria 1999) investigate the impact of industry and firm characteristics 
on the firm-level financial performance for the period 1980-1990 and cover 171 
Indian firms in twenty-one industry groups. Using the difference between the firm's 
performance rates and the market average (ROE, ROA and others), they find that 
capital intensity is positively related to the financial performance. They use two sets 
of measures to reflect the financial performance: return on equity and return on assets 
as indicators for a firm's profitability on one hand, and growth in sales, growth in 
dividends, and growth in net total assets as measures for growth on the other hand. 
3.4.2 Growth opportunities with performance: 
In the light of the free cash flows hypothesis, (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx 2000) 
for Maryland-USA find a strong positive relationship between sales growth and a 
firm's financial performance in terms of stockholders' returns and return on assets. 
Additionally, (Hutchinson & Gul 2006) for the top 500 Australian companies find that 
firms with high investment opportunities are associated with lower agency costs and 
better return on equity. (Axinn 1988a), using Ontario and Michigan (USA) data, finds 
that export-based growth opportunities link positively with firm export performance. 
Finally, (Amidu 2007b), using return on equity and return on assets for Ghana, finds 
support for the fact that growing firms have a prospect of generating more returns for 
the owners. 
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3.4.3 Size and performance 
Many studies investigate the relationship between size and performance. Those who 
find a positive effect for a firm's size support the arguments that size reflects greater 
diversification, economies of scale production, greater access to new technology and 
cheaper sources of funds. These studies include (Orser, Hogarth-Scott, & Riding 2000) 
using Canadian firms using changes in gross revenue to reflect performance, (Shergill 
& Sarkaria 1999) for Indian firms also confirm a positive relationship between a 
firm's size and financial performance. On the other hand, (Goodman, Peavy III, & 
Cox 1986), using Standard and Poor's 400 firms and stock returns to reflect financial 
performance, and (Forbes 2002), using firms from 42 countries and changes in four 
variables to reflect performance (i. e., sales, net income, market capitalization, and 
assets), find an inverse relationship between size and performance. However, (Moen 
1999) for Norwegian companies finds that export performance is not subject to the 
firm's size (employment). He finds that small firms are just as successful as large 
firms, and the main competitive advantages are their products and technology. 
3.4.4 Risk and performance 
Numerous studies investigate the relationship between risk and performance. Among 
others who confirm the positive relationship between a firm's risk and financial 
performance, for example, these include (Shergill & Sarkaria 1999) for Indian firms, 
(Dewan, Shi, & Gurbaxani 2007) using the Fortune 1000 and the total firm value to 
reflect performance, (Loudon 2006) for 15 markets, comprising a mix of developed 
and emerging markets using equity returns. 
Other studies that use excess stock market returns find also a positive relationship 
include (Ludvigson & Ng 2007) using large data sets in different US markets, (BALI 
T. & Peng L. 2006) for the S&P 500 index, (Tang & Shum 2004) for the Singapore 
stock market, (Tang & Wai 2006) in the Hong Kong stock market, (Assaf 2005) for 
the Canadian stock exchange and (Girard, Rahman, & Zaher 2001), using nine Asian 
capital markets and the U. S. 
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3.4.5 Non-debt tax shields and performance 
To the best of researcher's knowledge, no studies investigate the relationship between 
non-debt tax shields and performance. However, (Forbes 2002) uses the depreciation 
for firms from 42 countries and finds that in the year after depreciation, firms have 
significantly higher growth in market capitalization. 
3.4.6 Liquidity and performance 
To the researcher's knowledge, no studies address this relationship except (Wang 
2002), who addresses the liquidity management. He investigates the liquidity 
management and its relationship with performance and corporate value using data of 
Taiwan and Japan. Furthermore, he observes that the cash conversion cycle (CCC)i 
has a negative relationship with the financial performance measured by returns on 
assets (ROA) or returns on equity (ROE) and this relationship is sensitive to industry 
factors. Furthermore, he finds that aggressive liquidity management enhances 
operating performance. 
'The CCC focuses on the length of time between the company making payments and receiving cash 
flows. In other words, it is the net time interval between actual cash expenditures on af ='s purchase 
of productive resources and the recovery of cash receipts from product sales. 
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3.5 Summary of chapter three: 
Chapter three presents the theoretical and empirical studies in the capital structure and 
its determinants fields. Also, it explains the available few empirical studies 
investigating the relationship between debt and financial performance. In addition, 
there are very little studies investigate the relationship between the determinants of 
capital structure and the financial performance from different points of view; these 
available studies are explained in this chapter. This chapter is classified by the 
subject; under each sub-title we present the available studies which support the 
positive, negative, insignificant, and contradicted results. Furthermore, we present the 
theoretical and/or specific reasons for these results according to the previous studies. 
This assists the researcher in analyzing and justifying the results of this research 
which is explained in the results discussion chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
and RESEARCH 
MODEL 
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4.1 Introduction 
Reasonable numbers of studies investigate the relationship between the determinants 
of capital structure and the firm's debt level. This research aims to expand these 
studies' findings and investigate whether these determinants also are related to the 
firm's performance directly or through the expected relationship between debt and 
performance. Debt is used to mitigate the agency costs of outside equity and increases 
a firm's performance by committing managers to act in the interest of shareholders. If 
there is such a relationship between determinants of capital structure and the firm's 
performance, managers should take these determinants in consideration for financing 
their capital structure. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The hypotheses development section will 
discuss the theoretical background as a base to build up the research hypotheses. The 
second section represents the research model: variables will be summarized with 
appropriate relationships that reflect the expected relationships among those variables 
which form the research model. 
4.2 Hypotheses development 
In reflection of the study problem, this study has four sets of hypotheses development. 
First, a set of hypotheses represent the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and debt level. Although the previous studies investigate the determinants of 
capital structure, it is worthwhile to assure that this relationship is still valid especially 
in our sample for the period selected. The second hypothesis investigates the 
relationship between debt level and a firm's financial performance. The third group of 
hypotheses represents the direct relationship between determinants of capital structure 
and a firm's financial performance. Finally, the mediating role of debt will be 
assigned a hypothesis gathering the determinants of capital structure and the debt 
level together to be regressed on the financial performance. Additionally, for each 
relationship, different control variables will be discussed at the end of each section. 
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4.2.1 Determinants of capital structure 
Theoretically, the capital structure can be determined through several factors. This 
study will test the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the debt 
level combining all variables affecting the determination of capital structure. 
Therefore, next section discusses different thiories lies behind the role of each factor 
in determining the debt level. Seven determinants have been discussed for the first 
relationship, moreover, the theoretical background of industry and ownership 
structure as control variables are discussed at the end of this section. 
4.2.1.1 Assets structure 
Agency theory suggests that collateralized assets can be used as a monitoring 
instrument to control managers, and prevent threats of transferring wealth from debt- 
holders to shareholders. Lenders require collateral since it is considered an explicit 
promise over debt. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between assets 
structure (tangibility) and debt level. 
Transaction cost economies by (Williamson 1988) demonstrate that when assets 
become more redeployable, firms prefer debt over equity in financing decisions. 
Tangible assets have less asset specificity; accordingly, this feature maximizes its 
benefit as collateralization for debt which also increases the lenders' guarantee. On 
the other hand, assets' specificity for intangible assets creates difficulties in finding 
credit because they are non-redeployable or non-collateralizable. As a result, this also 
will suggest a positive relationship between collateral of assets and debt level. 
Trade-off theory assumes that firms with tangible assets are stronger to face financial 
distress, and these assets make debt more secured. Tangibility of assets increases the 
liquidation value of the firm, and decreases the hazards of mispricing and the 
difficulties of financial loss in the case of bankruptcy. Therefore, this theory also 
expects a positive relationship. 
The pecking-order hypothesis assumes that firms prefer debt over equity. This is due 
to the fact that debt is considered more secured, and has less agency costs. The 
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demand of debt will be covered by collateral assets. Therefore, the more the 
tangibility of assets, the more the secured debt, and also a positive relationship is 
expected. 
On the other hand, (DeAngelo & Masulis 1980) state that if the proportion of fixed 
assets provides a reasonable proxy for the availability of depreciation tax shields, 
firms with high levels of depreciation would be expected to have low levels of debt. 
Therefore, this will involve a negative relationship between tangibility and debt level. 
This research will follow the majority of capital structure theories which expect a 
positive relationship between tangibility of assets and debt level represented in the 
following hypothesis: 
HI-1: There is a positive relation between assets' tangibility and debt. 
4.2.1.2 Growth opportunities 
Banks can be more likely to lend firms who present superior growth rates or when 
considering valuable future firms' growth opportunities (Chen 2004). 
Pecking-order theory assumes that growing firms depend on internal funds more than 
external funds. Additionally, growth opportunities could be an indicator for the firm's 
success and the level of its profitability. Therefore, this leads to a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and debt level. However, firms with rapid 
growth opportunities are looking for more debt due to the lack of their internal 
earnings (Michaelas & Chittenden 1999). In this special case, a positive relationship is 
expected. 
Trade-off theory considers future growth opportunities as intangible assets which 
cannot be collateralized. Accordingly, firms with intangible assets use less debt than 
those holding tangible assets. According to these arguments, a negative relationship is 
expected between growth opportunities and debt level. 
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Agency theory has a dual role; it assumes that growth opportunities enlarge managers' 
power by increasing the resources under their control. Therefore, debt is needed here 
to control the managers' opportunistic behaviour. To the contrary, firms with high 
future investment opportunities might have fewer debt levels due to the fear of the 
debtholders to restrict firms from invest in valuable investment opportunities and 
exproperiate wealth to themselves on the account of shareholders. Therefore, a 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt level is expected. 
Because of the information asymmetries problem, many firms with high future growth 
opportunities which tend to issue risky debt, may forego this option because it reduces 
the shareholders' value and transfers wealth to debtholders. Therefore, a negative 
relationship is also expected between growth opportunities and debt level. 
Signalling theory assumes that past investments can be a signal of good news. This 
means that managers are confident about the future, and may be followed by positive 
performance response. Firms with high future growth opportunities are able to use 
more debt because of the dead weight costs of debt funds. On the other hand, less 
valuable companies use less debt because of high debt cost. These firms are more 
likely to fall into bankruptcy. Therefore, this indicates a positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and debt level. 
This research will follow the majority of capital structure theories which expect a 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt level as represented in 
the following hypothesis: 
HI-2: There is a negative relation between growth opportunities and debt. 
4.2.1.3 Profitability 
Current profitability can be a good indicator to expect the future trends of profits. 
Although many theoretical studies have taken place since (Modigliani & Miller 1958), 
no consensus in the relationship between profitability and debt level has been 
accomplished. 
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Trading-off theory assumes that profitable firms are stronger to face financial distress 
and bankruptcy costs than firms of low profitability. This theory expects a positive 
relationship between profitability and debt level. 
Pecking-order theory postulates that firms prefer internal resources in financing 
decisions. This means that profitable firms may have less debt, and the last choice will 
be the costly issuing of new equities. This also indicates a negative relationship 
between profitability and debt level. 
Asymmetric information problems between the firm and outsiders include that 
managers prefer internal financing if they cannot convey credible information to the 
outsiders. This also indicates a negative relationship between profitability and debt 
level. 
According to agency theory, profitable firms prefer not to raise external equity in 
order to avoid potential dilution of ownership. On the other hand, controlling 
shareholders prefer rising of debt level to ensure that managers pay out profits rather 
than build empires. Issuing of debt is also to prevent others from threatening their 
shareholding dominance by sharing the controlling position which results from the 
issuance of new equities. This indicates a positive relationship between profitability 
and debt level. 
According to the above discussion, because capital structure theories give different 
implications for the relationship between profitability and debt level, this research 
assumes either a negative or positive relationship between profitability and debt level 
as is shown in the following hypothesis: 
HI 3: There is either a negative or positive relation between profitability and debt. 
4.2.1.4 Firm size 
Agency theory expects a dual role for the relationship between a firm's size and debt 
level. First, a large firm's ownership is more widespread than a small firm's. Also, the 
owners of large firms are too far away to take a primary role in controlling activities 
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inside the company. Therefore these large companies prefer long-term debt to have a 
good control over managers. This argument suggests a positive relationship between a 
firm's size and debt level. 
On the other hand, if controlling roles are played by managers who are more 
interested in their benefits over the shareholders' benefits, they will prefer less debt to 
avoid the bankruptcy risks which includes personal loss. This behaviour by managers 
grows in significance along with the firm's size. When the firm becomes larger, the 
management power becomes greater in controlling the company's resources. This 
affects the management efficiency in dealing with the external environment, 
Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between a firm's size and debt level. 
Similarly, large firms need less debt as a monitoring tool because they can avoid such 
costs in the case of economies of scale. Large investors or the market occupy this 
monitoring role in these firms and this also reflects a negative relation between a 
firm's size and debt level. 
In terms of information asymmetries, size reflects the amount of information an 
outside investor has. As a result, large firms should have more information 
transparency and disclose more information than small firms. Due to this reason, 
firms with less asymmetric information problems should have more equity and 
consequently lower debt. This conveys a negative relationship between a firm's size 
and debt level. 
Trading-off theory assumes that large firms are more diversified, have lower risk, 
better reputation, more stable cash flows and fewer hazards to be liquidated. This 
gives large firms easier access to the capital markets with negligible debt costs. Thus 
these firms are stronger to face bankruptcy and financial distress. Consequently, a 
positive relationship between a firm's size and debt level is expected. 
According to the above discussion, and because capital structure theories give 
different implications for the relationship between a firm's size and debt level; this 
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research assumes either a negative or positive relationship between a firm's size and 
debt level represented in the following hypothesis: 
Hl-4: There is either a negative or positive relationship between a firm's size and 
debt. 
4.2.1.5 Risk 
As debt involves a commitment of periodic payments, highly leveraged firms are in 
danger of financial distress costs while facing a near bankruptcy situation. Trade-off 
theory assumes that costs of bankruptcy and financial distress reduce the firm's 
incentive to use debt financing. Higher volatility of earnings increases the probability 
of financial distress and bankruptcy costs because firms may not be able to fulfil their 
debt commitments. As a result, a firm's debt capacity decreases with increases in 
earnings volatility. This leads to an expected inverse (negative) relationship between a 
firm's risk and debt level. 
From the agency theory perspective, debt is used as a disciplinary device to prevent 
managers from transfer resources to their own personal benefits or invest in negative 
projects. The more the probability of agency costs, the more the debt needed. This 
expects a positive relationship between firm's risk and debt level. 
According to the above discussion, and because capital structure theories give 
different implications for the relationship between a firm's risk and debt level, this 
research assumes either a negative or positive relationship between a firm's risk and 
debt level as represented in the following hypothesis: 
HI-S: There is either a negative or positive relationship between risk and debt. 
4.2.1.6 Non-debt tax shield 
Tax benefits of interest deductibility are considered as the cornerstone of the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. Interest payments associated to debt are tax deductible, 
while payments associated with equity such as dividends are not tax deductible. 
(DeAngelo & Masulis 1980) state that non-debt tax shields can be considered 
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alternatives of debt tax benefits. Therefore, the major motivation of using debt over 
equity is the saving of corporate tax. Higher non-debt tax shields reduce the potential 
tax benefits of debt; hence a negative effect is expected between non-debt tax shields 
and debt level. 
This research assumes a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt 
level following this hypothesis: 
HI-6: There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt. 
4.2.1.7 Liquidity 
Liquidity is the firm's ability to meet its short-term obligations; it is defined as the 
ratio of current assets to current liability. Liquidity has various impacts on the capital 
structure choice. First, firms with high liquidity may have high debt because of their 
ability to meet short-term liabilities which means a positive relationship between 
liquidity and debt level. On the other hand according to the pecking-order theory, high 
liquidity firms have the choice to use their assets as an internal financing source 
instead of issuing debt to finance their projects. This indicates a negative relationship 
with debt. Moreover, in regards to agency theory, liquidity of the company's assets 
can be used to show the extent to which these assets can be manipulated by 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders (Prowse 1990). This implies a negative 
relationship between liquidity and debt level. 
According to the above discussion, and because capital structure theories give 
different implications for the relationship between a firm's liquidity and debt level, 
this research assumes either a negative or positive relationship between a firm's 
liquidity and debt level represented in the following hypothesis: 
HI- 7: There is either a negative or a positive relationship between liquidity and debt. 
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4.2.1.8 Control variables for the first relationship 
4.2.1.8.1 Industry 
Funding requirements are likely to vary by industry (Watson 2006). Trade-off theory 
assumes that firms within the same industry are similar in their capital structures since 
they have equivalent types of assets, business risks and profitability (Phillips & 
Sipahioglu 2004). Firms in the same industry class face the same business risk 
because they share the same technology in producing the same products as well as 
using similar raw materials and labour costs (Ferri & Jones 1979). 
Reasonable number of studies supporting this argument include (Akhtar 2005), who 
finds that the Australian multinational corporations that belong to the basic materials, 
energy and industrial industries have a significant positive relationship with level of 
debt. As for domestic firms that belong to the basic materials, consumer cyclical and 
telecommunication industries, they have a significant negative relationship with debt 
level. Also, (Allen & Mizunot 1989), for Japanese industrial and commercial 
companies suggest that industry factors play an important part in the determination of 
capital structure. (Baker 1973b), for Michael Mann's industries, reveals that firms in 
the same industrial field tend to have similar amounts of leverage. (Bhaduri 2002) 
states for Indian firms that the choice of capital structure is affected by factors 
including product and industry characteristics. Also, (Chung 1993) states that industry 
regulation has a strong positive effect on the long-term debt capacity which perhaps 
indicates lower agency costs of debt in regulated industries. 
On the other hand, (Krishnan & Moyer 1997) for emerging market economies of Asia 
find that industry classifications are not significant in explaining the capital structure 
decision. Also, (HUANG & SONG 2006) for Chinese companies reveal that 
considering industry characteristics' variables is not important in the leverage 
decision. 
4.2.1.8.2 Ownership structure 
Because of the separation of ownership and control in the firm, dependence on debt or 
equity changes as the firm's stock ownership changes and this separation will shift the 
firm's financial goals (Donaldson 1985). 
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Reasonable number of studies test the role of ownership structure on the capital 
structure like (Lasfer 1995) who finds that firms that use debt are those who have less 
managerial ownership in their capital structure. Also, (LeeSeok & Kim 1998) find that 
the negative relationship between leverage and agency problem factors are most 
marked in the low debt/low equity group; (Lowe, Naughton, & Taylor 1994) also 
support the importance of the ownership structure on the capital structure choice. 
Also, (Wi & Sorensen 1986) reveal that firms with higher insider ownership have 
greater long-term debt. 
In addition, (Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002) find a positive effect for the external 
block holders and leverage; this relationship varies across the level of managerial 
share ownership. They also find a non-linear relation between the level of managerial 
share ownership and leverage. Moreover, (Arslan 2008) investigates the relationship 
between insider ownership and capital structure decisions made by managers for an 
emerging market (Turkey). He finds that leverage issues reduce the ability of 
managers to divert resources from value maximisation. Also he finds that the more 
willing are the managers to reduce asymmetric information between themselves and 
shareholders, the higher their ownership level in firms. 
4.2.2 Capital structure and firm performance 
Different theories expect different relationship between debt level and a firm's 
performance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their irrelevant theory predict no 
relationship between the level of debt and performance. 
On the other hand, Modigliani and Miller (1963) assume that higher debt level leads 
to a firm's better performance due to the tax benefits of debt. This indicates a positive 
relationship between debt level and the firm's performance. 
The asymmetric information model assumes that managers generally have better 
information about their firm's fundamentals than do outside investors. Well-informed 
insiders tend to convey the firm's positive information to the poorly informed 
outsiders to enhance the firm's performance. According to signalling theory, 
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managers have clear incentives to use signals to differentiate their firm from weaker 
competitors; one of the important signals employed in this concern is the use of debt. 
Debt signals good news which implies that firm is doing well and can pay the debt 
cost, also the managers are confident about the future. This encourages investors to 
undertake investments in the firm, and consequently causes a superior performance 
for the firm. However, equity signals bad news that the managers can not hold debt 
because they can not pay off its cost, and possibly means that earnings will fall in the 
future. These indicators will discourage different parties to undertake investments in 
the firm, and consequently causes a poor performance. 
Additionally, (Harris & Raviv 1991) argue that debt can produce information; debt 
pay-off indicates that the income exceeds the amount of payment, and this reflects the 
investors' ideas about the firm's quality. This information produced by debt contract 
is useful because it allows investors to make better operating decisions. So debt is 
used by investors when they are uncertain about the quality of management and the 
efficiency of their strategy. 
From the above, the asymmetric information model also expects a positive 
relationship between debt level and the firm's performance. 
The trade-off theory by (Miller 1977) states that the firm has an incentive to use debt 
and will continue to do that until their additional supply drives up interest rates to the 
point where the tax advantages of interest deduction are completely offset by higher 
rates. In other words, the firm will use the debt until the optimal level of debt which 
occurs by the trading-off between benefits and costs of that debt. Trade-off theory 
expects a positive relationship between debt level and a firm's performance up to the 
optimal mix of capital structure. The appropriate capital structure mix minimizes a 
firm's cost of capital which consequently maximizes the firm's performance. 
The agency theory for free cash flows by (Jensen 1986) suggests that the use of debt 
can reduce the free cash flow available to managers and constrain or encourage them 
to act more in the interests of shareholders. Debt is used to control the managers' 
opportunistic behaviour by reducing the free cash flows in their hands. This will 
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prevent investment in negative projects by committing the management to pay fixed 
interest payments. According to the agency theory, a negative relationship is expected 
between debt level and firm's performance 
According to the above discussion, most capital structure theories state that there is a 
relationship between debt level and a firm's performance. Therefore, this research 
assumes that debt level influences the firm's financial performance as represented in 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: Debt level influences the firm's financial performance. 
4.2.2.1 Control variables for the second relationship 
" Ownership structure 
Under agency theory, ownership structure is important because the separation of 
ownership and control creates agency costs. Therefore, suitable insider shareholdings 
may reduce these costs. Also, outside block ownership, institutional holdings or 
concentrated ownership tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient 
monitor over managers, and thus positively affect a firm's performance (De Miguel, 
Pindado, & De La Torre 2005). 
Accordingly, the higher the proportion of large institutional investors or concentrated 
ownership, the greater can the monitoring role be accomplished by these investors, 
and consequently the better the financial performance 
The effect of managerial entrenchment on the performance has two sides or 
perspectives. The first view considers the high entrenchment for the manager as a 
good chance to have good and profitable opportunities in the future. This means there 
will be a positive effect on the firm's performance. On the other hand, the second 
perspective considers that entrenchment reduces the power of debt as a control 
(commitment) device which leads managers to choose bad (unprofitable) investments 
if they cannot find the good opportunities (Dessi & Robertson 2003). 
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Agency theory also states that managers' equity ownership has a significant role in 
aligning the conflict between managers and owners. More stock ownership by 
executives will give them more power in influencing a firm's strategies, and hence 
better performance. Non-executive individuals or family owners will act to change a 
professional manager if his performance is low or bad. Also, managers usually act in 
accordance with outside investors' orientation toward a firm's performance as stock 
ownership by outside institutions increases (Chaganti & Damanpour 1991). 
Those who find a positive effect for the outsider institutional stockholdings include 
(Chang Aik Leng 2004), (Krishnan & Moyer 1997), (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti 
2006), and (Chaganti & Damanpour 1991), who find that stockholdings by executives 
increase the relationship between outsiders' stockholding and the firm's performance. 
Others finding no or insignificant effect include (Hsiang-tsai 2005), (Akimova & 
SCHWÖDIAUER 2004) and (De Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre 2005). A reason 
suggested by (Mehrar 1995) is that institutional investors do not monitor managers 
because they have joint benefits with the firm. 
Those who find positive effect for the managerial equity ownership on the firm's 
performance include (Thompson, Wright, & Robbie 1992), (Judge, Naoumova, & 
Koutzevol 2003), (Naoumova and Koutzevol 2003), (Cole & Mehran 1998) and 
(Mehran 1995). Also, (Fuerst & Kang 2004) find that the CEO, corporate insiders, 
and outside directors' ownership have a positive relationship with performance and 
value. 
On the other hand, those who find negative effect for managerial ownership include 
(De Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre 2005), (McConaughy & Mishra 1996) and 
(Gugler, Mueller, & Yurtoglu 2004). (Evans, Evans, & Loh 2002) find no relationship 
between declining performance and insider ownership levels, and finally, (Akimova 
& SCHWÖDIAUER 2004) find that insider ownership has a significant non-linear 
effect on performance. 
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Block ownership has a positive effect on performance in (Krishnan & Moyer 1997) 
for Hong Kong, which is due to the small number of large conglomerates controlling a 
large number of public corporations. On the other hand, (Fuerst & Kang 2004) and 
(Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006) find that block ownership has a negative effect 
on a firm's performance. 
On the other hand, (Mehran 1995) finds no significant relationship between a firm's 
performance and block holders' stockholdings, which he justifies due to the different 
goals between short and long-term holdings. 
Family ownership or concentrated ownership have a positive effect on performance 
according to (De Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre 2005), but insignificant effect 
according to (Chaganti & Damanpour 1991) and (Chang Aik Leng 2004). 
Other variables represent the ownership structure are also examined by previous 
studies. For example, outsiders' ownership have a negative effect on performance 
according to (Fuerst & Kang 2004), but (Akimova & SCHWÖDIAUER 2004) find 
insignificant effect. Non-executive directors' stockholdings have no and insignificant 
effect on performance according to (Chang Aik Leng 2004) and (Mehran 1995), 
respectively. Foreign ownership has a significant non-linear effect on performance 
according to (Akimova & SCHWODIAUER 2004). Control type (i. e., owner-control 
or manager-control) is unrelated statistically to performance according to (McKean & 
Kania 1978). However, they note that owner-controlled firms have a little higher 
levels of performance. 
" Managerial incentives 
Agency theory suggests that managerial incentives and compensation schemes are 
positively related to a firm's performance. An important way to mitigate the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders in the firms is the use of compensation 
contracts. 
Those who support the agency theory for the compensation positive effect on the 
firm's performance include (Mehran 1995), (McConaughy & Mishra 1996) and 
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(Jensen & Murphy 1990). On the other hand, (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker 1999) 
find that the compensation structure has a statistically significant negative relation 
with subsequent performance for the reason of weak corporate governance structure 
which indicates greater agency problems and then destroys the firm's performance. 
However, (Evans, Evans, & Loh 2002) find no relationship between declining 
performance and CEO pay levels. 
" Firm's Size 
A firm's size reflects the benefits of economics of scale and market bargaining power. 
(Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur 2000), (Simerly & Mingfang 2000) and (Omran, Atrill, 
& Pointon 2002) confirm that a firm's size has a positive and significant coefficient 
for the relationship between debt level and performance. 
On the other hand, (Dessi & Robertson 2003), (Krishnan & Moyer 1997) and 
(McKean & Kania 1978) find that the relationship between leverage and performance 
becomes unimportant when controlling a firm's size. 
However, (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006) find a negative effect for controlling 
size in the relationship between debt and performance. 
" Industry 
Trade-off theory assumes that firms in the same industry should have the same capital 
structure since they have same assets, business risk and profitability, (McKean & 
Kania 1978) find that profit performance differs significantly by industry, but they 
find no effect of industry concentration to influence the results. This result was 
studied by (Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur 2000), who confirm that industry 
concentration is not significant for the relationship between debt and performance. 
(Murphy 1968) confirms that debt ratio was unrelated to the price/earning ratio or the 
dividend yield on common stock in all industries. 
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4.2.3 Determinants of capital structure and firm 
performance 
The trade-off theory suggests an optimal capital structure mix for a firm to achieve the 
minimum cost of capital of financing. Theoretically, the expected minimum cost of 
capital should reflect the maximum financial performance and maximum welfare of 
shareholders. This is important for financial management in that, if the determinants 
of capital structure do not lead to the increase of the firm's performance, there is no 
need for financial managers to search for those determinants. The following 
hypotheses test whether the determinants of capital structure directly affect the 
financial performance. 
The third set of relationships will consider the proposed relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance. This research 
will test the relationship of each factor separately jointly. 
To the researcher's knowledge, there are no previous researches relating the 
determinants of capital structure directly with the financial performance in terms of 
shareholders' value from the perspective of capital structure theories for the UK 
capital market for the study period. Therefore, this research will propose such a 
relationship between each determinant and the firm's financial performance. Next 
section explains the proposed hypotheses for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and the firm's financial performance. 
1. Assets structure: 
Apart from (Shergill & Sarkaria 1999), there are no studies testing the assets structure 
and its relationship with performance. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate this 
relationship for this study sample due to the effect described by the trading-off theory. 
Trade-off theory assumes that firms with high tangible assets are stronger to face 
financial distress; because of their liquidation value, these assets are considered as 
productive resources, this would speed up the production process as well as improve 
the quality of product, and then improve the financial performance. Also, firms which 
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have tangible assets have a good reputation in getting funds since tangible assets are 
used as a guarantee for external debt. These funds are used in profitable projects that 
result in higher performance. Therefore, trading-off assumes a relationship between 
tangibility and performance as represented in the following hypothesis: 
H3-1: There is a relationship between assets' tangibility and the firm's financial 
performance for the UK capital market. 
2. Growth opportunities 
Trading-off theory considers growth opportunities as an indicator for the firm's 
success; these firms are stronger to face financial distress. Firms with good growth 
opportunities have a good reputation in getting funds, easier access to the finance 
market, and this could be reflected in better performance for these firms. 
According to the agency theory perspective, firms with high growth opportunities 
have lower agency costs. Firms with greater growth opportunities might have lower 
debt ratios due to the fear of debtholders that firms may forgo valuable investment 
opportunities and expropriate wealth to their benefit, and this outcome would be 
reflected in lower agency costs. 
Also, agency theory assumes that growth opportunities enlarge managers' power. This 
can be treated as an advantage for the company in that these managers use this power 
to enlarge the firm's performance, although they increase their own wealth at the 
same time. 
Accoding to the above discussion, capital structure theories assume a relationship 
between growth opportunities and performance as represented in the following 
hypothesis: 
H3-2: There is a relationship between growth opportunities and the firm's financial 
performance for the UK capital market. 
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3. Firm's size: 
Trading-off theory assumes that large firms are more diversifid, more to use 
economies of scale production, have greater access to new technology and cheaper 
sources of funds, and also investors believe that large companies are less risky. This 
suggests a positive relationship between size and performance. 
On the other hand, there is an argument supported by many studies that a firm's size 
does not reflect its performance and small firms are more productive than the large 
firms. In addition, many studies find no relationship support the proposition that the 
competitive advantages among firms are their products and technology, and not the 
size of the firm. 
In this research we consider the trading-off theory and assume a relationship between 
the firm size and financial performance as represented in the following hypothesis: 
H3-3: There is a relationship between the firm's size and the firm's financial performance for 
the UK capital market. 
4. Firm's risk: 
According to the agency theory, the required return of investors should be suitable to 
their risk in the firm. Shareholders will require high return in order to hold the risk 
related to the bankruptcy and financial distress since the debtholders have the priority 
in the case of bankruptcy. Also, the debtholders will require such return to hold the 
risk of agency conflicts with shareholders and management. This will encourage the 
managers to maximise their performance in order to fulfil the requerments of these 
investors, which may indicate a relationship between firm's risk and performance as 
represented in the following hypothesis: 
H3-4: There is a relationship between risk and the firm's financial performance for the UK 
capital market. 
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5. Non-debt tax shields 
According to the trade-off theory, the main advantage of NDTS is the tax savings 
which have been obtained by the use of debt. These savings may have been used in 
profitable projects which may indicate a relationship between NNDTS and the firm's 
performance. However, more NDTS reduce the benefits of the tax shields from the 
use of the debt and consequently may indicate a negative relationship with the 
performance. There are no previous studies in regards to the non-debt tax shields and 
their effect on the financial performance. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate 
this relationship for this study sample as represented by the following hypothesis: 
H3-5: There is a relationship between non-debt tax shields and the firm's financial 
performance for the UK capital market 
6. Firm's liquidity: 
According to the trade-off theory, high liquidity position for the firm's indicates that 
this firm is strong enough to face any short or long-term financial problems; this 
strong firm can perform better than a weak firm which has week liquidity position in 
its financial statements. This may indicate a relationship between a firm's liquidity 
and the financial performance as stated by the following hypothesis: 
H3-6: There is a relationship between liquidity and the firm's financial performance for the 
UK capital market. 
4.2.4 The mediating role of debt level 
In order to test the mediating role of debt, three relationships should be significant: 
independent- mediator, mediator- dependent and independent- dependent. 
First, the relationship between the independent variables (i. e., determinants of capital 
structure) and mediating variable (i. e., debt level) should be significant. Second, the 
relationship between the mediating variable (i. e., debt level) and the dependent 
variable (i. e., a finn's financial performance) should be significant. Third, the 
relationship between the independent variables (i. e., determinants of capital structure) 
and the dependent variable (i. e., a firm's financial performance) directly also should 
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be significant. This mediating role of debt level is expressed by the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Capital structure mediates the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and a firm's financial performance. 
4.3 Research model 
Four relationships have been tested in this research. In the first relationship, debt level 
represents the dependent variable, and the determinants of capital structure are the 
independent variables. Namely, assets structure, growth opportunities, profitability, 
firm's size, firm's risk, non-debt tax shields, liquidity, industry and ownership 
structure. However, ownership structure as a control variable related to the capital 
structure as discussed earlier is included in the cross-sectional analysis only due to the 
unavailability of data. 
The second relationship investigates the relationship between debt level as 
independent variable and firm's financial performance as dependent variable. Four 
control variables are included in this relationship; industry, firms' size, ownership 
structure and CEO remunerations. The third relationship investigates the relationship 
between determinants of capital structure as independent variables and financial 
performance as dependent variable. Industry is included as a control variable in the 
third relationship. Finally, the fourth relationship investigates the effect of inclusion 
of debt level as a mediating variable. Consequently, debt level and all determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables (regardless of the relationships defined in 
the first relationship) are regressed on the financial performance as dependent 
variable. 
Four indicators are used to reflect the firm's financial performance, ROI, ROE, PE, 
and EVA (used in the cross-sectional analysis only due to the unavailability of data). 
In addition, four indicators are used to reflect the debt level, TDBV, TDMV, LDBV, 
and LDMV 
The following diagram summarizes the research model relationships: 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
VARIABLES' 
MEASUREMENT 
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5.1 Introduction 
Depending on the literature review, this chapter presents the measurement process of 
the study variables; it discusses all alternative measures used in previous studies and 
the justifications for such use. At the end of each section, the researcher chooses the 
most suitable factors supported by reasons for this selection. Generally, the selection 
of any indicator depends on its benefits and the validity to be employed in the 
research sample environment, the wide usage and the availability in the databases 
which are used for this research. 
This chapter consists of four main categories: the measurement of the determinants of 
capital structure, the measurement of debt level, and the measurement of a firm's 
financial performance followed by the measurement of control variables. Moreover, 
in the capital structure measurement, the focal point will be the debt component of 
capital structure, since one of the goals of this research is to find the relationship 
between debt level and a firm's financial performance. 
5.2 Capital structure determinants' measurement 
5.2.1 Assets structure 
Most previous empirical studies use a ratio of fixed assets to total assets to measure 
the tangibility of a firm's assets. Tangibility assets are considered as collateral and 
guarantee for creditors when the firm needs external financing. Tangibility is defined 
as total fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Meanwhile, net fixed assets are 
defined as gross fixed assets minus total depreciation for all these assets. Gross fixed 
assets are defined as the sum of total lands and buildings, plant machinery and 
equipment, and other fixed assets (Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 2005). 
This research will use the ratio of fixed to total assets to measure the tangibility of 
assets. This ratio is the most related (suitable) to the tangibility, and there is a 
consensus to its use. Most previous studies use this ratio including (Rajan & Zingales 
1995), (Wald 1999), (Bevan & Danbolt 2002), (Akhtar 2005) and (Gleason, Mathur, 
& Mathur 2000). 
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5.2.2 Growth opportunities 
The possible growth indicators are the growth of investments, employees, assets, sales, 
profits, Tobin's Q, research and development expenditures, growth in capital 
expenditure, price-earnings ratio (P/E) and earnings per share (EPS). (Delmar 1997) 
presents 55 published researches having growth as a dependent variable. Most of 
these studies prefer objective measures such as employment and sales growth 
indicators rather than subjective measures such as perceived performance or market 
share. He states that objective measures are easily available. 
However, there is no consensus on an appropriate growth measure, especially 
considering that none of the used growth indicators is free from other effects. As an 
example, total assets as a growth indicator is affected by capital intensity and is 
sensitive to change over time and affected by changes in inflation. Also, growth rate 
of employment is a direct indicator of organizational complexity and job creation, and 
it is affected by labour productivity changes, degree of integration, and other make-or- 
buy decisions (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner 2003). Moreover, earnings per share 
(EPS) ignores the growth of earnings after the current year (Bridge & Dodds 1978). 
In this research growth opportunities will be represented by two measures. The first 
indicator is Tobin's Q since it reflects how investors regard the company (Brigham & 
Ehrhardt 2005). Also, it is a proxy for future growth opportunities, while sales growth 
rate reflects the past growth experience (HUANG & SONG 2006). Moreover, it is a 
good indicator for the firm to survive (Hall 1987). Studies which use this ratio include 
(Rajan & Zingales 1995), (Bevan & Danbolt 2002) and (Lasfer 1995). 
The second indicator is the growth in total sales since it is easily accessible and it can 
be applied for all kinds of firms even though it is sensitive to inflation and currency 
exchange rates (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner 2003). Also, it reflects short-term as 
well as long-term changes in the firm (Gailly et al. 2004). Studies which use this ratio 
include (Cassar & Holmes 2003) for Australian firms, (Wald 1999) for five developed 
countries, (Dessi & Robertson 2003) for UK companies, (Lowe, Naughton, & Taylor 
1994) for Australian firms, (Singh & Nejadmalayeri 2004) for French companies 
(Singh & Faircloth 2005) for USA firms. 
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5.2.3 Profitability 
Profitability can be expressed generally by return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), return on investments (ROI), return on sales (ROS) or net profit to sales, gross 
profit margin and basic earnings power. All these measures are discussed in the 
performance measurement section later. 
However, (Titman & Wessels 1988), state that the strong negative relationship 
between profitability and debt measures can create a problem in identifying the 
relationship between variables scaled by operating income or total assets and debt 
measures. In that respect, a variable scaled by operating income may have a strong 
correlation with the operating income scaled by total assets. So they suggest greater 
carefulness when interpreting variables scaled by operating income that have a 
positive relationship with debt. Also, the same caution holds true for variables scaled 
by total assets and that have a negative relationship with debt ratios; for example, the 
positive relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt explained above. 
In this research, profitability will be measured by two factors, net profit margin and 
the basic earnings power. Net profit to sales or return on sales (ROS) considers the 
profit available for distribution to shareholders. The use of net profit before interest 
and taxation represents the profit from trading operations before any costs of servicing 
long-term finance. This ratio is commonly used in previous studies. It is represented 
by the following equation: 
Net pro? /it margin on sales = Xr 
The second ratio that will be used is the basic earnings power. In addition to the fact 
that it is easy to use, it shows the raw earnings power of the firm's assets, before the 
effect of taxes and leverage (Brigham & Ehrhardt 2005). It evaluates managers' 
performance by comparing their ability to generate operating income earnings before 
interest and taxes (EU11) with the operating assets under their control. A successful 
manager is one who can generate profits with small investment in operating assets. 
Also this ratio is commonly used by previous studies like that of (Wald 1999) for five 
developed countries, namely France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA, and 
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(E3railsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002) for Australian firms. This ratio is represented in the 
following equation: 
5.2.4 Size 
In most previous studies, firm size is expressed by the logarithm of total assets. This 
indicator is the most suitable measure of a firmn's size. Total assets are defined as the 
sum of net fixed assets, total intangibles, total investments, net current assets, and 
other assets. ('Pitman & Wessels 1988), state that there is a high correlation between 
the logarithm of total assets and the logarithm of sales (about 0.98), and therefore 
choosing any of them is a substitute to the other. 
In this research, since it is the most suitable measure of a firm's size, the logarithm of' 
total assets employed will be chosen to measure the size of the firm. Studies that use 
assets as a size measure include (Cassar & Holmes 2003), (Akhtar 2005) and 
(Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002) for Australian firms, (Ghosh & Cai 2000) and 
(Singh & Faircloth 2005) for US firms, (Panno 2003) for the UK and Italy, and (Wald 
1999) for five developed countries. 
5.2.5 Risk 
Fundamental beta reflects changes in the firm's operations and capital structure 
including financial leverage, sales volatility. This in contrast to historical betas, which 
may reflect these changes after several years when the firm's true beta has changed 
(Brigham & Ehrhardt 2005). Volatility of* income is considered the strongest factor in 
measuring business risk since it determines the ability ot'the firm to meet its interest 
charges (E3railstord, Oliver, & Pua 2002) (Ferri & Jones 1979). Also, it is not directly 
affected by the firm's debt level (Titman & Wessels 1988). It can be measured by the 
standard deviation of the annual percentage change in operating income before 
interest, taxes and depreciation over total assets (EBIT/'I'A). 
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In this research volatility of income will be a proxy of the firm's risk, since it 
determines the ability of the firm to meet its interest charges and is not directly 
affected by the firm's debt level. Other studies using this measure include (Wald 1999) 
for five developed countries, (Kim & Limpaphayom 1998) and (Allen & Mizunot 
1989) for Japanese firms and (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004) for four 
countries, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. 
5.2.6 Non-debt tax shields 
Non-interest tax deductions are generally known as "non-debt tax shields"; examples 
include accelerated depreciation allowances and investment tax credits (Shuetrim, 
Lowe, & Morling 1993). Non-debt tax shields are usually measured by the ratio of 
total annual depreciation expense divided by total assets because depreciation is the 
most significant element among non-debt tax shields. 
In this research, depreciation, depletion and amortization to total assets is used 
because it reflects a high percentage of non-debt tax shields and it is the most 
common measure used, besides its availability and ease of use. 
5.2.7 Liquidity 
Liquidity (short-term solvency) is usually defined as the ability of a firm to pay its 
obligations when they become due (Laitinen 2002). It is vital for the firm's survival to 
hold liquid resources to meet its obligations. 
In this research, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities which is the most 
suitable measure will be used to reflect the firm's liquidity. It is a widely used ratio to 
reflect the firm's solvency. (Ozkan 2001) for UK firms and (Panno 2003) for UK and 
Italian firms use this ratio to assess the firm's liquidity. 
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5.3 Capital structure (Debt level) 
5.3.1 Definition and importance 
Capital structure is one of the key elements in analyzing firm solvency and it refers to 
the sources of the firm financing. It is known that financing ranges from relatively 
permanent equity capital to more risky financing sources (Wild, Subramanyan, & 
Hasle 2003). Financial leverage is defined by the extent to which debt is used by the 
firm, or the ratio of non-equity liabilities to total assets. This can be viewed as a proxy 
for "what is left for shareholders in the case of liquidation" (Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
From the agency theory point of view, capital structure can be defined as a managerial 
incentive mechanism and/ or commitment device. It is known that a high ratio of debt 
means more control of lenders and less freedom for management to deal with 
competitive hazards or opportunities. 
Capital structure measures the power of the firm's ability to offer the stakeholders 
according to their needs (Dessi & Robertson 2003). Capital structure is important 
because it affects the returns of the investors, and it is important to assess the firm's 
ability to deal with its competitive environment effectively (Simerly & Mingfang 
2000). 
Debt level has three implications. First, by using debt, shareholders can maintain 
control over the firm. Second, capital financed by shareholders lowers the risk faced 
by creditors. Third, the return on owners' capital becomes good if the firm earns on 
projects financed by debt more than the interest paid for these borrowed funds 
(Brigham, Foster, & Houston 2004). 
5.3.2 Book and market value of debt 
(Titman & Wessels 1988), state that there is no suspicion that the differences between 
debt book values and market values should be correlated with any of the determinants 
of capital structure suggested by the theory. Additionally, (Bowman 1980) assures 
that there is a large correlation between book and market value of debt. Also, the book 
value debt performs as well as market value debt, so no need arises for the 
incremental costs of estimating market value of debt. To the contrary, (Mulford 1985) 
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re-examined the issues raised by (Bowman 1980) and finds superior performance for 
the market value debt ratios. These differences are justified by debt maturity horizons 
and market interest rates which are important determinants of the market value of debt. 
Moreover, (Sweeney & Warga 1997) find that book value sometimes, but not always, 
seriously mis-measures the market value of debt. However, because of the difficulty 
of estimating the market value of debt, most previous studies use the accounting 
measures of debt. 
Financial managers who are against the market value of debt argue that book value is 
more reliable since it is not as volatile and does not change as often as market value. 
Nevertheless, this is evidence that market value is the true value which changes as a 
reflection of both firm-specific and market information over time. However, using the 
book value rather than market value is the more conservative approach in estimating 
debt level. This argument is based on the fact that market value debt ratios are always 
lower than book value debt which reflects on the lower cost of capital. Furthermore, 
lenders differ in lending basis. Those who depend on book value do so because it is 
more reliable, but those who depend on market value assert that it is also acceptable 
because it is the true value (Damodaran A. 2002) 
Market value information is helpful in evaluating the amount, timing and uncertainty 
of future cash flows. However, it appears to be inconsistent with the going concern 
concept which considers that the firm has unlimited life, whereas the market or 
liquidation values are needed only if the company's existence is in doubt. Therefore, 
the book values are more reliable and relevant for financial statement users (Ethridge 
& Corbin 1996). 
According to the above discussion, this study uses both book and market value of debt 
although the complexity of calculating the later indicator makes it harder to use. 
Choosing different measures for debt is due to the fact that capital structure theories 
may have different implications. This may affect the proposed relationships with the 
determinants of capital structure by the method of how debt is measured (Titman & 
Wessels 1988). Moreover, book value is more reliable since it is not as volatile as 
market value. This also confirms the market value as the true value which changes as 
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a reflection of' both firm-specific and market information over time. Therefore, the 
researcher chooses these measures to capture any proposed relationship between the 
determinants of capital structure, debt level, and firm's financial performance which 
achieve the study objectives. 
5.3.3 Debt measurement 
1. Total debt 
Ratios of debt to capital structure reveal the extent of the firm's use of non-equity 
capital, and also the firm's long-run ability to meet its suppliers' payments. A debt to 
equity ratio from the shareholder's viewpoint indicates the extent to which external 
parties are financing the firm's assets. The debt to total assets ratios are not used 
because of the problem explained earlier according to Titman & Wessels (1988) that 
some variables scaled by total assets may have misleading relationship with debt 
ratios scaled also by total assets. 
This ratio is represented by book and market values respectively as follows: 
Debt: Capital (MV) = 
Total Debt 
(13 V) total debt + (MV) equity and reserves + preferred shares 
Those who use these ratios include (Phillips & Sipahioglu 2004), (Bevan & Danbolt 
2002) for UK companies, (Rajan & Zingales 1995) for the G7, and (Brailsford, Oliver, 
& Pua 2002) for Australian firms. 
2. Long-term debt 
Since long-term debt is issued infrequently, it may measure a more long-run relation, 
and then the long-term debt ratio provides the most stable measure of the firm's 
capital structure (Wald 1999). When interest rates fluctuate, issuing long-term debt 
may affect the bond-holder positively or negatively depending on the match between 
interest rates and the bond price (Brick & Palmon 1992). It may help in lowering the 
monthly instalment, and sometimes it contains some restrictions on the borrower in 
using the debt. For example, it prevents him or her from investing in certain types of 
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leases to limit additional fixed-payment obligations to protect the lenders' interests 
(Peterson 2007). The long-term debt ratios are used by (Dessi & Robertson 2003) for 
UK firms, ('Pitman & Wessels 1988) and (Thies & Klock 1992) for US firms, 
(Akhtar 2005) for Australian companies, (Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 2005) for 
South Korean firms, (Chen 2004) and (HUANG & SONG 2006) for Chinese listed 
companies, (Bhaduri 2002) for Indian firms. 
This ratio is represented by book and market values respectively as lollows: 
long term Debt ratio = 
long term Debt 
long term Debt + Equity (B 1") 
long term Debt ratio = 
long term Debt 
long term Debt + Equity (MV) 
5.4 Financial performance measures 
The concept of shareholder value as a key indicator of a firm's financial performance 
is driven by investors. These investors are seeking for superior returns to increase 
their wealth through the company's management. The longer a company can maintain 
and improve its competitive advantage, the more valuable its shares will be later. This 
will be reflected in the wealth of the firm's investors who are looking to invest in a 
strong future cash flow firm. These investors can persuade or force the firm's 
management to create the shareholders' value (Beaver 2001). Shareholders' value will 
be created if return on investment or return on equity is greater than the average cost 
of capital or cost of equity, respectively (Rappaport 1983). 
(Laitinen 2002) gives a general definition of performance as "the ability of an object 
lo produce results in a dimension determined a priori, in relation lo a target. " 
Because performance measurement is a wide topic, and it may mean different things 
to diCtcrent people (Miller 2005), an attractive valuation measure should be easy to 
use, understandable and help the user to perform better estimations (Plenborg 2002). 
Accounting measures are considered backward-looking, they are an estimate of the 
accomplishment by management and measure how efficiently a manager uses 
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resources to produce outputs and create shareholder value. In contrast, economic 
measures are forward-looking, and evaluate what management will accomplish 
(Lanfeng, Jeng-Ren, & Anlin 2004). 
The utility of financial accounting rests on many advantages. First, it is commonly 
widely used. Second, it is useful and meaningful. Third, these ratios reveal an 
unbiased quantitative representation of results of internal and external decisions. 
Fourth, it is considered as a tool for identifying irregularities in managerial behavior 
and company opportunities (Voulgaris & Doumpos 2000). Fifth, all parties seem 
united in their interest in associating financial ratios, because they provide benchmark 
measures and help in answering critical financial questions about organizational 
performance (Casteuble 1997). 
On the other hand, since these ratios depend mainly on the financial statements, their 
results also depend on the quality of these statements and are affected by the 
limitations of the statements on which they are based. Moreover, these ratios are 
affected by the problem of inflation and changes in the value of money (Britton & 
Waterston 2006). 
As discussed above, financial accounting measures are useful, meaningful, unbiased, 
commonly widely used and a good representative for the managerial power to create 
the shareholders' value. Therefore, this study uses four measures to evaluate the 
firm's financial performance: return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE), 
economic value added (EVA) and price-to-earning-ratio (P/E). These measures are 
explained in detail in the following section. 
1. Return on investment (ROI) 
ROI compares income with the operational assets which produce that income. It 
shows the relationship between the firm's net profit (outputs) and the long-term 
invested capital (inputs) (Foster 1978). Also, it represents the power of operating 
capital to generate the net operating profits (Brigham & Ehrhardt 2005). In addition, 
ROI conveys the return on invested capital from the different perspectives of 
contributors including creditors and shareholders (Wild, Subramanyan, & Hasle 2003) 
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ROI is a popular indicator of management efficiency because it contrasts the net 
income generated with the total value of assets under the management control. 
Accordingly, it represents how well management utilizes the firm's assets and its 
power to create the shareholders' value (Elliott & Elliott 2002). The value is created 
for the shareholders only when the company earns a rate of return on new invested 
capital that exceeds its cost of capital (Copeland et al. 2000). Moreover, this measure 
is considered to be more accurate than others which depend only on the balance sheet. 
ROI relies on two financial statements, balance sheet (financing) and income 
statement (profit). 
ROl is calculated by operating income divided by total assets minus current liabilities 
(Copeland, Koller, Murrin, & McKinsey & Company 2000), illustrated here: 
ROIL- profit 
before interest and taxation 
Total Assets - Current Liabilities 
The use of net profit before interest and taxation is because the ratio measures the 
returns for all suppliers of long-term finance before any deductions for lenders' 
interests and shareholders' dividends. 
2. Return on equity (ROE) 
Return on equity is the ratio used to assess the return on shareholder's investment 
(Brigham, Foster, & Houston 2004). It reflects management's effectiveness to 
generate additional earnings for its shareholders (Tezel & McManus 2003). Wall 
Street analysts support the use of this ratio because the higher the ROE, the faster the 
growth of total shareholder equity. As a result, stock price will grow in the case of 
maximizing the shareholders' wealth (Rothschild 2006). On the other hand, return on 
equity does not consider risk, even though shareholders clearly care about that 
(Brigham, Foster, &I louston 2004). 
ROE is calculated by net income available to shareholders divided by shareholders' 
equity (Phillips & Sipahioglu 2004), as illustrated here: 
Net income available for shareholders ROE = Average common shareholders' equity 
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3. Price-to-earning-ratio (P/E) 
The importance of the selection of this indicator lies in the importance of a market 
measure of a firm's performance besides the book measures. Price to earnings ratio as 
a proxy rely on price information has the advantage of being forward-looking (Dessi 
& Robertson 2003). P/E ratio relates the market price per share to earnings per share. 
P/E reveals the capital value of the share in comparison with its current level of 
earnings. 
4. Economic value added (EVA) 
Residual income measures (RI) combine two important factors, capital and income, so 
these measures are sensitive to the changes of cost of capital (Shwayder 1970). 
Economic value added ratio is the financial performance measure that comes closer 
than any other to capture the true economic profit of a company. In comparison to 
other performance measures the economic value added ratio has the highest 
correlation with the shareholders' value creation. Moreover, it represents the residual 
income that remains after deducting the cost of all capital, including equity capital, 
whereas accounting profit is determined without imposing a charge for equity capital 
(Wallace 1997) (Stern Stewart Co. 2006), (Brigham & Ehrhardt 2005) (Tully 1993). 
Also, the economic value added ratio focuses on managerial effectiveness in a given 
year; it measures the extent to which the firm has increased shareholder value. The 
economic value added ratio also links the firm's accounting data to its stock market 
performance. In addition, EVA is not subject to the noise inherent in the firm's stock 
price (Bacidore et al. 1997), which is driven by many factors beyond the control of 
the firm's executives (Bacidore, Boquist, Milbourn, & Thakor 1997). 
On the other hand, (Biddle, Bowen, & Wallace 1997) disprove the claim that 
economic value added (EVA) is more related with stock returns than accounting 
earnings and operating cash flows. On the contrary, they confirm that simple, 
unadjusted accounting earnings are more highly related with stock returns than EVA. 
This implies that accounting-based performance indicators are more value-relevant 
than value-based measures. 
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Economic value added ratio (EVA) can be calculated using the lollowing equation: 
EVA = Net operating profit afler tax - (weighted average cost of capital x invested capital) 
= NOPA T- WA CC x (total assets - current liabilities) 
= EBIT x (1- Tax rate) - WACC x (TA - CL) 
(Weaver 2001) (McIntyre 1999) 
It can also be calculated in terms of return on invested capital (ROIC), as follows: 
In terms of ROIL' : 
(Brigham & Ehrhardt 2005 ) 
EVA = (Operating capital) (ROIL, ' - WA CC) 
The current study uses the first equation above. In addition, the calculations of net 
operating profit after taxes (NOPAT), capital and the weighted average cost of capital 
are discussed in the appendix according to (Ramezani, Socnen, & Jung 2002). 
5.5 Control variables measurements 
Ownership structure can be measured by major-holdings ownership. Major ownership 
(%) is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by major holders 
(institutions and families investors). According to the UK firms' annual reports, a 
major share-holder is defined as a shareholder who holds more than 3% of 
outstanding shares. The largest owner (%) is defined as the fraction of outstanding 
shares owned by the largest share-holder. 
Executive compensation is measured by remunerations (% CEO salary and % CEO 
bonuses and other benefits). Additionally, industry as a dummy variable will be 
included in the analysis to control for the possible differences in leverages across 
industries. Size as a dummy variable will be included in the second relationship to 
control for the firm's size; it takes the value one (1) for large companies and zero (0) 
for small companies. This classification divides the companies in the sample into two 
groups, small and large, according to the total assets. 
The le)llowing table summarizes the research's variables, the proxies used to reflect 
these variables and how these variables are measured. 
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Table 5.6 Summary of variables measures: 
Main 
Variables 
Proxy and Code Measurement 
Assets Tangibility of assets Ratio of fixed to total assets: Property, Plant and 
structure (PPE/TA) Equipment to Total Assets 
Growth in total sales Annual growth in total sales Growth (REVGTI1) 
opportunities Tobin's Q (Yob's Q) 
Market value of equity plus book value of debt 
divided by book value of equity and debt 
Net profit margin Net income available for common stockholders over 
i bili NetMar l sales 
* 100% 
Prof ta ty Basic earnings power Earnings before interest and taxes (LUFF) over total 
EBITDA) assets 
Total assets defined as the sum of net fixed assets, 
Size Logarithm of total total intangibles, total investments, net current 
assets (Log (TA)) 
assets, and other assets 
Volatility of income 
Standard deviation of the annual percentage change 
Risk 
(Risk) 
in operating income before interest, taxes and 
depreciation over total assets (EBIT/ A 
Non-debt tax Non-debt tax shields The ratio of total annual depreciation, depletion and 
shields (DDA/TA) amortization to total assets 
Liquidity Current Ratio (CurRtio) Current assets divided by current liabilities 
b bt Total debt divided by capital calculated as total de t Debt to total capital 
plus book value of equity capital and reserves plus (TD (BV)) 
referred shares 
Debt to capital ratio 
Total debt divided by the book value of total debt 
Debt (TD (MV)) plus the market value of equity and reserves plus 
referred shares 
Long-term debt to Long-term debt divided by capital calculated as 
capital ratio (LDBV) long-term debt plus book value of equity capital 
Long-term debt to Long-term debt divided by capital calculated as 
capital ratio (LDMV) long-term debt plus market value of equity capital 
Return on investment Profit betirre interest and taxation divided by total 
(ROI assets minus current liabilities 
Net income available for shareholders divided by Return on equity (ROE) shareholders' equity 
Financial 
performance 
Price-to-earnings-ratio 
(PE) Market price per share to earnings per share 
Net operating profit after tax minus weighted 
Economic value added average cost of capital multiplied by invested 
(EVA) capital, which is calculated by total assets minus 
current liabilities 
Control 
Variables Proxy Measurement 
Ownershi Major shareholdin s 
Internal and block-holdings ownership(No. p g 
structure Internal and block-holdings ownership (%) 
Largest shareholder Largest shareholdings (%) 
Executive Executive CEO salary (%) 
compensation remunerations CEO bonuses and other benefits (%) 
Industry Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
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The table below shows the DataStream variables' names, codes and the way that some 
variables have been calculated. In addition, DataStream calculations and descriptions 
are shown in the appendix. 
Table 5.7 DataStrcam variables' names and codes: 
Notation DataStream DataStream Description 
Mnemonic 
PPE/TA WC02501 / WC02999 
Property, Plant And Equipment - Net (Key Item) 
divided by Total Assets (WS) (Key Item) 
REVGTH WC01001 Net Sales or Revenues (Key Item) 
(((P)*(WC05301))+ Price (Adjusted - Default) multiplied by Common 
Tob's Q (WC03255)) 
/ Shares Outstanding (Key Item) plus Total Debt (WS) 
(WC03255) + (Key Item) all divided by Total Debt (WS) (Key 
(WC03995) Item) plus Total Shareholders' Equity (Key Item) 
NetMarg WC08366 Net Margin (Key Item) 
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation 
EBITDA WC 18198 / WC02999 (EBITDA) (Key Item) divided by Total Assets (WS) 
(Key Item) 
Log (TA) Log, WC02999 Log of Total Assets (WS) (Key Item) 
_ Standard deviation of Earnings Before Interest, 
Risk 
ST. D 
Taxes and Depreciation (EBITDA) (Key Item) WC 18198/WC02999 divided by Total Assets (WS) (Key Item) 
DDA/TA WCO 1151 / WC02999 Depreciation, 
Depletion And Amortization (Key 
Item) divided by Total Assets (WS) (Key Item) 
CurrRatio WC08106 Current Ratio (Key Item) 
TD (13V) WC08221 Total debt % total capital 
(WC03255) / Total Debt (WS) (Key Item) divided by the sum of 
'ED (MV) (WC03255) + Total Debt (WS) (Key Item) and the Market value of 
(P)*(WC05301) common stockholders' equity (calculated) 
(WC03251) / Long Term Debt (WS) (Key Item) divided by the 
LD (BV) (WC0325 I) + sum of Long Term Debt (WS) (Key Item) and Total 
(WC03995)% Shareholders' F, c iity (Key Item) 
Long Term Debt (WS) (Key Item) divided by the 
LD (MV) 
(WC03251) / 
(WC0325 1) + sum of 
Long Ternm Debt (WS) (Key Item) and 
' 
(P)*(WC05301) Market value of common stockholders equity 
(calculated) 
ROI WC08376 Return On Invested Capital (Key Item) 
ROE WC08301 Return On Equity - Total % (Key Item) 
PE PE Price/Earnin gs Ratio (Adjusted 
WC 18191 * (1- Earnings Before Interest And Taxes (EBI"f) (Key 
WC08346) - WACC * Item) multiplied by (I- Tax Rate WS) minus 
(WC02999 - (WACC) multiplied by (Total Assets (WS) (Key 
EVA WC03101) Item) minus Current Liabilities, Total (Key Item) 
OR: OR: Net income available to common minus 
(WCO175I) - WACC * (WACC) multiplied by (Total Assets (WS) (Key 
(WC02999 - WC03101) Item) minus Current Liabilities, Total (Key Item) 
Indust Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
DATA 
COLLECTION, 
SAMPLE SET and 
DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the process of how data is collected for this study and it describes 
the sample and the importance of the index used. This chapter also describes the 
descriptive analysis of the study variables. 
This chapter contains two sections. Section one presents the data collection process, 
characteristics of the sample selected and the software packages used in this study. 
Section two presents the process of data transformation and the reason behind this 
process, and then the descriptive analysis for the study variables is discussed extensively. 
6.2 Data collection and sample specifications 
6.2.1 Data collection 
Most of the data used in this study are collected from secondary sources, and the main 
source of the research data is the DataStream database which contains published accounts 
data. It also provides both accounting data on firms and the market value of equity. This 
database contains balance sheet, profit and loss and cash flow statement information for 
companies in the majority of countries. 
In addition, because of the unavailability of variables of ownership structures and the 
managerial remunerations included in this study, recent annual reports are collected for 
the whole sample in order to test the cross-sectional effects on the study relationships. 
The maximum annual reports that are available are found in the year of 2005; so this 
research chooses this year for the cross-sectional analysis. 
6.2.2 Research Sample 
This research covers a period of fifteen years from 1992 to 2006; it was deemed 
necessary to select a long period in order to draw sound statistical estimations for the 
relationships selected to be tested in this research. Because each firm in the study sample 
has the same number of time series observations among panel members, this panel data is 
a balanced panel. The final sample consists of the FTSE All-Share Index published by the 
UNS 79 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange contains 425 companies. This research 
is trying to cover all the I JK non-financial listed firms on the London Exchange Stock 
Market. The FTSI- All-Share Index is considered to be the most recent constituent list. It 
is the aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCap Indices. 
The FTSE All-Share Index is a market-capitalization weighted index representing the 
performance of all eligible companies listed on the London Stock Exchange's main 
market which pass screening for size and liquidity. Today the FTSE All-Share Index 
covers 693 companies with a combined value of nearly £2 trillion (as of April 2007) - 
approximately 98-99% of the UK's market capitalization. The FTSE All-Share Index is 
considered to be the best performance measure of the overall London equity market with 
the vast majority of UJK-focused money invested in funds which track it. The FTSE All- 
Share Index also accounts for 11.58% of the world's equity market capitalization (as of 
April 2007) (FTSE 2008) 
The FTSE UK Index Series are shown in the following diagram. 
6.1 FTSE UJK Index Series: 
FTSE UK Index Series 
F CSI All-Share Index lI Sl 
r. - 
: All Small Index 
TSl: Small Cap II SI All-Share F I'S I: 100 I n(lex f l'SI 250 
Index Sector Indices Index 
F'I'SI 350 Index 
F'I'ST: 350 Yield I "I SI? 350 Style I'"I Sl: 356 FI SE UK Dividend 
Indices Indices Sector Indices Index 
Source: (F7SE 2008, ) 
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Ne IFTSE All-Share Index includes 10 industry sectors and 85 industry sub-sectors. The 
main industry sectors' classifications, number of constitutions, index market 
capitalization (GBPm) and index weight (%) are presented below. 
'T'able 6.1 I°ISI' Al I -SI 11I: I . 
INDIA: 
ICB Code 
0001 
ICB Industry 
Oil & Gas 
Number of 
Constitutions 
22 
Index market 
Capitalization 
___(GBPm1__ 256,224 
Index Weight 
13.63 
1000 Basic materials 20 140,714 7.49 
2000 Industrials 148 147,972 7.87 
3000 Consumer Goods 48 188,538 10.03 
4000 Health Care 29 139,908 7.44 
5000 Consumer service 109 241,563 12.85 
6000 Telecommunications 9 103,857 5.53 
7000 Utilities 12 88,878 4.73 
8000 Financials 260 552,539 29.40 
9000 Technology 36 19,077 1.02 
Total 693 1,879,269 100 
Source: FTSE Group, data as of March. 30,2007 
Financial companies are eliminated from the sample because the capital structures of 
these companies are naturally different from other companies. They have specific 
characteristics in their capital structures that may be affected by regulatory requirements, 
such as the minimum capital required. Moreover, debt in financial companies such as 
banks and insurance companies are not strictly comparable to debt issued by non- 
tinancial firms (Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
Due to the above reasons, it has been decided to exclude financial companies from the 
study sample. As a result, the FTSE All-Share Index-as offered by the DataStream-has 
decreased from 693 to 425 companies. 
The final sample is 425 companies after excluding eight companies due to the 
unavailability of data in the DataStream database. This sample is classified into nine 
industry sectors as in the following table. 
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I'ahle 62 Samnle Industry classifications: 
Code Industry sector Number of Constitutions No. % 
1 Basic materials 20 5 
2 Consumer Goods 43 10 
3 Consumer service 107 25 
4 Health Care 29 7 
5 Industrials 148 35 
6 Oil and Gas 22 5 
7 Technology 36 8 
8 Telecommunications 9 2 
9 Utilities 11 3 
Total 425 100 
The largest sector is the industrial sector which represents more than 35% of the whole 
sample, followed by the customer service at 25%. Other sectors range between 2% and 
10%. However, if we combine these other sectors as non-industrial companies, it will 
comprise 65% of the whole sample. 
This study investigates the role of the industry sector beside the main research objectives. 
"Therefore, this study divides the industry sector into only two groups, industrial and non- 
industrial firms. This will make it easy to find if there are any differences for the study 
relationships between industrial and non-industrial firms. Industry is represented as a 
dummy variable giving one for the industrial firms and zero for the non-industrial firms. 
6.2.3 Software packages 
Several software packages could be used to complete the empirical analysis of this study. 
SPSS, I, IM[)FP, L-Views, PcGive and Stata are among the most commonly used 
softwares to deal with this kind of analysis. SPSS is the most friendly-user, widely used 
software, and could be used for cross-sectional studies properly. Unfortunately, it has 
limited functions for the panel data analysis. LIMDFII is good software fur use in panel 
studies, but in addition to the lack of some important panel specification tests, this 
software is not available, so it could not be considered either. In addition, f; -Views and 
PcGive statistical packages have the same features and they are commonly used. '('hose 
softwares can be used for cross-sectional, time series and panel data analysis. I lowever, 
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they also do not contain all the required tools to deal with panel data analysis. Stata is 
also a statistical package used for cross-sectional, time series economics and panel data 
studies and it gives a number of tests which are not available in other softwares, mainly 
and most importantly the Hausman test. The last three software packages have the ability 
to control for heteroscedasticity and deal with fixed effects and random effects models. 
Therefore, this study uses the Stata to test the study relationships because it can be 
applied for panel data studies and it gives the related tests which are not available in other 
software packages. 
6.3 Descriptive analysis 
Chapter Five discusses the measurements of research variables. This section will use the 
sample set to further show and discuss some descriptive statistics analyses for these 
variables. The descriptive statistics include mean, standard deviation, skewness 
(symmetry of the distribution), kurtosis (peakedness of the distribution), minimum and 
maximum. 
Distribution can be non-symmetrical, which means that one tail of this distribution is 
longer than the other tail; non-symmetrical is called skewed. Also, if the distribution is 
too flat or too peaked, tails are too short or too long, this distribution is described as 
kurtosed (Miles & Shevlin 2001). 
Violation of normality tests remain even when data is free of outliers, therefore 
transformation is required as a reasonable remedy. The major advantage for the 
transformation method is that it takes into consideration all observations available, 
meanwhile deleting the extreme values manually-even it is a common method-and 
ignores a significant numbers of those observations which perhaps affect the final results. 
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6.3.1 Transformation of variables 
Because of the data type in such researches, firms are different in their values and there 
are no limits of the figures. Kolmogrov-Smirnov test of normality statistic for large 
samples (n > 2000) is tested for this study sample and it shows a violation of the normal 
distribution. In such a situation, data transformation is required. Data transformation 
makes the statistical analysis more meaningful (Cooke 1999). However, the study proves 
that the transformed sample set is better than the original sample which may give 
misleading results, and also the transformation method as mentioned before uses the 
whole observations available in the sample. Therefore, this study transforms the 
variables' data before implementing the statistics methods to test the proposed hypotheses 
of this study. 
When variables are found to have shown non-normality, steps are taken to manipulate 
these variables. Different types of transformation techniques are utilized, namely normal 
scores using the Van der Waerden proportion estimated formula, log odds ratio, and 
simple ranking. This study uses the Van der Waerden's method which depends on normal 
scores. 
Because of the inherent properties of ranks and their use in regression analysis, an 
extension is proposed that provides an alternative mapping that replaces the data with 
their normal scores. The normal scores approach retains the advantages of using ranks but 
has other beneficial characteristics, particularly in hypothesis testing. (Cooke 1999). 
An alternative to Rank Regression and other data transformations when non-linearity is a 
problem is proposed here and is based on normal scores. The transformation proposed is 
from actual observations to the normal distribution by dividing the distribution into the 
number of observations plus one region on the basis that each region has equal 
probability. This method is referred to as the van der Waerden approach (Van der 
Waerden, 1952,1953). In effect, the ranks are being substituted by scores on the normal 
distribution and so the normal scores approach may be considered to represent an 
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extension of the rank method. The regression analysis would then proceed using the 
normal scores as the dependent variable. 
The main advantage of replacing the ranks by normal scores is that the resulting tests 
would have exact statistical properties. This is because (a) significance levels can now be 
determined, (b) the F and t-tests are meaningful, and (c) the power of the F and t-tests 
may be used. In addition, the regression coefficients derived using normal scores are 
meaningful, whereas from rank regression is difficult to interpret for most values (Cooke 
1999). 
In addition, this method have been used in similar studies like (Conover 1999), (Haniffa 
& Cooke 2002), and (Mangena, Musa, and Tauringana 2007). The normal score of an 
observation can be calculated as follows 
s- o(n+l) 
Where 
s is the normal score for an observation, 
r is the rank for that observation, 
n is the sample size, and 
c (p) is the (p)'th quintile from the standard normal distribution. 
6.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
To prevent redundancy, proxies' codes appeared in all regression tables in the subsequent 
chapters will be mentioned once in this section only, and consequent tables will be titled 
only by the dependent variable under each table. 
The following table summarizes the variables for this study. The first column represents 
the categories for the study variables. The second column represents factors inside each 
category. The third column represents the appreciations for these variables; afterwards 
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these will be used to prevent redundancy. The fourth column gives a brief description for 
each variable. 
Table 6.3 Proxies' regression codes: 
Variables Äbbreviation Description 
Assets PPE 
Property, Plant and Equipment to Total 
Structure Assets 
Growth RVGTH Annual growth in total sales 
opportunities TSQ 
_ 
Tobin's Q 
MRG Net profit marin Determinants Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes to total of 
i l 
EBITD 
assets (EBIT/TA) ta cap 
t t Firm's size LGTA Logarithm of total assets ruc ure s _ Standard deviation of the annual percentage Firm's risk SDIV change in EBIT/TA 
Non-debt DDA Ratio of total annual depreciation, 
depletion 
tax shields and amortization to total assets 
Liquidity CRT Current Ratio 
TDBV Total debt to total capital (Book value) Capital 
t t D b l l TDMV Total debt to total capital 
(Market value) ruc ure s e t eve LDBV -term debt to total capital (Book value) Lon ti g os ra LDMV Long-term debt to total capital (Market value) 
ROI Return on investment 
Financial Financial ROE Return on _equity 
Performance Performance PE Price to earnin ratio 
EVA Economic value added 
Industry dummy variable, 1 if industrial firms, Industry DVIND 0 for non-industrial. 
Firm's size DVSIZE 
Logarithm of total assets dummy variable, 1 
Control for large firms and 0 for small firms 
variables Other benefits given to the CEO: 1 minus Remuneration 1 -SAL% basic salary 
Ownership The number of total major shareholders who 
structure 
TSSno 
own more than (3%) 
cons 
_cons 
Constant 
6.3.3 Statistics of variables 
This section shows the descriptive statistics for each variable. Normal histograms which 
display the normal distributions and the Normal Q-Q Plots For all variables before and 
after transferring variables using normal scores are attached in the appendix of this 
chapter. It is clear that the normality distributions of the majority of' variables are violated 
before transformation giving the p value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov of 0.000. However, 
after transformation it gives the value of 0.200; this violation is approved by the 
Skewness and Kurtosis values before and after transformation as will be discussed shortly. 
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For the debt measures, P values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov remain significant after 
transformation which indicates the violation of the normality assumption. This is because 
of the presence of many non-missing zero values in these variables which indicates that 
these firms do not have any debt; in other words many values are concentrated around a 
specific point. These non-missing zeros are important in the overall objectives of this 
study, therefore the researcher does not have a choice to isolate or delete these figures. 
The most fundamental assumption in data analysis is normality, which considers the 
benchmark for statistical methods. Normality refers to the shape of the data distribution 
for an individual metric variable. 
Normality is tested using graphical and statistical tests. The simplest test for normality is 
a visual check of the histogram that compares the observed data values with a distribution 
approximating the normal distribution. This method is problematic for small samples 
where the construction of the histogram can distort the visual portrayal to such an extent 
that the analysis is useless. A more reliable approach is the normal probability plot, which 
compares the cumulative distribution of actual data values with the cumulative 
distribution of a normal distribution. The normal distribution forms a straight diagonal 
line, and the plotted data values are compared with the diagonal. If the distribution is 
normal, the line representing the actual data distribution closely follows the diagonal. 
The first table below summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables and will be 
described for each variable afterwards. The second table summarizes tests of normality 
for all continuous variables before and after transformation using the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test. The third table summarizes skewness and kurtosis values as other indicators 
for the normality. In addition, figures attached in this chapter appendix convey the normal 
distribution graphs and the difference between the two sets of data, (i. e., transformed and 
untransformed). 
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fable 6.4 Descriptive Statistics: 
Descri tive Statistics 
e 
Observations 
4,993 
Minimum 
0.000 
Maximum 
0.960 
Median 
0.279 
Mean 
0.330 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.250 
CVZ 
0.760 
rvgth 4,212 -0.320 0.530 0.079 0.090 0.150 1.670 
is 4,153 0.002 486.710 135.434 160.050 105.190 0.660 
mrg 4,310 -9.900 21.890 5.360 6.080 5.610 0.920 
ebitd 4,507 -7.990 35.000 14.268 14.700 7.890 0.540 
to 4,943 3.300 7.740 5.450 5.500 0.790 0.140 
sdiv 4,024 0.000 9.990 1.698 2.510 2.360 0.940 
dda 4,732 0.000 0.110 0.039 0.040 0.020 0.500 
crt 4,592 0.130 2.990 1.230 1.290 0.540 0.420 
tdbv 4,795 0.000 103.540 28.180 29.400 22.720 0.770 
tdmv 4,335 0.000 103.550 16.401 23.390 23.530 1.010 
Idbv 4,813 0.000 103.630 18.856 22.600 22.350 0.990 
Idmv 4,443 0.000 103.820 9.563 17.770 21.630 1.220 
ROI 4,669 0.000 18.490 11.800 12.800 4.480 0.350 
ROE 4,125 -13.900 38.990 15.400 16.200 9.350 0.580 
PE 3,930 -20.600 52.800 15.000 16.100 13.080 0.810 
EVA 387 -592259 3789497 4463.165 58137.77 324209.50 5.580 
1-SAL% 294 0.000 0.920 0.398 0.400 0.010 0.030 
TSSno. 276 0.000 13.000 5.000 5.080 0.172 0.030 
The above table represents the number of observations, minimum, maximum, median, 
mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation for all variables in this study. 
The median value above is the middle value of a distribution. This means that half of the 
values are above a median and halt are below a median. The median value is less 
sensitive to extreme values than the mean value, which makes a median a better measure 
than a mean. 
Coefficient of variation (CV) is a more uniform method of determining the relevance of 
the standard deviation. It is calculated by the standard deviation divided by the mean. The 
closer the coefficient of variation is to 0, the greater the uniformity of the data. On the 
other hand, the closer the coefficient of variation is to I or more than 1, the greater the 
variability of the data (Field A. 2005). 
2 CV = Standard deviation/ Mean. 
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Table 6.5 Kolm; orov-Smirnov tests: 
Tests of Normality -Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a)- for Transformed and 
Untransfornied data 
Untransformed Transformed 
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. 
e 0.09 0.000 
_0.002 . 
200 
rvgth 0.445 0.000 0.001 . 
200 
is 0.457 0.000 0.001 . 
200 
mrg 0.487 0.000 0.001 . 
200 
ebitd 0.252 0.000 0.000 . 
200 
to 0.032 0.000 0.001 . 200 
sdiv 0.395 0.000 0.000 . 200 
dda 0.182 0.000 0.002 . 200 
crt 0.314 0.000 0.006 . 200 
TDBV 0.436 0.000 0.037 0.000 
TDMV 0.477 0.000 0.035 0.000 
LDBV 0.448 0.000 0.085 0.000 
LDMV 0.484 0.000 0.081 0.000 
ROI 0.303 0.000 0.001 . 
200 
ROE 0.338 0.000 0.001 . 200 
PE 0.468 0.000 0.005 . 
200 
EVA 0.412 0.000 0.006 . 200 
1-SAL% 0.063 0.072 0.008 . 200 _ TSSno. 0.116 0.000 0.008 . 200 
The main statistical tests for normality which are available in most of the statistical 
programs are Shapiro-Wilks test for small samples (less than 50), and a modification of 
the Kolmogorov-Siirnov test (more than 2000). Each calculates the level of significance 
for the differences from a normal distribution (t lair . I. et at. 
2006). A non-significant 
result (sig value of more than . 05) 
indicates that the distribution is normal. Meanwhile, a 
significant result (sig value of' less than . 05) 
indicates that the distribution violates the 
assumption of normality which is common in large samples (Pallant 2005). 
The above table represents the normal distribution of the study variables using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. As is shown in the above table, most variables violate the 
normality for the raw data; however, the majority of these variables have acceptable 
values after transformation except for the debt ratios as it is discussed earlier. 
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Table 6.6 Skewness and Kurtosis tests: 
Skewness and Kurtosis tests for two sets of data 
Untransformed Transformed 
Skewness Statistic 
Kurtosis 
Statistic 
Skewness 
Statistic 
Kurtosis 
Statistic 
e 0.698 -0.524 0.007 -0.056 
rvgth 40.956 1856.499 0.001 -0.037 
is 54.432 3465.350 0.000 -0.034 
mrg -49.182 2543.206 0.000 -0.032 
ebitd -18.342 675.244 0.000 -0.032 
to 0.226 0.150 0.000 -0.032 
sdiv -28.579 1825.838 0.000 -0.033 
dda 12.905 288.554 0.007 -0.056 
crt 31.375 1480.338 0.000 -0.033 
tdbv 60.289 3988.096 0.124 -0.296 
tdmv 7.234 50.475 0.078 -0.398 
Idbv 56.228 3569.853 0.245 -0.422 
Idmv 7.296 51.319 0.198 -0.543 
ROI 7.914 501.262 0.000 -0.033 
ROE -27.826 1277.153 0.000 -0.034 
PE 53.021 3108.688 0.000 -0.037 
EVA -9.823 128.903 0.000 -0.290 
1-SAL% 0.274 0.370 -0.009 -0.230 
TSSno. 0.396 -0.261 0.003 -0.205 
A simple test for the normality is a rule of thumb based on the skewness and kurtosis 
values which are available as a part of the basic descriptive statistics for a variable. The 
shape of any distribution can be described by these two measures: kurtosis and skewness. 
Kurtosis refers to the peakedness or flatness of the distribution compared with the normal 
distribution. In other words, kurtosis refers to the height of the distribution. Skewness, on 
the other hand, describes the balance of the distribution. It asks whether the distribution is 
unbalanced or shitted to one side (right or left) or centered and symmetrical with about 
the same shape on both sides. 
In most programs, the skewness and kurtosis of a normal distribution are given values of 
zero. Then, values above or below zero denote departure from normality. Large sample 
sizes (more than 50 observations) reduce the unfavourable effects of nonnormality. 
The statistics value (z) for the skewness value is calculated as: 
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skewness Zskewness = I-W, 
where N is the sample size. 
Az value can also be calculated for the kurtosis value using the following formula: 
zkurlosls = 
kurtosis 
24 
N 
The researcher also aims to establish some important variable trends in comparison with 
other related variables through the study period. To do so, the study panel data is 
summarized in fifteen averages which represent the study period in order to get a trend 
graph (these averages are used for this target only). Moreover, the researcher uses 
different software to establish the trends between the study's variables; these trends are 
also summarised in the appendix of this chapter. 
In addition to the general view described above in the first table, the following section 
describes each factor individually. The related normality figures are attached at the end of 
this chapter as an appendix as discussed above. 
1. Assets structure 
The first variable is the assets structure (assets tangibility), proxied by property, plant and 
equipment to total assets. The mean is 0.334 and median 0.279. The fixed assets to total 
assets for the sample are ranged from 0 which means no fixed assets in these firms to 
0.955 expresses that 95.5% of a firm's assets are fixed assets with low standard deviation 
0.249 and coefficients of variation 0.76. Unexpectedly, it has been noticed that industrial 
firms have less fixed assets (29%) than non-industrial firms (36%). 
Skewness of this variable is 0.007 and kurtosis is -0.056, which are acceptable to reflect 
normality; the related figures show the variable's distribution, which is close to normal 
distribution. 
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In addition, a graph has been drawn for the PPE and debt ratios, trying to lind any trend 
for this relationship using the total debt measured by the book value (TDE3V) as an 
example. No clear trend appears because the concentration of the PPE ratio is in a narrow 
range of figures. Therefore, we use the whole panel data; it seems clearly that a positive 
trend is apparant between PPE and TDBV as it is shown in the appendix. 
AI Trend of PPF and the rieht- 
PPE and the debt ratio (TDBV) 
PPE% with TDBV 
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oc4ý 
d` o'ý ocp' oo`' oti c co ýo r ý ýo hý 
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t PPE% -A TDBV' 
Averages of PPE and TDBV 
Similarly, fixed assets ratio is found to have a negative trend in comparison to the firm 
size, as is shown in the related graph below. While firm size increases, the ratio of fixed 
assets in the firms becomes less. 
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6.3 PPE trend with Firm's Size: 
Year PPE 
Log 
TA 
1992 0.395 5.310 
1993 0.396 5.351 
1994 0.384 5.357 
1995 0.382 5.389 
1996 0.371 5.361 
1997 0.363 5.345 
1998 0.364 5.379 
1999 0.356 5.460 
2000 0.324 5.546 
2001 0.319 5.594 
2002 0.316 5.565 
2003 0.309 5.572 
2004 0.297 5.603 
2005 0.283 5.663 
2006 0.266 5.713 
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2. Growth opportunities 
The second variable is the growth opportunities which have been measured by two 
proxies, growth in total sales and Tobin's Q. For the first proxy (growth in total sales), 
the mean is 0.094 and median 0.079, growth in total sales for the sample are ranged from 
-0.320 to 0.528 with a standard deviation of 0.154 and coefficients of' variation of 1.667, 
skewness of this variable is 0.001 and kurtosis is -0.037. The related figure in the 
appendix shows the variable's distribution, which is acceptable to normal distribution. 
For the second proxy (Tobin's Q), the mean is 160.052 and median is 135.433, Tohin's Q 
för the sample are ranged from 0.002 to 486.713 with a high standard deviation of 
105.191 but a low coefficient of variation of 0.657; skewness of this variable is 0.000 and 
excess kurtosis is -0.034. The related figure in the appendix shows the variable's 
distribution which is fair to normal distribution. 
I lowever, the standard deviation is slightly high; therefore the researcher looks into the 
distribution of this variable's data in more depth. Firstly, we calculate the average of 
Tobin's Q for each company for the fifteen years. "Then, we classify this ratio in four 
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categories, which show the following results: 92 firms have less than 100 'robin's Q, 179 
have between 100 and 199,93 have between 200 and 299, and 49 have more than 300 up 
to the maximum ratio 460. The other 12 firms do not show data for this variable. The 
distribution for such data seems to be normal as is shown in the related graph. 
Growth opportunities are considered to be an indicator for the firm's success and the 
level of its profitability; this encourages banks to lend these firms who present high 
growth rates or valuable growth opportunities in the firm's future. 
Similarly, the growth opportunities represented by Tobin's Q seems to have a negative 
trend compared with the debt represented by TDIV. For the following graph, figures of 
Tobin's Q were divided by 10 to make it possible to compare its trend line with the debt 
trend line. 
A Trend of ornwth nnnnrtiinitiec with TDRV- 
Year Tobin's Q TDBV Tobin 's Q with TDBV 
1992 135.179 29.987 h TDBV i ' 
1993 143.258 26.336 
t s Gl w Tobin 
1994 173.342 26.286 40.000 1 1995 173.294 26.017 
1996 180.633 26.485 30.000 j 
l 1997 190.503 26.019 
, _, _. ý, 20 , 000 
I 
1998 185.487 28.600 rý`týý If 
1999 163.453 30.359 10.000 
2000 159.650 28.859 0.000. 
2001 148.538 31.553 9--888 
2002 156.633 31.578 Years 
2003 127.854 32.436 
' 
2004 152.476 31.292 
s+ TDBV -+-Tobin 
2005 154.229 32.316 
2006 173.228 33.667 
Also, the negative trend between Tobin's Q and TDRV is clear when we use the whole 
panel data, this is obviously apparent in the related graph in the appendix. 
Moreover, using the whole cross-sectional data, it has been noted that there is a negative 
trend for growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) against a firm's size; this means when size 
increases, T'obin's Q seems to decrease vice versa as is shown in the following graph. 
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6.5 Growth opportunities according to firm's size: 
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3. Firm's profitability 
The third variable is the firm's profitability. Profitable firms are stronger to face financial 
distress and stronger to continue more than unprofitable firms in the future. Profitability 
variables are proxied by two proxies, net profit margin and basic earnings power. 
The mean for the net profit margin is 6.079 and median is 5.360 with a standard deviation 
of 5.605 and coefficient of variation of 0.923; net profit margin for the sample is ranged 
from -9.900 to 21.890; skewness of this variable is 0.000 and kurtosis is -0.032. These 
ligures are acceptable for the normal distribution as shown in the related figure in the 
appendix. 
For the second proxy (Eß1TDTA), the mean is 14.698 and median is 14.268 with a 
standard deviation of 7.887 and coefficient of variation (CV) of 0.537; the firms in the 
sample are ranged according to basic earnings power from -7.992 to 34.998; skewness of 
this variable is 0.000 and kurtosis is -0.032, which are acceptable for the normal 
distribution as shown in the related figure in the appendix. 
A firm's profitability, measured by both net margin and earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation (F. 131'14)) seems to have a negative trend through the study period in 
comparison with the trend of'i'DBV as is shown in the following related graphs and table 
which represents the averages of the firm's profitability and firm's debt level over the 
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study period from 1992 to 2006. In addition, a clear negative trend as shown in the 
appendix is apparent using the whole panel data for these two measures with 'FDBV. 
6.6 Trend of Profitability with TU13V: 
4. Firms' size 
The fourth variable is the firms' size which is represented by the logarithm of total assets. 
The mean of this variable is 5.504 and median is 5.450 with a low standard deviation of 
0.794 and low coefficient of variation 0.144. Logarithms of total assets for the sample are 
ranged from 3.303 to 7.742. Skewness of this variable is 0.000 and excess kurtosis is - 
0.032. 
The figure below shows the firm's size trend. Averages of the total assets' figures are 
used for the purpose of finding the size trend. These averages represent the fifteen years 
of the study period. It is clear from the figure and the averages of the total assets that the 
sizes of the firms in general are raising through the study period; this implies that the UJK 
companies are growing gradually. 
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6.7 Firm's Size trend: 
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Large firms gain from economies of scale, are stronger to face financial distress, more 
diversified, have lower risk, likely to have a good reputation, more stable cash flows and 
fewer hazards to be liquidated and then have easier access to the capital markets. 
Moreover, we invitigate the trend between the firm size and TDBV using the whole panel 
data; the related graph in the appendix clearly shows a positive trend. 
Unexpectedly, it has been noted that the size of assets is larger for non-industrial firms 
(log of assets is 5.58) than the industrial (5.38). Also, it has been noted for the cross- 
sectional data that there is a positive trend between a firm's size and 'l'DBV as is shown 
in the following graph; this trend will be explained in the following chapters. 
1 6.8 Firm's size by industry: 
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5. Firm's risk 
6.9 Size and debt ('I'DBV) trend: 
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The fifth variable described here is the firm's risk, which is presented by the volatility of 
the firm's earnings. The volatility of earnings increases the probability of financial 
distress and bankruptcy costs. The mean of this variable is 2.509 and the median is 1.698 
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with a low standard deviation of 2.356 and a low coefficient of variation of 0.940. Firms 
vary in adopting risk; fror the study sample, risk is ranged between 0.000 to 9.990, 
skewness of this variable is 0.000 and excess kurtosis is -0.033. 
There is no specific trend for the relationship between firm's risk and TDBV. However, 
perhaps for the long run, it seems that when debt increases, risk also shows an increasing 
habit; this can be seen after the year of 1997 to the year 2006 as is shown in the lhllowing 
graphs. In addition, using the whole panel data sample to find the trend between risk and 
TDBV, the related graph in the appendix shows slightly straight line between these two 
variables. The straight line here supports the unclear trend between these two variables. 
6.10 Risk trend with Debt (TDBV): 
Year EBIT TDBV 
Risk Trend 
1992 29.987 3500 3000 
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2004 2.441 31.292 11 0000 T ' T T 
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6. Non-debt tax shields 
The sixth variable is the non-debt tax shields proxied by the ratio of total annual 
depreciation, depletion and amortization to total assets (DDA"I'A). The higher the non- 
debt tax shields, the lower the potential tax benefits of debt. The mean ol'this variable is 
0.042 and median is 0.039 with a standard deviation of' 0.023 and a coefficient of' 
variation of 0.50. Firms vary in their ratios of non-debt tax shields; they are ranged 
between 0.000, which means the firms do not have any non-debt tax shields, to 0. I 10, 
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which considers also small ratio; the skewness of this variable is 0.007 and excess 
kurtosis is -0.056. 
Unexpectedly, the trend between NDTS and TDBV graphically shows positive behaviour. 
This has been shown clearly in the related graph in the appendix. however, there are no 
differences between non-debt tax shields for industrial or non-industrial companies. 
6.11 NDTS (DDA%) by industr : 
Industry DDA By Industry 
Type DDA/TA 
ooO 0 0.042 
1 0.042 
0040 
Indu*y type (0 nnn. ndumd; t: Ind. *YI. l) 
7. Firm's liquidity 
The seventh variable is the firm's liquidity proxied by the current ratio. A firm's high 
liquidity position indicates that this firm is strong enough to face any short or long-term 
financial problems, and this strong firm can perform better than weak firms which have 
low current ratios in their financial statements. 
The mean of this variable is 1.291 and median is 1.230 with a standard deviation of 0.542 
and a coefficient of variation of 0.419. Firms vary in their current ratios; they are ranged 
between 0.130 to 2.990; the skewness of this variable is 0.000 and excess kurtosis is - 
0.033. 
There is a clear negative trend between liquidity and 11)13V. This is clear using the whole 
panel data for the study period as is shown in the appendix. 
In addition, there is a difference for the liquidity ratio according to the industry sector; 
industrial companies have a liquidity ratio of 1.396 more than non-industrial companies 
1.224, as is shown in the following graph. 
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The second group of variables are the debt ratios. As was discussed earlier, a large 
number of firms in the sample have zero concentrated values including the non-missing 
zero values, which indicate that such firms do not have any debt. In other words, many 
values are concentrated around a specific point (i. e., zero). This concentration violates the 
normality of the debt value distributions. These non-missing zeros are important in the 
overall objectives of this study, therefore the researcher does not have a choice to isolate 
or delete these measures. 
The average of the debt in the whole sample is 23.67 for the four values of debt and the 
average of the medians is 18.250 with an average standard deviation of 22.56 and an 
average coefficient of variation of 0.996. Debt levels for the sample ranges from zero to 
103. Skewness and Kurtosis are acceptable for the normal distribution as is shown in 
table 6.5 before. The majority of the sample (90%) have de bt ratios less than 50% 
(average of debt using all ratios) in their capital structure. Additionally, it has been noted 
graphically that all performance measures have a negative trend with debt measures as is 
shown in the appednix. 
The following table shows another classitication for the debt averages. Using the normal 
distribution limits, the following table shows the concentration of'the debt levels among 
the study sample. 
Table 6.7 Debt categories: 
Debt Average categories Frequency Percent 
<=9 66 0.16 
>9-<=26 166 0.40 
> 26 -<= 42 122 0.29 
> 42 66 0.16 
Total 420 1.00 
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The figure below presents the debt level trends in comparison with the performance 
trends in the sample. The figure shows the TDBV with ROI trends for the sample period 
of fifteen years. A simple view of the graph shows that when debt started to be slightly 
high in the year of 1992 (30%), the ROl was low (11 %). Then, when 1 D13V became 
lower, the ROI started to move up (15%). Also, TDßV started to rise at the beginning of 
1999 to have an average of 30.36% up to an average of 32.44% in 2003. During those 
same years, the ROI decreased from 15.38% to 10.17% respectively. These trends are 
observed also for the other debt and performance measures. 
The table below summarizes the averages for the panel data period from 1992 to 2006 for 
total debt level represented by the TD13V and financial performance represented by the 
ROI. 
6.13 Trend of Debt and Performance: 
Averages Debt with performance trend 
Year TDBV ROI 
1992 29.987 11.425 ROI with TDBV 
1993 
1994 
26.336 
26.286 
11.776 
13.008 40.000 
1995 26.017 14.825 35.000 +ý 
1996 26.485 14.701 30.000 f.. - 
1997 26.019 15.438 25.000 
1998 28.600 15.514 .2 20.000 
1999 30.359 15.380 > 15.000 
10 000 2000 28.859 12.768 . 5 000 2001 31.553 10.135 . 
- - - 2002 31.578 9.482 
0.000 -- T r- 
2003 32.436 10.171 ,, o., % ,, °°ý' °°° ýo ý0°0 ýo°°tioN odoo° o 2004 31.2 22 10.814 Y 2005 32.316 12.553 ears 
2006 33.667 13.958 f TDBV -+- ROI ' 
Additionally, it is interesting to look for any differences between industrial and non- 
industrial companies in the study sample. For this target, an average for all debt ratios is 
computed for the whole sample. The overall debt average for the industrial companies 
(23.71 %) is higher than the average of non-industrial companies (23.46%), as is shown in 
the following graph. These observations will be discussed and justified in the following 
chapters. 
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For the cross-sectional data, to test the trends of debt level according to the firm's size, 
SPSS graphs results are used to show that when size increases, total debt ("1'1)ßV and 
'Ft)BV) also shows an increasing behaviour; this is shown in the following graph. 
6.15 Debt trend according 
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For the financial performance variables, the overall average is 15% with an average 
median of 14.067, an average of standard deviation of 8.97, and an average coefficient of 
variation of 0.580. Meanwhile, ROE ranges between 0.000 and 18.494, ROI ranges 
between 13.900 and 38.990, but PE; has a wider range between -20.600 and 52.800. 
Skewness and kurtosis values for pert . rmance measures are acceptable to reflect normal 
distribution as shown in table 6.5 and figures attached in the appendix of this chapter. 
For the Economic value added (EVA), the mean is 58137 and median is 4463, while 
EVA ranges from -592258 to 3789497 with a standard deviation of' 324209. This value 
seems to he high; however, the coefficient of variation for EVA is 5.577. Skewness and 
Kurtosis values for EVA are acceptable as is shown in table 6.5 and in the graphs in the 
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chapter appendix. The negative figures for EVA are because of the low net income which 
is the first figure in the EVA equation. However, one of the limitations of this study is the 
calculating of EVA as was discussed earlier. 
The researcher also looks into the distribution of EVA in depth; it has been classified into 
six groups selecting the cut points at mean and selected standard deviation based on 
standard deviation of +/- 3, which represents the rule of normal distribution. Between 
these two borders there are 285 firms (73.6%) of EVA sample which are between -50000 
and +50000. The other 26.4% consists of 36 firms that have EVA value of' less than - 
50000 and 65 firms have EVA value greater than 50000. In addition, 151 firms (39%) of 
EVA sample reveal negative EVA values and the other 236 (61%) have positive EVA 
values. I lowever, transformed data solve the large deviation of the EVA variable, as is 
shown in the EVA figures that follow in the chapter appendix. 
Table 6.8 [: VA categories 
EVA categories__ Number of firms 
Less than -50000 36 
From (-50000) to (-25000) 27 
From (-25000) to 0 85 
From 0 to (25000) 149 
_ From (25000) to (50000) 25 
More than 50000 65 
Total 387 
285 firms 
(% 73.6) 
EVA shows a negative trend with TDMV using the whole cross-sectional data for this 
study as is shown in the appendix. 
In order to capture the trend of EVA according to the firm size (Log. of total assets), the 
1 )llowing graph gives a positive trend for this relationship. This might imply that when a 
firm's size increases, the economic value added will increase simultaneously. 
6.16 EVA Trend according to firm's size: 
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Additionally, it is interesting to look for any differences between industrial and non- 
industrial companies in the performance for the study sample. For this target, an average 
for all panel performance ratios (ROI, ROE, and PE) is computed for the whole sample in 
order to compare the sample on the industry type. 
6.17 Performance (average for all measures) by industry type: 
Industry Performance Perfonnance averages by Industry 
Type average 
0 14.725 .. 15WO _. __ý.. 
1 15.13 14BOO. ____. 
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From the table and graph above, it is clear that the overall average of financial 
performance (i. e., ROI, ROE and PE) for the industrial companies (code I above) is 
15.13%, which is higher than the financial performance of the non-industrial at 14.73%. 
Moreover, these observations will be discussed and justified in the Following chapters. 
For the remuneration variable (other benefits ratio), the mean is 40% and median is 
39.80/o. This means that the UK firms are paying on average 40% in addition to the basic 
salary to the CEO. This ratio is considered to be high, and this supports the policy olpay- 
perlbrmance-based on encouraging managers to perform better. Two firms only from the 
whole sample (425 firms) are not paying other benefits, so the basic salary represents 
100% of the total income for the chief executive officers (CEOs) for these firms. 
I lowever, the rest of firms are paying other benefits, and the largest percentage of' the 
dustry Performance Pertonnance averages by Industry 
Type average 
0 14.725 015 _. __ý.. 
1 15.13 ¬14BOO. 
____. 
I4 400 - l_. _ 
1. 
o, 
Indu*y 0: Yan1ndur1 I. 1: Indudrl. l) 
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other benefits ratio is 92%. Moreover, 77 firms (26%) pay more than 50% as other 
benefits to their CEOs. 
Ownership structure variable is represented by the number of total major shareholders 
(TSSno) who own more than 3% of outstanding shares, a figure which ranges from 0 to 
13. The mean and median are S. Most of the firms in the sample 83% have 7 or fewer, 
and 69.9% have from 3 to 7. The value zero means that there is no big shareholder who 
owns 3% or more, and, similarly, the 13 shareholders own the majority of that firm. 
Agency theory states that the higher the proportion of large institutional investors or 
concentrated ownership, the greater the monitoring role of these investors, and therefore 
the greater the chance for better financial performance. It has been noted that the number 
of large stakeholders has no trend with the debt level, as is shown in the related graphs in 
the appendix. 
Moreover, the researcher uses the SPSS software for the transformed panel data in order 
to draw trends for selected variables. Regarding the graphs for the TDBV and the 
determinants of capital structure, the results show that there is a positive trend between 
TDBV and PPE, log TA, and DDA. On the other hand, the graphs show that there is a 
negative trend between TDBV and Tobin's Q, Sales growth, EBITD and C. RT. However, 
regarding the risk graph, there is no clear trend for the risk SDEBITD and TDBV; the line 
is close to be horizontal. 
Regarding the graphs for the debt-performance trends, results show a negative trend for 
performance measures with the selected debt measures for total debt book value (TDBV) 
and total debt market value (TDMV) respectively. 
Regarding the graphs representing the relationships between determinants of capital 
structure and financial performance ROI as an example, results reveal that there is a 
positive trend between ROI and Tobin's Q and SDEBITD. On the other hand, the graphs 
reveal a negative trend for the ROI with DDA. However, in regards to the related graphs, 
there is no clear trend for the PPE, log TA and C. RT with the ROI. The lines in these 
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graphs are close to the horizontal. Moreover, all graphs representing the above trends are 
summarized in the chapter appendix. 
In addition, selected variables have been chosen for the cross-sectional relationships. As 
it is shown in those graphs, there is a negative trend for the relationship between debt 
level TDMV and financial performance ROI, EVA, and PE. For the ownership structure 
represented by the number of major shareholders, there is no clear trend for this variable 
with TDMV, ROI, and PE; a horizontal line is clear for all three graphs. However, the 
remunerations variable reveals a positive trend with TDMV, ROI, and EVA as is shown 
in the following graphs. 
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6.4 Appendix for Chapter Six 
6.4.1 Variables' trends 
6.18 Panel data analysis trends for selected relationships: 
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6.4.2 Testing for Normal distributions: 
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6.26 SDEBI"I'DATA normality and Q-Q Plot: 
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6.34 ROE normality and Q-Q Plot: 
Before transformation After transformation 
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6.35 PE normality and 0-0 Plot: 
Before transformation After transformation 
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6.36 EVA normality and Q-Q Plot 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
REGRESSION 
MODELS 
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7.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter describes the study variables and confirms their suitableness to 
go through the statistical methods in order to attain the objectives of this study. 
This chapter presents firstly the regression models in general, followed by those 
which are used in this study. A detailed discussion is given about regression analysis 
in general, and then a discussion of the importance and advantages of using panel data 
statistics is explained. Furthermore, this chapter describes the importance of using 
pooled, fixed and random effects models and expresses the differences among these 
methods. Moreover, it expresses the specification tests related to the panel data 
analysis and the role of these tests in the coming results. The later sections in this 
chapter explain extensively the reasons for using two sets of statistics (cross-sectional 
and panel data) and the suitableness of using both in this study. The tests of 
multicollinearity for the study variables for different relationships are discussed in 
detail. This chapter ends with the correlation matrix between the study's variables. 
This chapter also discusses the statistical method introduced by (Baron & Kenny 
1986), which explains how to test the mediating role of a variable for a relationship. 
Regarding to the last objective of this study, in this chapter we will discuss how we 
can test the mediating role of the debt level for the relationship between determinants 
of capital structure and the firm's financial performance. 
7.2 Regression analysis 
Regression analysis is a statistical technique used to test the relationship between one 
dependent or (criterion) variable, and one or several independent or (predictor) 
variables. The objective of multiple regression analysis is to use the independent 
variables whose values are known to predict a selected single dependent variable 
(Hair J., Black W., Babin B., Anderson, & Talharn 2006). 
Simple regression can be expressed in the following equation: 
Y, =a+flX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Panel data equation differs from the previous equation in that it combines time series 
and cross-sections in the same relationship, as shown here: 
Y= a+ß1X11 +ß2X 2 +....... +AX# +uu 
where 
Y, Dependent variable 
a: Constant 
Xil 0X12IX : Independent variables 
u, r : 
Error terms. 
Error terms are assumed to have these properties: 
e(u) =0 (Exogeneity of independent variables) 
Var(u) = aZ , for all i =1... n, (Homoscedasticity and nonautocorrelation) 
Cov(u u1) =0, for all i#j (Homoscedasticity and nonautocorrelation) 
Error terms are assumed to have normal distribution with a mean of 0 (zero) and 
variance ofa 2. The mean of each u, conditioned of all observations X, is 0 (zero). 
The disturbance is assumed to have a conditional expected value of 0 (zero) at every 
observation. This assumption (exogeneity of independent variables) states that no 
observations of X, convey information about the expected value of the disturbance. 
In addition, these error terms are assumed to be independent. 
Homoscedasticity and nonautocorrelation assumption states that each disturbance 
u, has the same finite variance o. 2 and is uncorrelated with every other disturbance 
uj 
Cov(u,, u, ) =0 For i*j (Greene 2007). 
Most panel data studies use a one-way error model for disturbances with: 
uu - A+VII 
where 
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p, : Unobserved individual specific effect. A, is not time variant and accounts for any 
individual specific effect that is not included in the regression. 
V, r : Remainder disturbance; it varies with individual and time and is considered the 
usual disturbance in the regression. 
The linear model in panel data could be identified as in the following relationship: 
Yº =ßX it + u,, ; i=1 ...... N; t =1,...., T 
The coefficient parameter A3,, in the previous relationship reflects the effects of X in 
period t for the unit i. Ideally, many empirical studies assume that the /3;, is constant 
for all units and periods, except the intercept term: 
Yt =a, +A, X,, +u;, ; i=1...... N; t=1...... T 
The relationship above shows that the intercept is constant for all units and periods. 
7.3 Panel data statistics 
In this section, panel data estimators are presented which allow the researcher to 
construct and test more complicated behaviour than cross-sectional or time series 
estimators. 
Panel data is the combination of cross-sectional and time series data. It is common in 
economics since it provides massive sources of information about economy. Panel 
data is also called pooled data, micro panel data, longitudinal data, event history 
analysis and cohort analysis (Gujarati 2003). 
Analysis of panel data is the subject of one of the most active bodies in econometrics. 
Besides other benefits of panel data, researchers have been able to use time-series and 
cross-sectional data to examine issues that could not be studied in either time-series or 
cross-sectional settings alone (Greene 2007). 
7.3.1 Balanced and unbalanced panel data 
Panel data contains cross-sections which refer to individuals or companies, and time 
series refers to the time periods covered by the study. Balanced panel data occurs 
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when each cross-sectional unit has the same number of time series observations, 
whereas unbalanced panel data refers to the case that the number of observations 
differs among panel units (Gujarati 2003). 
Missing data are very common in panel data studies. In this study, the researcher 
considers the number of observations depends on the availability of the variables' data 
which are included in different relationships. The number of observations for each 
relationship is mentioned in the regression tables that follow in the next chapter for 
different relationships. 
7.3.2 Advantages and weaknesses of using panel data 
Many theoretical books discuss advantages and weaknesses of using panel data. 
Benefits of using panel data include the following: 
9 Panel data can control for individual heterogeneity, since it considers that 
individuals, firms or countries are heterogeneous. Other kinds of data like cross- 
sectional or time series sets do not control for this, and may produce biased 
results. 
41 Panel data gives a large number of data points and more informative data, 
increasing the degrees of freedom, efficiency and variability, and reducing 
collinearity among variables. 
" Panel data allow a researcher to analyze important issues that cannot be 
addressed by the cross-sectional or the time series data. Panel data can better 
detect and measure effects that cannot be observed by pure cross-sectional or 
pure time series data. If the panel data is long enough, it can shed light on the 
speed of adjustments to the economic policy changes. 
" Panel data allow a researcher to construct and test more complicated behaviour 
models than do purely cross-sectional or time series data. Also fewer restrictions 
are imposed to panel data sets compared to time series data sets. 
" Panel data supports the accuracy of variables measurements, since panel data are 
usually collected for the micro-level units. The accuracy in this level will be 
better and reduce the biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals. 
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However, a researcher should be careful in using panel data and consider the 
following limitations: 
" Design and data collection problems, these include problems of coverage 
(incomplete accounts of the population of interest), non-response due to lack of 
cooperation of the respondents, and other problems related to the interviews. 
For this study, data is downloaded from the DataStream database, and for the 
annual reports, the researcher used official websites to get these reports (www. 
Northcote. co. uk) 
9 Distortions or measurement errors. Measurement errors may arise because of 
inappropriate information and mis-recording of data. 
For the variables used in this study, all the indicators used for measurement are 
from the annual financial statements for UK listed firms, which are audited and 
published, reducing the chance of measurement errors. 
" Short time series dimension: typical panels include annual data covering a short 
period of time for each individual (firm), which means that asymptotic 
arguments depend crucially on the number of individuals tending to infinity. 
Increasing the time span of the panel is not without cost either. This will 
increase the chances of attrition and increase the computational difficulty for 
limited dependent variable panel data models. 
This research has relatively short time series and large cross-sections. Using the 
fixed versus random effects would be suitable to view individual specific effects 
for the cross-section units which are drawn from a large population. 
7.4 Panel data estimation 
There are three groups of models which control the estimation of static panel data 
models and depend on the intercept assumptions. These models are presented as 
follows: 
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First, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) considers a constant intercept among all 
cross-sectional units. The main assumption of this estimation method is that the 
regression coefficients, both the slope and intercept, are equal for all units (i. e., firms 
in this research). This estimation method ignores any form of heterogeneity across 
units. In other words, if heterogeneity (or individual effect) is observed for all 
individuals, this means there is only the constant term for all units, then the entire 
model can be treated as an ordinary linear model and fit by least squares (Greene 
2007). 
Second, Fixed Effects Models (FEM) assume that differences across units can be 
captured in differences in constant terms (Greene 2007). This model considers an 
intercept to vary between cross-sectional units, so each unit has a fixed, unique 
intercept and differences in the intercepts reflect the unobserved differences between 
these cross-sectional units. These differences are possibly due to the special features 
of each unit such as managerial style or managerial philosophy. Different dummy 
variables are used to allow for the fixed effects; therefore this method is called also 
the Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV) (Gujarati 2003). 
LSDV is widely used because it is relatively simple to estimate and understand. It 
becomes difficult when there are many groups in the panel data; in this case "LSDV" 
is useless, and the "within effect model" is required. 
When many dummies are needed to represent each unit, the within groups effect 
model is useful because it transforms variables using group means to avoid dummies. 
Accordingly, it does not use dummy variables but it uses deviations from group 
means. As a result of not using these dummy variables, this model has a larger degree 
of freedom from error. 
The "between effects" model uses group means of variables. In other words, the unit 
of analysis is not an individual observation, but groups or subjects. The number of 
observations skips down from (nT) to (n). This group mean regression generates 
different goodness-of-fits and parameter estimates from those of the least squared 
dummy variable (LSDV) and the within effect model. Also similar to within-groups, 
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Stata command for this model does not provide an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
table 
The least squared dummy variable (LSDV) is an OLS with dummy variables. A 
dummy variable is a binary variable that is coded either I or zero. It is commonly 
used to examine group and time effects in regression. The critical issue in LSDV is 
how to avoid the perfect multicollinearity "dummy variable trap. " LSDV has three 
approaches to avoid this trap. They produce different parameter estimates, but their 
results are equivalent, these estimates are: 
" LSDV 1: an OLS drops a dummy variable. 
" LSDV2: an OLS includes all dummies but drops the intercept; as a 
result it produces incorrect R-squared. 
9 LSDV3: an OLS includes all dummies and intercept, but imposes a 
restriction that the sum of parameters of all dummies is zero. 
Third, the Random Effects Model (REM) also allows the intercept to vary between 
units, but variation is treated as randomly determined, therefore this model avoids the 
loss of the degrees of freedom compared with the FEM. GLS estimator is a 
combination of between group and within group variations. The fixed effects, 
however, ignore the between units' variations and the only effect will be the intercept 
(Greene 2007). GLS introduces unit specific effects in the disturbances term; 
therefore the error term contains two components, the individual component and 
overall remainder, as follows: 
co = a, + v , both components are assumed to have normal distribution with a mean 
of 0 and variance ofar2. 
The random effect model is appropriate for n individuals who were drawn randomly 
from a large population. It assumes that q, is independent of u, 1 and X,,, which is 
not necessary in the fixed effects model. This model can be estimated by Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) if the variance structure is known and by Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) if the variance structure is unknown. 
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Moreover, panel data might have group effects, time effects or both. These group or 
time effects are either fixed or random. An FEM assumes differences in intercepts 
across groups or time periods, whereas a random effect model investigates the 
differences in error variances. In other words, it examines group and/or time influence 
error variances. A one-way model consists of only one set of dummy variables (e. g., 
firm), while a two-way model considers two sets of dummy variables (e. g., firm and 
year). A dummy variable is a part of the intercept in the fixed effects model and a part 
of the error in the random effects model, and shows that errors are independent 
identically distributed (Hun Myoung Park 2005). 
A one-way fixed group model examines group differences in the intercept. Dummy 
variables for the fixed model are created as many as the number of groups or subjects. 
Meanwhile the fixed time effect model investigates how time influences the intercept 
using time dummy variables, and the two-way fixed model considers both group and 
time effects, thus this model needs two sets of dummy variables to represent group 
and time differences (Hun Myoung Park 2005). 
7.5 Panel data motivation and error treatment 
The regression model is an essential statistical tool in econometrics. However, 
regression lines from economic data often cannot be given a causal interpretation. The 
reason behind that is the relation of interest between observables and un-observables. 
We might expect explanatory variables to be correlated with un-observables, whereas 
in the regression model regressors and un-observables are uncorrelated by 
construction. 
There are several reasons for such correlation between observables and un- 
observables. One of these reasons is due to the unobserved heterogeneity which is 
pervasive in cross-sectional regression analysis. Heterogeneity (or individual effect) 
across units is an integral part of the panel analysis and it is considered the central 
focus (Greene 2007). The traditional response of econometrics to such a problem has 
been multiple regressions and instrumental-variable models (Arellano 2003). 
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Econometrics researchers are interested here in the partial effects of the observable 
explanatory variables in the population of interest which includes both observables 
and unobservable variables. In other words, researchers like to hold the unobservable 
variables constant when obtaining partial effects of the observable explanatory 
variables. Unobservable variables are random variables, not a parameter to be 
estimated. This random variable can be called unobserved component or latent 
variable and the most common is the unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge 2002). 
The motivation of using panel data has been the ability to control for possibly 
correlated, time-invariant heterogeneity without observing it (Arellano 2003). In other 
words, to allow the unobserved effect to be correlated with the explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge 2002). 
Variable-intercept models are used to control for the heterogeneity across individuals 
and/or through time. The basic assumption of these models is that the effects of 
omitted or excluded variables are determined by three types of variables: individual 
time-invariant variables, period individual-invariant variables and individual time- 
varying variables. 
First, individual time-invariant variables are those which are the same for given cross- 
sectional units through time but vary across cross-sectional units. Examples for these 
variables include the attributes of individual-firm management, ability and sex. 
Second, period individual-invariant variables are those that are the same for all cross- 
sectional units at a given point of time but that vary through time, such as prices and 
interest rates. Third, individual time-varying variables are those which vary across 
cross-sectional units at a given point of time, but also exhibit variations through time, 
such as a firm's profit and sales. 
The variable-intercept models assume that the effects of the numerous omitted 
individual-time varying variables are each individually insignificant but are together 
significant. Also they have the property of a random variable that is un-correlated 
with all other included or excluded variables. On the other hand, they can be absorbed 
in the intercept term of the regression model because of the effects of remaining 
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omitted variables. These are valid and either remains constant through time for a 
given cross-sectional unit, or is the same for all cross-sectional units at a given period 
of time or a combination of both, This absorbability allows for the individual and/or 
time heterogeneity contained in the temporal cross-sectional data. The variable- 
intercept models can provide a useful specification for fitting regression models using 
panel data (Hsiao 1986). 
FEM (within-groups) assume that the individual specific effects (u) are fixed 
parameters to be estimated, and that the remaining disturbance component is 
independent. On the other hand, REM (between-groups estimator) are two error 
components (u, v) and assume that these components are independent of each other 
(Baltagi 2001). 
The fixed effects estimation method assumes intercepts vary across firms but that 
each individual intercept does not vary over time (time invariant). These differences 
in intercepts among firms are due to the special features of each company, such as 
managerial style or managerial philosophy. Intercept can be allowed to vary between 
companies by using a dummy variable for each company (Gujarati 2003). 
For the error treatment, the fixed effects method treats the unobservable specific 
effects A, as fixed constants. This means µ, is assumed to be fixed parameters and the 
remaining disturbances are stochastic. Also it is assumed that the parameters X are 
independent of the remainder disturbance Vi for all cross-sectional units and all 
periods. The term "fixed effects" does not usually mean that the unobservable 
variables are to be treated as non-random, rather it means that one is allowing for 
arbitrary correlation between the unobservable and the observable variables. 
Random effect models treat the individual specific effects like u as random 
variables. In regression analysis, it is normal practice to assume that there are many 
variables affecting the value of the dependent variable, but not necessary to be 
included as independent variables, this can be appropriately summarized by a random 
disturbance. When numerous firms are observed, it is assumed sometimes that some 
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of the omitted variables will represent strange factors. These factors are strange for 
the firms themselves and for the time period for which observations are obtained. 
Whereas other variables will reflect individual differences that tend to affect the 
observations for an individual firm in same way over time. Other variables may 
reflect factors which are strange to specific time periods, but affecting individual 
firms equally (Hsiao 1986). 
7.6 Panel data specification tests 
7.6.1 Testing group effects (F-test): POOLED or FEM 
The question is: How can we know whether there are fixed group effects? The null 
hypothesis is that all dummy parameters except one are zero, as shown here: 
Ho : fy =... =fin-1 =0 
This hypothesis is tested by F test, which is based on loss of goodness-of-fit. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, this concludes that the fixed group effect model is better 
than the pooled OLS model. A large F statistic rejects the null hypothesis in favour of 
the fixed group effect model (p <. 0000) (Hun Myoung Park 2005). 
7.6.2 Testing random effects: (LM) test: POOLED or REM 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is designed to test random effects. 
This test assumes under the null hypothesis that there are no random effects; if this 
hypothesis is rejected (according to the given value of Chi-squared distribution), this 
means there are random effects and the random effects (REM) model will be favoured 
over the pooled ordinary least squares model (POLS). 
The null hypothesis of the one-way random group effect model is that the variances of 
groups are zero: 
Ho : Qu =0 
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If the null hypothesis is accepted, the pooled regression model is appropriate, but if is 
rejected, random is appropriate. With a large chi-squared, we reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the random group effect model (Hun Myoung Park 2005). 
7.6.3 Hausman (1978) Test: 
Which model is better, FEM or REM? This question seems to be hard to answer. 
(Judge et al. 1980) recommend a few suggestions which are related to the context of 
the data, and its environment beside the correlation between error component and the 
regressors. If it is assumed to be uncorrelated, random effects may be appropriate, 
whereas if correlated, fixed effects are unbiased and then are more appropriate. 
The (Hausman 1978) specification test can be used to determine the appropriate 
method, i. e., fixed or random effects models. However, econometricians seem to be 
united generally that the random effects model is more appropriate to be used if 
individuals are drawn randomly from a large population. By contrast, the FEM is 
more appropriate in the case of focusing on specific sets of firms. 
An important test for model specifications is to decide whether the FEM or REM is 
more appropriate (Maddala 2001). The null hypothesis is that the residuals in the 
random effects model (REM) are uncorrelated with the regressors and that the model 
is correctly specified. Consequently, the estimated coefficients by the REM or FEM 
should be statistically equal. Otherwise, the REM estimator is inconsistent. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, then the units' specific effects are correlated with the regressors 
or the models are not correctly specified (Baltagi 2001). In other words, the null 
hypothesis states that individual effects are not correlated with the other regressors in 
the model. If correlated (HO is rejected), a random effects model produces biased 
estimators, so the fixed effects model is preferred (Hun Myoung Park 2005). 
To put it more simply, the idea behind this test is that if u, is uncorrelated with x,,, 
then there is no difference between estimates from both fixed effects (within group's 
estimator) or random effects (GLS estimator) models. 
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Ho : u, are not correlated with x, 
H, : u, are correlated with x,, 
Under the null hypothesis, random effects would be consistent and efficient (i. e., 
Ho 
is true), but under the alternative hypothesis, random effects would be inconsistent. 
The FEM is consistent whether the null hypothesis is true or not, this means if the 
Hausman test is significant then we accept the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
correlation between the individual effects and x (Baltagi 2001). 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients which are estimated 
by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the 
consistent fixed effects estimator. If so, this includes insignificant P-value, Prob > 
chi2 larger than . 05, then 
it is more suitable to use random effects. However, if we 
have a significant P-value, then we should use fixed effects. 
7.6.4 Wald Test: joint significance 
The Wald test is a statistical test and is simply used to test whether an effect exists or 
not. In other words, it tests whether an independent variable has a statistically 
significant relationship with a dependent variable. 
The Wald test of joint significance described by (Polft 1996) and (Agresti 1990) is a 
way of testing the significance whether all the coefficients are simultaneously equal to 
zero. Null hypothesis under this test is that all are zero; meanwhile, the alternative 
hypothesis is that they are not all equal to zero. 
If, for a group of explanatory variables, the Wald test is significant, we would 
conclude that the coefficients are not zero; this means these variables should be 
included in the model. On the other hand, if null hypothesis is false, then explanatory 
variables can be omitted from the model. 
An alternative approach to test the significance of a number of explanatory variables 
is to use the likelihood ratio test. (Agresti 1990) argues it is appropriate to use this test 
if the sample size is small or parameters are large. 
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7.6.5 The poolability test: 
This test asks if slopes are the same across groups or over time. In order to conduct 
the poolability test, we need to run group by group OLS regression and/or time by 
time OLS regression. The null hypothesis for the first type is 
Ho : ßk = ßk Under the assumption u N(O, s2Ir1T) 
Similarly the null hypothesis of the poolability test over time is 
Ho : /irk =f 'k 
This test uses the F test statistic, in that if the null hypothesis is rejected, the panel 
data are not poolable. In this case, the random coefficient model and hierarchical 
model can be used. 
In poolability testing across groups, a large F statistic rejects the null hypothesis of 
poolability (p < . 0000). We conclude that the panel data are not poolable with respect 
to the group. F test is: 
IF- (e'e-2: e, e, )/(n-1) *K -F[(n-1)K, n(T-K)] Z e, e, /n(T-K) 
Where 
e'e is the SSE of the pooled OLS 
e, 'e, is the SSE of the OLS regression for group I (Hun Myoung Park 2005) 
This test detects whether the data can be pooled by using the F test. If the calculated F 
is smaller than the critical value, the null hypothesis of homogeneous slopes and 
intercepts across the (N) should be accepted. If the null hypothesis is accepted, then 
the data can be pooled and the panel data modelling approach is appropriate. 
7.7 Two sets of statistics 
Regarding the study hypotheses and the variables measurement used in this study, this 
research will use two sets of statistics: panel data and cross-sectional statistics. All the 
study hypotheses assigned for this research will be tested in both sets, 
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Panel data analysis is used for the whole period targeted in this study from 1992 to 
2006. Moreover, cross-sectional analysis covers the year of 2005 only because of the 
data limitation described before. Additionally, panel data analysis uses three measures 
of financial performance, namely return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE), 
and price earnings ratio (PE). In addition to these three measures, cross-sectional 
analysis has an additional performance measure, economic value added (EVA) due to 
unavailability of data for this variable for the panel study period. Furthermore, cross- 
sectional analysis will have more variables that reflect the ownership structure and 
CEO remunerations also due to unavailability of data for the panel period. 
A panel analysis limitation for this study is the unavailability of data for the economic 
value added, ownership structure and remunerations for the panel study period (1992- 
2006). However, a good picture is expected for the study results if these data are 
available. The use of cross-sectional data analysis is an attempt to mend this limitation, 
or at least give an indication of the proposed effect for these variables. Therefore, we 
believe that it is worthwhile to run a cross-sectional analysis for the research 
hypotheses considering these variables. 
The year of 2005 is selected due to the maximum availability of data for these 
additional variables. The data for these variables are collected directly from the 
companies' annual reports. The use of the EVA variable is worth to compare the 
results with the other financial performance results according to the advantages 
mentioned before. However, to compute the EVA figure, it is essential to have the 
data of the weighted average cost of capital. Unfortunately, data is unavailable for the 
whole period in either the DataStream database or in the annual reports. 
7.8 The mediating role of debt 
It is expected for the debt level to have a mediating role between determinants of 
capital structure and the firm's financial performance. Testing the mediating role of a 
variable between two variables is prepared following the criteria suggested by (Baron 
& Kenny 1986). 
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The third objective for this study investigates the direct relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance. Moreover, the 
goal from including the debt level for the previous relationship is to test whether the 
relationship is valid directly or through the debt level. There are two kinds of 
mediating roles for a variable, full (complete) and partial. 
A variable is said to be fully (complete) mediated in a relationship between a 
predictor and an outcome variable if the predictor variable first has an effect on the 
mediator variable, and this in turn influences the outcome variable. On the other hand, 
sometimes a variable may be a "partial mediator" of a relationship between a 
predictor variable and an outcome. The predictor variable exerts some of its influence 
via a mediating variable, and it exerts some of its influence directly and not via a 
mediator (Miles & Shevlin 2001). 
For the mediating effect in the fourth relationship in this study, it will only be 
accepted if the criteria specified by (Baron & Kenny 1986) are met. The mediator 
relationship can be detected and established if: 
" The independent variables; determinants of capital structure (X) are significant 
predictors of the dependent variable financial performance (Y), using 
regression. 
" The independent variables; determinants of capital structure (X) are significant 
predictors of the dependent variable debt level (M), using regression. 
" The independent variable debt level (M) is a significant predictor of the 
dependent variable financial performance (Y), when independent variables 
determinants of capital structure (X) are controlled for. 
" In case of a complete mediator relationship, the effect of independent variables 
determinants of capital structure (X) on the dependent variable the financial 
performance (Y), when controlled for the mediator capital structure (M), 
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should be zero, but in the case of partial mediator relationship, this effect will 
be reduced. 
7.9 Testing for Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when the independent variables are highly correlated. Usually 
the multicollinearity is existing if the correlation between two independent variables is 
more than 0.90 (r = 0.9 and above) (Pallant 2005). 
As it appears in the correlation matrix table follows, there is no such high correlation 
between the determinants of capital structure that they will be used as independent 
variables. For the debt measures, as it appears, there is high correlation between these 
debt measures if they are used as independent variables in a same regression. 
Therefore, each indicator will be used individually in any regression. 
Variance inflation factor VIF is a widely used method to test for multicollinearity; it 
measures the increase in the variance of a coefficient as a result of collinearity. Also, 
tolerance (TOL) is a commonly used measure of collinearity and multicollinearity. It 
is represented by 1-R*, where R* is the coefficient of determination for the prediction 
of a variable by the other independent variables. As the tolerance value smaller, the 
variable is more highly predicted by the other independent variables. 
VIF is directly related to the tolerance value (VIF = l/TOL), More than 10 for VIF 
values or TOL less than . 10 indicates high degrees of collinearity or multicollinearity 
among the independent variables (Hair J., Black W., Babin B., Anderson, & Talham 
2006). 
Having guidance from the correlation matrix, variables are tested for multicollinearity 
using Stata software for each relationship testing the values of variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and tolerance (TOL). Consequently, correlation matrix, VIF and 
tolerance results are acceptable and prove that the data is free of multicollinearity. 
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Hie first following table represents the multicollinearity test for the determinants of 
capital structure in the first relationship as independent variables, whereas the 
dependent variable in this relationship is the debt level using the tour measures TDUV, 
'l'DMV, LDBV, and LDMV respectively. All VIF and TOL are acceptable and prove 
that there is no multicollinearity problem for all regressions. 
Takle 7.1 Multicollinearity test for determinants of capital structure in the first relationship 
TDBV TD MV LD BV LD MV 
Variable VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF 
ebitd 2.770 0.361 2.770 0.361 2.770 0.361 2.770 0.361 
mrg 2.600 0.384 2.580 0.388 2.590 0.386 2.580 0.388 
dda 1.950 0.512 1.930 0.518 1.960 0.511 1.930 0.518 
e 1.680 0.595 1.670 0.599 1.680 0.595 1.670 0.599 
is 1.450 0.689 1.470 0.681 1.450 0.689 1.470 0.681 
Igta 1.290 0.776 1.260 0.794 1.290 0.775 1.260 0.794 
crt 1.200 0.832 1.180 0.845 1.200 0.830 1.180 0.845 
rvqth 1.160 0.859 1.150 0.869 1.160 0.861 1_150 0.869 
sdiv 1.060 0.940 1.070 0.939 1.060 0.941 1.070 0.939 
Mean VIF 1.690 1.680 1.690 1.680 
Dependent Variable: I)cht I. ev'el as it is headed ahuve 
The second table represents the multicollinearity test for the determinants of capital 
structure in the third relationship as independent variables. The dependent variable in 
this relationship is the firm's financial performance using four factors, ROt, ROE, PF, 
and EVA. All VIF and ml, are acceptable and prove that there is no multicollincarity 
problem for all regressions. 
Table 7.2 Multicollincarity test for determinants of capital structure in the third relationship 
ROI ROE P E EVA 
Variable VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF 
_ 
VIF 1NIF 
e 1.47 0.678 1.49 _ 0.671 1.48 0.676 1.5 0.666 
dda 1.36 0.736 1.35 0.741 1.48 0.677 1.42 0.706 
Ito 1.21 0.826 1.28 0.782 1.29 0.774 1.22 0.820 
crt 1.16 0.858 1.19 0.840 1.29 0.777 1.16 0.863 
is 1.12 0.889 1.18 0.847 1.15 0.866 1.12 0.891 
rvgth 1.06 0.943 1.05 0.948 1.1 0.911 1.06 0.946 
sdiv 1.03 0.972 1.04 0.965 1.06 0.939 1.03 0.974 
Mean VIF 1.2 1.23 1.26 1.21 
UcpenlIcnt variable: firm's tinancial performance 
The third table represents the multicollinearity test for the second relationship. Debt is 
considered as an independent variable using tour factors '1'1)1W, TI)MV, LD1V, and 
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LDMV, and the firm's financial performance is the dependent variable using Four 
indicators, ROI, ROE, PE, and EVA. 
able 7. i Multicollincarity test for second rclationshin 
ROI RO E PE EVA 
Variable VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF 
Idmv 40.620 0.025 57.240 0.017 41.980 0.024 39.870 0.025 
tdmv 35.630 0.028 52.450 0.019 40.810 0.025 34.970 0.029 
Idbv 33.260 0.030 51.220 0.020 32.840 0.030 31.990 0.031 
tdbv 28.800 0.035 46.570 0.021 31.900 0.031 27.660 0.036 
Mean VIF 34.58 51.87 36.88 33.62 
Dependent variable: firm's financial performance 
From the above table, VIF values appear to be more than 10 for all debt variables. 
However, it is clear that there is high multicollinearity between the debt level 
variables if it used as independent variables in the same regression. Because of this 
high multicollinearity, afterwards, this relationship will not contain more than one 
debt indicator with the firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. This will 
be discussed in detail in the results chapter that follows. 
The fourth table tests the multicollinearity for the second relationship including all 
control variables using the ROI as dependent variable and IDUV to reflect the debt 
variables. Regarding the first test, it is clear that there is a very high multicollinearity 
between remuneration variables, VIF is 1579.54 for the CIF salaries, and 1579.15 Ihr 
the CFO other benefits. Therefore, the second test show the multicollinearity for the 
same relationship after excluding one of these two variables, the CIO salaries denoted 
by (NSAL). For the second test, all VIF and TOL are acceptable and prove that there 
is no multicollinearity problem. 
Table 7.4 Mtilt icolIinearity test for second relationship including control variables 
ROI 
Test 1 Test 2 
Variable VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF 
nsal 1579.54 0.001 
n1 sal 1579.15 0.001 4.69 0.213 
ntss 
_ 
4.72 0.212 3.41 0.293 
nltss 3.42 0.292 2.32 0.430 
ntssno 2.34 0.428 1.18 0.844 
dvisze 1.18 0.848 1.13 0.888 
tdbv 
dvind 
1.13 
1.12 
0.887 
0.893 
1.11 
1.07 
0.903 
0.932 
Mean VIF 396.58 2.13 
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The fifth table tests the multicollinearity for the second relationship including all 
control variables using the other three variables of firm's financial performance as 
dependent variables and TDBV to reflect the debt variables. From the table below, all 
VIF and TOI. are acceptable and prove that there is no multicollinearity problem for 
all regressions. 
Table 7.5 MulticoIIinearity test for second relationship including control variab 
PE ROE EVA 
Variable VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF VIF 1NIF 
ntss 4.710 0.212 4.670 0.214 4.680 0.213 
nitss 3.480 0.288 3.390 0.295 3.370 0.296 
ntssno _ 2.180 0.459 2.290 0.436 2.360 0.424 
dvisze 1.170 0.853 1.200 0.834 1.180 0.845 
tdbv 1.110 0.898 1.130 0.884 1.130 0.883 
dvind 1.090 0.915 1.110 0.903 1.090 0.918 
n1sal 1.080 0.930 1.080 0.928 1.080 0.924 
Mean VIF 2.120 2.120 2.130 
7.10 Model specifications tests 
les 
Specification tests arc discussed in details before in this chapter. 't'his section gives a 
summary of this study's specification tests for all related regressions. Moreover, these 
tests have been investigated for every single regression in the next chapter to assure 
that the study chooses the right test in each regression. 
In general, to choose between fixed effects models (FEM) and pooled OLS depends 
on the F-test. The null hypothesis states that all dummy parameters except one are 
zero. A large F statistic rejects the null hypothesis in favour of the fixed group elect 
model, p< . 
0000. This concludes that the fixed group effect model is better than the 
pooled OLS model. In this study, we have high F statistics (p < . 
0000); accordingly, 
the researcher concludes that the fixed group effect model is better than the pooled 
OLS model in all relationships done in this study as is shown in the following table. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to choose between the random effects model (RUM) and 
pooled OLS, this will be accomplished by the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
(I, M) test. The null hypothesis of the one-way random group ctllect model is that the 
variances of groups are zero. Large chi-squared values reject the null hypothesis in 
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favour of the random group effect model. The researcher concludes that the random 
effects method is appropriate and better than the pooled method for all relationships 
made in this study as discussed extensively earlier. All Chi squared values appear in 
the following table. 
Finally, we depend on the probability of chi2 of the Hausman test to choose between 
the REM and FEM. The null hypothesis is that individual effects are not correlated 
with the other regressors in the model. The researcher accepts the alternative 
hypothesis for all relationships which indicates that there is a correlation between the 
individual effects and regressors (xil). In this case, the I lausman specification test 
confirms the superiority of the fixed effect model over the random effects model as is 
shown in the following table. 
The following table summarizes all specification tests for this study. The first column 
expresses the relationship. The second column expresses the variables included in the 
relationship as discussed earlier. The last three columns present the F statistics, LM 
statistics, and I lausman tests statistics respectively. 
"fahle 7.6 Model snccilications tests summary: 
F test LM test Hausm an test 
Relationship Relationship 
Variables chi2 
Prob> 
chit chit 
Prob> 
chi2 chi2 
Prob> 
chi2 
TDBV _ 439.46 0.0000 5523.24 0.0000 18.94 0.0257 
TDMV Determinants C 3110.74 0.0000 4210.57 
0.0000 165.16 0.0000 
--- LDBV of apital t St 510.47 0.0000 4172.4 0.0000 37.61 0.0000 
LDMV ure ruc 1759.73 0.0000 4031.58 0.0000 162.11 0.0000 
2 PE TDMV 4.67 0.0000 1134.18 0.0000 0.7 0.4018 
ROI Determinants 7.03 0.0000 1705.54 0.0000 51.91 0.0000 
3 ROE of Capital 6.42 0.0000 1286.74 0.0000 48.15 0.0000 
PE Structure 3.73 0.0000 531.3 0.0000 27.66 0.0003 
TDBV 7.26 0.0000 1711.85 0.0000 68.75 0.0000 
4 1 ROI TDMV 7.17 0.0000 
1724.44 0.0000 89.7 0.0000 
. LDBV 7.08 0.0000 1692.94 0.0000 - 56.28 0.0000 
LDMV 6.97 0.0000 1713.89 
- 
0.0000 
-- - - 
70.76 0.0000 
TDBV 6.38 0.0000 
--- 
201.39 1201.39 0.0000 0.00 00 
------- 
72.35 0.0000 
4 2 ROE TDMV 6.33 0_0000 1234.85 0.0000 
---- 107.72 - ---- - 0.0000 
. LDBV 6.3 0.0000 1229.35 0.0000 54.48 0.0000 
LDMV 6.24 0.0000 1271.04 0.0000_ _ 72.36 0.0000 
TDBV 3.94_ 
- _0.0000 ----- 
569.75 0.0000 36.03 0.0000 
3 4 PE TDMV 3.78 
_ 0.0000 _ 543.04 ---- 0.0000 --- - 31.97 ----- 0.0001 
. LDBV 3.89 0.0000 560.69 0.0000 35.17 0.0000 
LDMV 3.77 0.0000 535.96 0.0000 33.91 0.0000 
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7.11 Summary of chapter seven: 
Chapter seven illustrates the regression models used in this study explaining the 
deference in the panel regression equation and the simple regression equation, this 
leads to the importance of using the panel analysis in terms of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity and other advantages explained extensively in the chapter. 
However, we explain also the weaknesses of using the panel data and we offer 
justifications for these disadvantages according to this study work. 
Furthermore, this chapter describes the importance of using pooled, fixed and random 
effects models and expresses the differences among these methods and how each of 
these regressions deal with errors. Moreover, specification tests related to the panel 
analysis are explained extensively. This helps the researcher to choose the right 
method and tests which have been used onwards in analysing the results. 
This chapter also discusses the statistical method introduced by (Baron & Kenny 
1986), which explains how to test the mediating role of a variable for a relationship. 
Regarding to the last objective of this study, in this chapter we discuss how we can 
test the mediating role of the debt level for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and the firm's financial performance. 
The later sections in this chapter explain extensively the reasons lies behind using two 
sets of statistics (cross-sectional and panel data) and the suitableness of using both in 
this study. This chapter ends with tests of multicollinearity for the study variables for 
different relationships depending on the correlation matrix between the study's 
variables. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
RESULTS 
ANALYSIS 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the regression results of static panel data and cross-sectional models 
including all regressions in the four relationships tested in this study. The first set of regressions 
investigates the relationship between the determinants of capital structure as independent 
variables and the debt level as a dependent variable. This relationship is represented by 
Relationship one. The second set of regressions are titled by Relationship two and show the 
results of the relationship between debt level as an independent variable and a firm's financial 
performance as a dependent variable. 
The third set of regressions is represented by Relationship three and investigates the direct 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance. The 
fourth set of regressions denoted by Relationship four investigates the mediating role of debt 
level for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial 
performance. 
This chapter contains two sections: the first section presents the results of panel data analysis 
results, and the second section presents the cross-sectional analysis results. All the above 
regressions will be presented firstly without introducing the control factors, followed by testing 
control variables' effect to see if they have any significant effect. 
Moreover, a brief summary for each of the above relationships is presented at the end of each 
section to sum up that relationship. 
8.2 Static panel data results 
This section presents and discusses the regression results for the four relationships-as presented 
earlier-of static panel data models for three estimates: the pooled OLS model, the fixed effects 
model (FEM), and the random effects model (REM). These three estimates are compared to find 
the method that offers the best model by examining the values of R squared value, F test, LM test 
and Hausman specification test. Each regression is followed by the effect of control variables. 
Industry, firm's size, ownership structure and CEO remunerations are used to control the study 
relationships for panel data analysis and cross-sectional data analysis where appropriate. 
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The FEM using dummy variables is known as the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model 
(Gujarati 2003), p. 652). LSDV regression in Stata is the same as for OLS (. regress). Due to the 
combination of cross-sectional data and time-series data, the OLS regression technique is 
unsuitable for the analysis (Learner 1978). Accordingly, the researcher uses the GLS random 
effects model for controlling the dummy variables. 
The firm's size as a control variable for the second relationship is considered to be a dummy 
variable. Since firms may have different assets through the study period from 1992 to 2006, an 
average for the whole period for each company is considered. Therefore, firms are classified 
according to their sizes. The average of the firm's size for the whole sample according to the 
logarithm of assets is 5.63 1, so a dummy variable is considered, given 1 if the firm's size more 
than this average and 0 otherwise. 
8.2.1 Relationship one 
As mentioned before, this first relationship investigates the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables and debt level as a dependent variable. Relationship 
one represents the relationship between determinants of capital structure as independent 
variables, and debt level as dependent variable. Four indicators are used to represent the debt 
level as a dependent variable; book value of total debt (TDBV), book value of long-term debt 
(LDBV), market value of total debt (TDMV) and market value of long-term debt (LDMV). 
The following section represents the first relationship for these four dependent variables 
followed by the effect of the control variables (industry sector only for the panel analysis and 
industry and ownership structure for the cross-sectional analysis for the first relationship). This 
sections ends with a summary for the first relationship. 
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1. Dependent variable: Total debt book value (T1)HV) 
The following table shows the regression results for the relationship between the i'I)I3V as a 
dependent variable and determinants of capital structure as independent variables. The number of 
observations is 3899 observations represented by 413 groups. 
Table 8.1 Relationshin 1 (TDI3V): 
Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P Si Coef_ P (Sig) 
_ 
Coef. P SSi 
Observations 3899 3899 3899 
No. of Groups 413 413 
ppe 0.0013 0.936 0.064 0.018 0.0683 0.002 
rv th -0.0327 0.014 -0.0036 0.727 -0.0084 0.399 
tsq -0.0883 0.000 -0.0744 0.000 -0.0797 0.000 
mrg -0.1372 0.000 -0.1012 0.000 -0.1074 0.000 
ebitd 0.051 0.021 -0.0384 0.078 -0.0221 0.290 
--Uta- 0.2026 0.000 0.1115 0.000 0.1483 0.000 
sdiv 0.0015 0.908 -0.0035 0.708 -0.0025 0.786 
dda -0.0129 0.430 0.0437 0.022 0.0311 0.080 
crt -0.4134 0.000 -0.3473 0.000 -0.3604 0.000 
cons 0.0083 0.522 0.0113 0.202 0.0372 0.294 
R-s uared 0.2919 0.2745 0.2814 
F, chi2 value 178.15 87.52 974.28 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 439 . 46 F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 18.94 
test Prob>chi2 0.0257 
chi2 5523.24 
LM test Prob>chi1 0.0000 
f ependent variable t otal Debt (BV): TDBV 
fliese regressions as a whole are significant at a 1% level of significance in the three methods as 
shown in the probability of F=0.0000 in pooled and fixed effects methods and probability of 
chi2 = 0.0000 for the random method. It has been noted that the R-squared is nearly the same for 
the three methods, pooled, fixed and random for the regressions of 29%, 27% and 28%, 
respectively. 
From the above table, we can draw the results which further explain the fixed ciThets model since 
it is the most suitable method, as was explained earlier in the previous chapter. 
From the above table, there is a positive relationship between TRDV and PI'F, LG'I'A, and l)DA. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between i'l3UV and growth opportunities 
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represented by growth in sales (RVGTH) and 'I'obin's Q ('fSQ). Also there is a negative 
relationship between profitability represented by net margin (MRG) and earnings before interes, 
tax, and depreciation (EEITD), firm's risk (S. DIV) and firm's liquidity (C. RT) on the one hand 
and Tn[3V on the other. Confidence levels are as shown in the above table. 
Moreover, these results are generally t he same for FEM and RC: M models. The following 
relationship represents the fixed effects method: 
I'dbv = . 01 1+ . 064 ppe -. 004 rvgth -. 074 tsq -. 101 mrg -. 038 ebitd + . 112 Igta -. 003 s. div + . 044 dda - 
. 347 c. rt 
The results after controlling the industry sector as a dummy variable show that industry sector 
has significant correlation at the 1% level with the TBDV. Therefore, there is a difference 
between industrial and non-industrial firms regarding the relationship with the debt level. 
Including the dummy variables does not change the direction of independent variables' effects as 
is shown in the following table. 
Table 8.2: Relationship I (TDBV) with dummy variables: 
The effect of'dimmmy varia bles: 
Coef. P>z 
Number of observations 3899 
Number of groups 413 
e 0.071 0.001 
rvgth -0.008 0.402 
is -0.078 0.000 
mrg -0.105 0.000 
ebitd -0.025 0.231 
to 0.152 0.000 
sdiv -0.003 0.778 
dda 0.032 0.073 
crt -0.361 0.000 
dvind 0.189 0.011 
cons 
Tý. -0.029 
0.508 
.. R- y_ _ 0.2 86 
Wald chit - 983.32 
Prob > chi2, F 0.0000 
Uepenoent vanaoie: 1 oral oebt book value (ttlbv) 
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2. Dependent variable: Total debt market value 
The following table shows the regression results for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables and the market value debt level (TDMV) as a 
dependent variable. The number of observations for this regression is 3936 observations 
represented by 413 groups. 
Table 83 Relationship I (TDMV) 
tdmv Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (5 ) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3936 _ 3936 3936 
No. of Groups 413 413 
e 0.099 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.118 0.000 
rv th -0.009 0.382 -0.006 0.511 -0.005 0.530 
is -0.541 0.000 -0.403 0.000 -0.446 0.000 
mrg -0.115 0.000 -0.096 0.000 -0.098 0.000 
ebitd 0.018 0.284 -0.056 0.002 -0.037 0.030 
to 0.184 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.186 0.000 
sdiv 0.000 0.986 -0.004 0.609 -0.004 0.584 
dda -0.032 0.014 0.000 0.981 -0.012 0.418 
crt -0.236 0.000 -0.211 0.000 -0.218 0.000 
cons -0.001 0.907 -0.003 0.705 0.037 0.133 
R-squared 0.565 0.5565 0.5606 
F, chi2 value 566.53 256.6 3110.74 
Pro6> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 3110.74 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 165.16 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
--ý---- chit 4210.57 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
Dependent variable Total debt (Market value) 
The model as a whole is significant in the three methods as shown in the probability of' F= 
0.0000 in pooled and fixed effects methods and probability of chit = 0.0000 for the random 
method. It has been noted that the R-squared for this regression is much better than the previous 
one; with the result that market value debt ratio is a better indicator to predict the debt level. 
I lowever, R-squared tör this regression is nearly the same for the three methods, pooled, fixed 
and random fier this model, of 57%, 56% and 56%, respectively. The fixed efFects model is the 
best to describe the panel data in this regression as is shown clearly in the panel data 
specification tests in the above table. "therefore, the results which are further explained are fier 
the fixed effects model. 
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The results for this regression give the same signs of the previous regression for the relationships 
between dependent and independent variables. To summarize, there is a positive relationship 
between PPf, LG'I'A and DDA on the one hand and the TDMV on the other. Moreover, there is 
a negative relationship between growth opportunities represented by RVG'flI and TSQ, 
profitability represented by both MRG and FE3ITD, S. DIV and C. RT on the one hand and 
'FDMV on the other. Confidence levels are as shown in the above table. Moreover, these results 
are generally the same for both fixed model and random effects model. The equation follows 
represents the fixed effects method: 
'I'dmv = -. 003 + . 
0103 ppe -. 006 rvgth -. 403 tsq -. 096 mrg -. 056 ebitd + . 177 
Igta -. 004 s. div + . 
0004 dda - 
. 
211 c. rt 
Results show that industry sector has significant correlation at 99% level with the TDMV. 
"Therefore, there is a difference between industrial and non-industrial companies regarding the 
relationship with the debt level. The dummy variables do not change the direction of independent 
variables' effects as is shown in the following table. 
Table 8.4 Relationship I (TDMV) with dummy variables: 
The effect of dummy variables: 
_ 
------- T Coef. P>z 
___ _ Number of observations 3963 
Number of groups 413 
pe_ 0.122 0.000 
rvgth -0.005 0.553 
tsq -0.445 0.000 
m r -0.094 0.000 _ 
ebitd -0.041 0.015 
Igta 0.191 0.000 
sdiv -0.004 0.567 
dda -0.011 0.464 
crt -0.219 0.000 
dvind 0.198 0.000 
cons -0.033 0.279 
R-sq 
Wald chit 
0.5653 
3142.66 
Prob > chi2, F 0.0000 
I) qwIl tent vanaDle: I oral debt market value (tdmv) 
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3. Dependent variable: Long-tern debt book value 
The following table shows the regression results for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables and the LDBV as a dependent variable. The number of 
observations for this regression is 3888 observations represented by 413 groups. 
Table 8.5 Relationshin I (I, DBV) 
ldbv Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (Sig) C oct: I' (tii ) Cud'. P (Sig) 
Observations 3888 3888 3888 
No. of Groups 413 413 
e 0.069 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.144 0.000 
rvgth 0.024 0.082 0.018 0.094 0.019 0.076 
IN -0.099 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.083 0.000 
mr -0.092 0.000 -0.083 0.000 -0.088 0.000 
ebitd 0.036 0.107 -0.010 0.657 0.003 0.905 
to 0.300 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.348 0.000 
sdiv 0.003 0.822 -0.002 0.835 -0.001 0.908 
dda 0.029 0.083 0.055 0.006 0.047 0.011 
crt -0.221 0.000 -0.042 0.023 -0.080 0.000 
cons 0.002 0.872 -0.007 0.421 0.045 0.194 
R-squared 0.2431 0.2126 0.2242 
F, chit value 138.41 40.53 510.47 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 5 10.47 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 37.61 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit 4172.4 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
This table represent the dependent variable: Long-term debt (Book value) 
The model as a whole is significant for the three methods as shown in the probability of F _= 
0.0000 in pooled and fixed effects methods and probability of chi2 - 0.0000 for the random 
method. It has been noted that the R-squared values for this regression are similar to the R- 
squared values in the first relationship represented with 'FRI)V. Ilowever, R-squared for this 
regression is nearly the same for the three methods, pooled, fixed and random tier this model of 
24%, 21 % and 22%, respectively. 
'Ehe results for this regression give nearly the same signs as the previous regression For the 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. The exception is for the growth 
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opportunities measured by the RVG'FII which gives a different sign but in both cases the 
relationship is not significant. To summarize, there is a positive relationship between PPE', 
RVGTI I, LGTA and DDA on one hand and LDBV on the other. However, there is a negative 
relationship between TSQ, MRG, EGITD, S. DIV and C. RT on the one hand and I, DBV on the 
other. Confidence levels are as shown in the above table. 
The equation follows represents the fixed effects method since it is the best to describe panel 
data in this regression as discussed earlier: 
Ldbv = -. 007+- . 0175 ppe i-. 018 rvgth -. 0.073 tsq -. 083 mrg -. 010 ebitd+ . 
372 Igta -. 002 s. div + . 
055 dda -- 
. 
042 c. rt 
The results after controlling the dummy variables show that industry has a positive relationship 
with the LDBV. The following table represents the inclusion of the industry as a dummy variable. 
Table 8.6 Relationship I ('Fl)MV) with dummy variables: 
The effect ofclunimy varia bles: 
Coef. P>z 
Number of observations 3888 
Number 
_of 
grows 413 
0.146 0.000 
rvgth 0.019 0.075 
is -0.081 0.000 
mii -0.086 0.000 
ebitd 0.000 0.991 
Igta 0.351 0.000 
sdiv -0.001 0.901 
dda 0.048 0.010 
crt -0.080 0.000 
dvind 0.125 0.089 
cons 
_ 
0.002 0.970 
R-sq 
_i 
0 _2262 
Wald chi2 514.12 
Prob > chi2, F 0.0000 
lkpendent variable: Long-term-debt book value (ldbv) 
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4. Dependent variable: Long-term debt book value 
Fhe Following table shows the regression results for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables and the LDMV as a dependent variable. The number of 
observations for this regression is 3935 observations represented by 413 groups. 
"fahle 8.7 Relationship I (LDMV) 
ldmv Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
- --- -------- Coef. P (Sig) Coef. I' (Sig) (oef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3935 3935 3935 
No. of Groups 413 413 
e 0.144 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.197 0.000 
rvgth 0.040 0.001 0.014 0.113 0.020 0.025 
is -0.450 0.000 -0.308 0.000 -0.350 0.000 
mr g -0.072 0.000 -0.091 0.000 -0.090 0.000 
ebitd 0.013 0.482 -0.018 0.337 -0.006 0.760 
gta 0.259 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.333 0.000 
sdiv -0.001 0.938 -0.002 0.800 -0.003 0.745 
dda 0.006 0.648 0.002 0.908 -0.001 0.930 
crt -0.113 0.000 0.041 0.008 0.005 0.718 
cons 0.001 0.907 -0.007 0.347 0.063 0.023 
R-squared 0.4646 0.4222 0.4436 
F, chit value 378.5 0.0000 1759.73 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 141.8200 0.0000 
chi2 1759.73 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 162. 11 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit 4031.58 
LM test Prob>chi 1 0.0000 
this table represent the dependent variable: Long-term debt (Market value) 
The model as a whole is significant in the three methods as shown in the probability of F= 
0.0000 in pooled and fixed effects methods and probability of chit = 0.0000 fier the random 
method. R-squared for this regression are 47%, 42% and 44% for the three methods, pooled, 
fixed and random, respectively. 
I'he results for this regression give nearly the same signs as the previous regressions fier the 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. The exception is for growth 
opportunities represented by RVG'1'FI, which gives ditlerent signs. Meanwhile, RVG'I'I I has a 
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negative relationship with total debt (book and market), and it has a positive relationship with the 
long-term debt (book and market). 
To summarize, there is a positive relationship between PPE, RVGTI I, LGTA and DDA on the 
one hand, and market value long-term debt (LDMV) on the other. I lowever, there is a negative 
relationship between TSQ, MRG, EBITD, S. DIV and CAT on the one hand and LDMV on the 
other hand. Confidence levels are as shown in the above table. 
The relationship that follows represents the fixed effects method since it is the best to describe 
panel data in this regression as discussed earlier. 
Idmv -- -. 007-+- . 
0175 ppe ti . 
018 rvgth -. 0.073 tsq -. 083 mrg -. 010 ebitd+- . 
372 Igta -. 002 s. div + . 055 
dda -. 042 c. rt 
1 
The results after controlling the dummy variables show that industry has a positive and 
significant relationship with the LDMV. The following table presents this regression. 
Table 8.8 Relationship I (LDMV) with dummy variables: 
The effect ol'dummy varia bles: 
Coef. P>z 
Number of observations 3935 
Number of grows 413 
ppe 0.199 0.000 
rv th 0.020 0.024 
is -0.349 0.000 
mr -0.087 0.000 
ebitd -0.009 0.636 
*ta 0.337 0.000 
sdiv -0.003 0.733 
dda -0.001 0.972 
crt 0.005 0.738 
dvind 0.145 0.013 
cons 0.012 0.719 
R-s 0.4459 
Wald chit 1768.86 
Prob > chi2, F 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Long-term-debt market value (Idmv) 
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8.2.2 Summary of Relationship one 
To summarize the previous section, Relationship one represents the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure as independent variables and the debt level as a dependent 
variable. Four indicators are used to reflect the debt level ratio: total debt book value ("l'D13V), 
total debt market value ("I'I)MV), long-term debt book value (I, 1)I3V), and long-term debt market 
value (LDMV). Industry as a control variable is shown to have a positive and significant 
relationship with all dependent variables. 
All models tested in the previous relationship are highly significant as shown in the probability 
of F=0.0000 in pooled and fixed effects methods and the probability of Chi2 = 0.0000 for the 
random method. It is clear that using the market debt ratios show a stronger relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and debt level than the book debt ratios. ']'his can be noted by 
the higher R-squared values for the market ratios for all static methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models. Using book values to represent debt level gives R-squared 
values of around 20. However, using the market values for debt level give values for R-squared 
of around 50 for the total debt market values and 40 for the long-term debt market values, as is 
shown in the following table. 
fable 8.9 R-suuarcd values (Relationship 1): 
tdbv 
tdmv 
Idbv 
Idmv 
R-s uared 
Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
0.2919 0.2745 0.2814 
0.565 0.5565 0.5606 
0.2431 0.2126 0.2242 
0.4646 0.4222 0.4436 
As a result, the best model predicting the debt ratios as a dependent variable is the TDMV. It 
gives the highest R-squared value (56%) in all three static methods, pooled OLS, fixed effects 
and random effects models. 
The results for the fixed effects models show same effect direction for the majority of variables 
for different indicators of debt level. The following table summarizes the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure as independent variables, and the debt level as dependent 
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variable. It shows the coefficients (Coef. ) and significance (P Sig) for all variables with the tout 
debt level indicators representing Relationship one. 
'I'ahte 9 10 Relationshin 1: Indenendent variables' coefficients: 
Fixed effects td bv tdmv Id bv Idmv 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) coet_ 1' (Sig) 
Re 0.064 0.018 0.103 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.220 0.000 
n nth -0.004 0.727 -0.006 0.511 0.018 0.094 0.014 0.113 
is -0.074 0.000 -0.403 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.308 0.000 
m -0.101 0.000 -0.096 0.000 -0.083 0.000 -0.091 0.000 
ebitd -0.038 0.078 -0.056 0.002 -0.010 0.657 -0.018 0.337 
eta 0.112 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.381 0.000 
sdiv -0.004 0.708 -0.004 0.609 -0.002 0.835 -0.002 0.800 
dda 0.044 0.022 0.000 0.981 0.055 0.006 0.002 0.908 
crt -0.347 0.000 -0.211 0.000 -0.042 0.023 0.041 0.008 
cons 0.011 0.202 -0.003 0.705 -0.007 0.421 -0.007 0.347 
In general, the results for the first relationship give the same signs of the relationships between 
independent and different dependent variables. To summarize, there is a positive relationship 
between ITF, LGTA and DDA on one hand and debt level on the other. However, there is a 
negative relationship between RVGTH 1, TSQ, MRG, FBI"FD, S. DIV and C. R"I' on one hand and 
debt level on the other. 
From the above table, the most important variables explaining the debt level as a dependent 
variable in different indicators are found to he PPF, TSQ, MRG, LGTA and ('. RT. I lowever, 
DDA is significant when debt is measured by the book values and become highly insignificant 
when debt is measured by the market values. Also, E13I'11) is significant only in affecting the 
total debt market value, but with other dependent variables it becomes highly insignificant. On 
the other hand, S. DIV measured by standard deviation ot'annual income is highly insignificant in 
all relationships, indicating that it is the most unimportant in defining the financing policy in the 
company. 
Unis 154 
8.2.3 Relationship two 
As mentioned earlier, because of high multicollinearity among debt variables, the researcher rums 
the regressions for this relationship between each debt measures individually as an independent 
variable and the firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. 
Three indicators are used to represent the firm's financial performance in the panel analysis; 
return on investment (ROl), return on equity (ROE), and price to earnings ratio (Pl). Moreover, 
all static methods, pooled OLS, fixed effect, and random effects models give similar values of R- 
squared for these regressions. Debt is the continuous independent variable with two dummy 
variables (industry and firm's size) regressed on one dependent variable (firm's financial 
performance). 
Because of the use of debt level as a single independent variable in this relationship, the values 
of R-squared are very low. However, the researcher runs the following regressions for this 
relationship. There are lour regressions for each dependent variable (ROI, ROE and PE: ) 
reflecting the four debt measures (TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and LDMV). R-squared and the 
significance values for all regressions are summarized in the following table. 
Table 8.1 1 Relationshin 2 reeressions' summary: 
Relationships 
R-Squared 
(without 
dummy 
variables) 
Sig 
R-Squared 
(including 
dummy 
variables) 
Sig. 
I-A ROI & TDBV 0.01 0.0000 0.01 0.0000 
I -B ROI & TDMV 0.08 0.0000 0.10 0.0000 
1-C ROI & LDBV 0.00 0.0000 0.01 0.0000 
I-D ROl & LDMV 0.05 0.0000 0.06 0.0000 
2-A ROE & TDBV 0.03 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
2-B ROE & TDMV 0.00 0.0000 0.05 0.0000 
2-C ROE & LDBV 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
2-D ROE & LDMV 0.02 0.0000 0.03 0.0000 
3-A PE & TDBV 0.01 0.0000 0.02 0.0000 
3-B PE & TDM V 0.10 0.0000 0,11 0.0000 
3-C PE & L. DBV 0.01 0.0000 0.02 0.0000 
3-D PE & LDMV 0.06 0.0000 0.07 0.0000 
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Although all regressions are highly significant, as appears in the significance levels for the 
regressions above Sig = 0.0000, R-squared itself is not high enough due to the use of debt as a 
single predictor for the firm's financial performance. I lowever, the highest R-squared value is 
11%. This represents the relationship between TDMV and PI as an indicator for the firm's 
financial performance controlling for industry and firm's size. 
The reason behind that is perhaps because the firm's financial performance here is measured by 
the PE, and it is well known that price reflects the market value. This has been supported in 
Relationship one before, where it has been noted that the R-squared values for the market debt 
ratios are higher than the book value debt ratios. The value of 11% means that the market value 
total debt ratio can explain 10% of the behaviour of the price to earnings ratio, and the other I% 
is the explanation by the control variables as is shown in the above table. 
This regression will he presented in this section. However, other regressions are ignored because 
of the low values of the R-squared which are presented in the previous table. Moreover, apart 
From these low R-squared values, all of these regressions passed the specification tests (i. e., F, 
Hausman and LM tests). 
Table 8.12 Relationshin 2 WE & TDMV): 
Relationship 2 Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random 
PE Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 4056 
- 
406 
- --- 
4056 
--- No. of Groups 
- --- -- 378 - - 378 
tdmv -0.347 0.000 -0.385 0.000 -0.376 0.000 
cons -0.010 0.491 -0.011 0.404 0.044 0.172 
R-s oared 0.098 0.098 0.0 98 
F value, Wild Chi2 438.27 269.56 336.45 
rob > F, Prob > chi2 
_ý. _. 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 4.67 
F test Prob>chi2 0,0000 
I lausman chit 0.7 
test Prob>chi2 0.4018 
chit I I34. I8 
LM test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
This table represents the dependent variable: Price to earnings ratio (PI: ) 
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The above table presents the relationship between the TDMV and the PE as an indicator l or the 
firm's financial performance. R-squared values are 0.098 for all panel data methods; pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and random effects models. The fixed effects method is the most suitable für the 
same reasons as explained in the previous section. 
The results for the three analysis methods show a negative and significant relationship between 
the TDMV and the firm's financial performance as measured by the PF,. This indicates that the 
higher the debt ratios, the lower the financial performance. The relationship fellows the 
subsequent equation which represents the FEM: 
PF, =-. O 11 -0.385 TDIV 
The above relationship has been controlled for two variables, industry and the firm's size. Both 
of these variables are dummy variables. For industry, I is given to represent the industrial firms 
and 0 otherwise. For a firm's size, I is given to represent large firms and 0 otherwise. The results 
show that industry sector has a negative and significant correlation at the 99% level with the 
price to earnings ratio. This means that industrial are different from non-industrial firms. A 
firm's size reveals a negative but highly insignificant relationship with the price to earnings ratio. 
This relationship is represented in the following equation: 
LII IIE = 0.137 -0.373 i'I)l3V - 0.240 dvind -0.017 dvsize 
Fable 8.13 Relationship 2 with dummy variables-Panel data: 
The effect of dumm variables: 
Coef P>z 
Number of observations 4056 
Number of groups 378 
Tdmv -0.373 0.000 
Dvind -0.240 0.000 . Dvisze -0.017 0.792 
cons 0.137 0.008 
R-s 0.1061 
Wald chi2 352.06 
Prob > chi2, F 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Price to earn earnings ratio (PE) 
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8.2.4 Relationship three 
This section investigates the direct relationship between determinants of capital structure as 
independent variables and the firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. Regressions 
afterwards present the three dependent variables representing the three indicators of the firm's 
financial performance (i. e., ROI, ROE and PE). 
As in previous sections, the results will show the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables without the control variables, and then the results will be discussed with the 
presence of these control variables. 
1. Dependent variable: Return on investment (1201) 
The following table shows the regression results for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables and ROl as a dependent variable. The number of 
observations is 3890 observations represented by 413 groups. 
'f'ahle 8.14 Relationshin 3 (ROI): 
3 Pooled OLS Fixed effects 
Random 
effects 
RO! Curf. P Itiig) Gael. t P (Sig) Coe'. P (Sig) 
Observations 3890 3890 3890 
No. of Groups 413 413 
0.126 3.790 0.000 0.172 0.000 
rvcýth 0.187 15.210 0.000 0.179 0.000 
tsq 0.416 21.530 0.000 0.426 0.000 
to -0.127 -3.730 0.000 -0.027 0.294 
sdiv 0.100 8.940 0.000 0.105 0.000 
dda -0.247 -11.450 0.000 -0.237 0.000 
crt 0.130 6.070 0.000 0.098 0.000 
_ cons -0.013 -1.190 0.232 -0.005 0.882 
R-juared 0.2072 0.244 
F value, Wald chit 188.23 1366.86 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 0.0000 
chi? _ 7.03 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 51.91 
test Prob>chi2 - -- - -- ---- 0.0000 
chi2 1705.54 
1. M test Prob>chi 1 0.0000 
'i his table represent the d ependent variable: Return on Investment (Rol) 
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These regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods. It is shown in the probability 
of' F=0.0000 in the pooled and fixed effects methods and probability of chit == 0.0000 f'or the 
random method. R-squared values for the three methods are 26%, 21% and 24%, respectively. 
The fixed effects model here is also considered to be the most appropriate method Im this 
regression as is shown in the table and as discussed earlier. Therefore, the results are explained 
further for the fixed effects model only. 
There is a positive relationship between PPE, RVG'I'II and TSQ, S. DIV and C. RT on the one 
hand and ROI on the other. Conversely, there is a negative relationship between LGTA and 
DDA on one hand and ROI on the other. Moreover, all relationships are highly significant 
(0.000). The equation that follows stands for the fixed effects method: 
ROI = -. 013 +. 126 ppe +. 187 rvgth +. 416 tsq -. 127 Igta +. 100 s. div -. 247 dda +. 130 c. rt 
As is shown in the following table, results after controlling dummy variables show that industry 
sector has a positive and significant relationship at a 99% confidence level with the return on 
investment. This indicates that industrial firms are different from non-industrial firms for the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and return on investment, as shown in the 
following equation: 
ROI = -. 074 +. 175 ppe +. 179 rvgth +. 428 tsq -. 020 Igta +. 104 s. div -. 237 dda +. 097 c. rt 
t aoºc O. ºJ MCIaLIOfSnº J (twº) - ºncluUºnl 
ROI Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3890 
No. of Groups 413 
pie 0.175 0.000 
rvgth 0.179 0.000 
is 0.428 0.000 
to -0.020 0.419 
sdiv 0.104 0.000 
dda -0.237 0.000 
crt 0.097 0.000 
vind d 0.197 0.008 
_ cons -0.074 0.089 _ R-s uared 0 . 2553 
Wald chit 1375.27 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Depcndent_variable: Return on Investment (ROl) 
dummy variables: 
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2. Dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
The following table shows the regression results for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, and ROE as a dependent variable. This regression has 
been represented by 3762 observations represented by 406 groups. 
"fable 8.16 Relationship 3 (ROE: ): 
3 
ROE 
Pooled OLS 
(-'oetl P (Sig) 
Fixed effects 
('od"f. tP (Sig) 
Random 
effects 
('Oef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3762 3762 
No. of Groups 406 406 
e 0.140 3.930 0.000 0.184 0.000 
rvgth 0.185 14.270 0.000 0.180 0.000 
ASq- 0.447 20.890 0.000 0.449 0.000 
to 0.025 0.680 0.496 0.102 0.000 
sdiv 0.107 9.090 0.000 0.112 0.000 
dda -0.258 -11.110 0.000 -0.239 0.000 
crt 0.103 4.510 0.000 0.073 0.000 
cons -0.019 -1.610 0.108 0.006 0.860 
R squared 0.2033 0.2323 
F value, chit 163.31 1197.56 
Prob> F, ch it 0.0000 0.0000 
---- chit 6.42 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 48.15 
test Prob>chi2 _ 0.0000 
chi2 1286.74 
LM test Prob>chi 1 0,0000 
This table represent the d ependent variable: Return on Equity (KOE) 
R-squared values for the three methods pooled, fixed and random are 25%, 20% and 23%, 
respectively. The regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods as is shown clearly 
in the Probability of F and Chi? (0.0000). The fixed effects model here is also considered to be 
the most appropriate method for this regression as is shown in the table and as discussed earlier. 
Therefore, the results are explained further for the fixed effects model only. 
In general and for the fixed effects model only, the results show that there is a positive 
relationship between Pill-, RVGfII, TSQ, LGTA, S. DIV and CAT on one side, and the firm's 
financial performance as represented by return on equity (ROE) on the other. On the other hand, 
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there is a negative relationship between DDA and the firm's financial perförmance as 
represented by ROL. 
Moreover, all relationships are significant at 1% except For the LGTA. The equation that 116 1 lows 
represents the fixed effects method: 
ROE = -. 019 +. 140 ppe +. 185 rvgth +. 447 tsq +. 025 Igta +. 107 s. div -. 258 dda +. 103 c. rt 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a positive relationship with the firm's financial performance as 
represented by ROE. This relationship is significant at 99%,, which indicates that industrial firms 
are different from non-industrial firms for the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and ROE. 
The equation that föllows represents the random effects method lör the reason explained earlier, 
and also the table that follows summarizes this relationship: 
ROE _ -. 077 +, 189 ppe +, 180 rvgth +. 451 tsq +, 110 lgta +. 1 12 s. div -. 240 dda +. 072 c. rt + 0.237 dvind 
Table 8.17_ Relationship 3 (ROE) - Including dummy variables: 
ROE Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3762 
No. of Groups 4 06 
pie 0.189 0.000 
rvgth 0.180 0.000 
is 0.451 0.000 
Igta 0.110 0.000 
sdiv 0.112 0.000 
dda -0.240 0.000 
crt 0.072 0.000 
dvind 0.237 0.002 
cons -0.077 0.086 
R-squared 0.2462 
Wald chi2 1209.27 
Prob> chit 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Return on Equity (ROE) 
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3. Dependent variable: Price to earnings ratio (PE) 
[he following table shows the regression results fier the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, and I'll as a dependent variable. This regression has 
been represented by 3414 observations represented by 371 groups. 
"fahle 8.18 Relationshirn 3 (PF): 
3 Pooled OLS Fixed effects 
------------ -- Random 
effects 
PF C: oet. P (Sig) Coef. I P (Sig) Coe'. P (Sig) 
Observations 3414 3414 3414 
No. of Groups 371 371 
e 
- 
0.047 0.980 0.328 0.005 0.839 
rvgth - - 0.189 - 11.150 0.000 -- 0.202 - --- 0.000 
is 0.462 20.190 0.000 0.464 0.000 
to 0.045 0.980 0.329 0.040 0.132 
sdiv 0.057 3.900 0.000 0.046 0.001 
dda -0.127 -4.280 0.000 -0.054 0.020 
crt -0.015 -0.490 0.622 0.017 0.474 
cons -0.036 -2.350 0.019 0.011 0.708 
R-s uared 0.2299 0.2439 
F value, chit 99.67 850.22 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 3.73 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chi2 27.66 
test Prob>chi2 0.0003 
T 
chit 531.3 
LM test Prob>chi I 0.0000 
this table represent the d ependent variable : Price: Earnings ratio (PI? ) 
The value of R-squared for the three methods of' pooled OLS, fixed and random effects are 25%, 
23% and 24%, respectively and each regression as a whole is significant in the three methods 
(0.0000). The fixed effect model here is also considered to be the most appropriate method för 
this regression as is shown in the table and as discussed earlier. Therefore, the results explained 
further are for the fixed effects model only. 
In general and for the fixed effects model only, the results show that there is a positive 
relationship between PPE, RVG'l'FI, TSQ, LGTA and S. DIV on the one side, and the firm's 
financial performance as represented by the PE on the other. 
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On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between DDA and C. RT on one side and the 
firm's financial performance and as represented by the PF on the other. Moreover, all 
relationships are significant except the LGTA and CAT. The equation that follows represents the 
fixed effects method: 
PE = -. 036 +. 047 ppe +. 189 rvgth +. 462 tsq +. 045 Igta +. 057 s. div -. 127 dda -. 015 c. rt 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a positive relationship with the firm's financial performance as 
represented by the PE. This relationship is significant at a 99% confidence level. This indicates 
that industrial firms are different from non-industrial firms for the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and the Pl;. 
The equation that follows represents the random effects method only for the reason explained 
earlier, and also the table that follows summarizes this relationship: 
PE = . 
088 -. 001 ppe +. 202 rvgth +. 460 tsq +. 029 Igta +. 046 s. div -. 050 dda +. 020 c. rt 
'fahle 8.19 Relationship 3 (PE) - Including dummy variables: 
PE - -- Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3414 
No. of Groups 371 
e -0.001 0.983 
rvgth 0.202 0.000 
tsg 0.460 0.000 
Iota 0.029 
_ 
0.279 
sdiv 0.046 0.001 
dda -0.050 0.031 
crt 0.020 0.396 
dvind -0.211 0.000 
cons 0.088 0.015 
R-s uared 0.2504 
Wald chi2 868.72 
Prob> chit 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Price: Earnings ratio PE 
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8.2.5 Summary of Relationship three 
To summarize the previous section, Relationship three represents the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure as independent variables and a firm's financial performance as a 
dependent variable. Three indicators are used to reflect a firm's financial performance, ROI, 
ROE and PE. All models tested in the third relationship are highly significant as is shown in the 
probability of F=0.0000 in the pooled and fixed effects methods and the probability of Chi? 
0.0000 for the random method. Industry as a control variable has a positive and significant 
relationship with ROI and ROE. 
Using ROI, ROE and PE results in nearly the same R-squared for all static methods, pooled OLS, 
fixed effect and random effects models as is shown in the following table. 
I ULM: o. -: v I\GI[IUVI IJI II /J I\-JL Ui1I U VUIUCI. 
R-squared 
Relationship Three Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
ROl 0.2666 0.2072 0.244 
ROE 0.2487 0.2033 0.2323 
PE 0.2502 0.2299 0.2439 
The results for the fixed effects models show the same effect in direction for the majority of 
variables for different indicators for the firm's financial performance. The following table 
summarizes the relationship between determinants of capital structure as independent variables, 
and the firm's financial performance as dependent variable. It shows the coefficients (Coe1. ) and 
significance (P Sig) for all variables with the three performance indicators representing 
relationship three. 
"fable 8.21 Relationship 3: Independent variables' coefficients: 
effects ROl ROE P E 
CocC P (Sig) ('ucf. P (Sig) (bet. 1' (Sig) 
pe 0.126 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.047 &328 
rvjth 0.187 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.189 0.000 
tsc 0.416 0.000 0.447 0.000 0.462 0.000 
to -0.127 0.000 0.025 0.496 0.045 0.329 
sdiv 0.100 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.057 0.000 
dda -0.247 0.000 -0.258 0.000 -0.127 0.000 
crt 0.130 0.000 0.103 0.000 -0.015 0.622 
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From the above table, the most important variables explaining the firm's financial performance 
dependent variable using different indicators are found to be: RVGTH, TSQ, S. DIV and DDA. 
These variables show a significant relationship at 99% confidence level for all three performance 
measures. Meanwhile, PPE and C. RT are significant at 99% using ROI and ROE. However, 
when the PE is used, these two variables convey a highly insignificant relationship with this 
indicator of the firm's financial performance. 
In general, the results for the third relationship give the same signs of the relationships between 
determinants of capital structure as independent variables and the firm's financial performance as 
dependent variables. 
To summarize, there is a positive relationship between PPE, RVGTH, TSQ, S. DIV and C. RT on 
the one side and the firm's financial performance on the other. On the other hand, there is a 
negative relationship between DDA and the firm's financial performance. 
However, the LGTA shows contradicted results. It shows a highly significant negative 
relationship with ROT, but it shows a highly insignificant positive relationship with ROE and PE. 
8.2.6 Relationship four 
This section contains regressions investigating the mediating role of debt level in the relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance. Determinants of 
capital structure are included as independent variables, debt level as a mediating variable and the 
firm's financial performance as a dependent variable, 
This includes three indicators for the firm's financial performance: ROI, ROE and PE. These 
performance measures are regressed individually with the determinants of capital structure using 
four indicators for the debt level, also individually: TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and LDMV. 
These regressions are done through three static methods: pooled (OLS), fixed and random effects 
models as is shown in the following graph. 
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As in previous sections, results for each relationship will be discussed without controlling the 
industry sector, and afterwards with the presence of industry sector. 
The four sections that follow represent the above relationships for the three indicators for the 
firm's financial performance, ROI, ROE and PE. 
1-A: Return on investment (ROI) mediating (TDBV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects, and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the ROI as a 
dependent variable and TDBV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3883 observations represented by 413 groups. 
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8.1 Relationship 4 diagram: 
Table 8.22 Relationship 4 (ROB & 'I'l)13V): 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effect s Random effects 
ROI Cocil P (Sig) Coef t P (Sig) ('Oct'. P (Sig) 
Observations 3883 3883 3883 
No. of Groups 413 413 
e 0.141 0.000 0.127 3.900 0.000 0.175 0.000 
rvgth 0.158 0.000 0.179 14.760 0.000 0.172 0.000 
tsq 0.483 0.000 0.431 21.470 0.000 0.439 0.000 
to 0.098 0.000 -0.098 -2.900 0.004 -0.002 0.947 
sdiv 0.122 0.000 0.095 8.600 0.000 0.100 0.000 
dda -0.187 0.000 -0.248 -11.630 0.000 -0.240 0.000 
crt 0.016 0.361 0.080 3.540 0.000 0.059 0.004 
tdbv -0.024 0.163 -0.134 -6.480 0.000 -0.105 0.000 
cons -0.030 0.028 -0.016 -1.450 0.147 -0.004 0.903 
R-s uared 0.2736 0.2111 0.2481 
F value, chi2 182.38 
---- 
179.74 
------- - 
1469.52 
- Prob> F, chi2 -- 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 7.26 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 68.75 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit 1711.85 
LM test Prob>chi l 0.0000 
Phis table represent the dependent variable: Return On Investment (ROI) 
These regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods as shown in the table. R- 
squared tier the three methods pooled, fixed and random are 27%, 21% and 25%, respectively. 
The fixed effect model is again the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. Therefore, the 
results are explained further for the fixed effects model. 
First, the results of this regression do not have significant differences Fron the previous 
regression in Relationship three. The model as a whole is still significant (0.0000); the R-squared 
values become slightly higher, increasing from 0.2072 to be 0.2111. 
Second, debt level still has the highly significant relationship with the return on investment 
(0.000) as was found before in the second relationship, with a coefficient of'-0.134 and t value of 
-6.480. This can be explained as that the debt level ('I'[)[V) mediates the relationship between 
the determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance (ROI). I lowever, this 
Unis 167 
relationship is partially mediated by the debt level (i'Dl3V in this regression). This mediation 
role will be discussed in detail shortly. 
This regression keeps the signs of the relationships between independent and dependent variables 
as before. The results show that there is a positive relationship between PPE, RVGTII, TSQ, 
S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on 
the other. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between the LGTA and [)DA on the 
one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on the other. All 
relationships are highly significant at 1%. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects 
method: 
ROI = -. 016+. 127 ppe+. 179 rvgth +. 431 tsq -. 098 Igta + . 
095 s. div -. 248 dda + . 
080 c. rt- . 
134 tdbv 
Table 8.23 Relationship 4 (ROl & TDBV) including dummy variables: 
ROI Coe£ z P (Sig) 
Observations 3883 
No. of Groups 413 
pe 0.179 7.270 0.000 
rvth 0.172 14.590 0.000 
tsg 0.441 24.240 0.000 
to 0.006 0.220 0.827 
sdiv 0.099 9.090 0.000 
dda -0.241 -12.580 0.000 
crt 0.057 2.750 0.006 
tdbv -0.107 -5.600 0.000 
dvind 0.226 3.050 0.002 
cons -0.084 -1.910 0.056 
Rs oared 0.2618 
Wald chi2 1480.87 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Return on Investment (ROI) 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that the debt ratio is still significant at 0.000. Also, industry sector has a positive and 
significant relationship with the firm's financial performance (1(01), as shown in the above table. 
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I-13: Return on investment (ROI) mediating total debt market value (TUMV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects, and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the ROI as a 
dependent variable and 1'DMV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3888 observations represented by 412 groups. 
Table 8.24 Relationshin 4 (ROI & 'FI)MV ): 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
ROI Coef. P (Sig) Coef. t P (Sig) Coct'. P (Sig) 
Observations 3888 
- 
3888 
- --- 
3888 
No. of Groups 
---- --- 412 412 
e 0.139 0.000 0.137 4.160 0.000 0.184 0.000 
rvth 0.160 0.000 0.185 15,180 0.000 0.177 0.000 
is 0.462 0.000 0.310 12.720 0.000 0.349 0.000 
, gta 
0.096 0.000 -0.109 -3.210 0.001 -0.004 0.881 
sdiv 0.126 0.000 0.096 8.640 0.000 0.102 0.000 
dda -0.183 0.000 -0.244 -11.380 0.000 -0.235 0.000 
crt 0.014 0.413 0.084 3.780 0.000 0.062 0.002 
tdmv -0.028 0.213 -0.186 -7.100 0.000 -0.137 0.000 
cons -0.028 0.040 -0.011 -1.010 0.314 -0.004 0.911 
R-s uared 0.27 0.2025 0.2437 
F value, chit 179.38 173.38 1414.4 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 7.17 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chi2 89.7 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit 1724.44 
LM test Prob>chi I 0.0000 
This table represent the dependent variable: Return on Investment (ROI) 
These regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods as shown in the table. R- 
squared values for pooled, fixed and random are 27%, 20% and 24%, respectively. The results 
are explained further for the fixed effects model since it is the most appropriate method as 
discussed earlier. 
The results of this regression do not have significant differences from the previous regression. 
The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000, and debt level still has significant relationship 
of'0.000 with a coefficient of'-0.186 and t value of-7.100. Debt level (market value of total debt) 
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in this regression also mediates the relationship between the determinants of capital structure and 
the financial performance (ROI). However, this relationship is partially mediated. 
This regression keeps the signs of the relationships between independent and dependent variables 
as before. The results show that there is a positive relationship between I'l'l:, RVGTII, TSQ, 
S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on 
the other. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between the LG1'A and DDA on the 
one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on the other. All 
relationships are highly significant at 1%. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects 
method: 
RO[ _ -. 011 + . 137 ppe + . 
185 rvgth + . 
310 tsq -. 109 lgta + . 
096 s. div -. 244 dda + . 
084 c. rt -. 186 tdmv 
Table 8.25 Relationship 4 (ROI & TDMV) including dummy variables: 
ROI Coef. z P (Sig) 
Observations 3888 
No. ot'Groups 412 
ppe 0.188 7.630 0.000 
rv th 0.177 14.820 0.000 
tss 0.349 15.250 0.000 
19ta 0.004 0.160 0.873 
sdiv 0.102 9.220 0.000 
dda -0.235 -12.290 0.000 
crt 0.060 2.970 0.003 
tdmv -0.141 -5.730 0.000 
dvind 0.232 3.190 0.001 
cons -0.085 -1.980 0.047 
R-s uared 0.2572 
Wald chit _ 1426.95 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Return on Investment (ROI) 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that the debt ratio is still significant at 0.000. Also, industry sector has a positive and 
significant relationship with the firm's financial performance (IWI), as shown in the above table. 
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1-C: Return on investment (ROt) and mediating total debt market value (11)13V) 
The following table summarizes the regression results tier three methods, pooled OL S, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial perlbrmance measured by the ROI as a 
dependent variable and LDBV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3883 observations represented by 413 groups. 
Table 8.26 Relationshin 4 (ROl & Ii)UV): 
4 Pooled OLS 
-- 
Fixed effects 
--- ----- -- 
Random effects 
- --------- - -- ----- - RO1 ('oel,. 1' (Sig) ('uel. t P (Sic) ('uet. I' (Sig) 
Observations 3871 3871 3871 
No. ofGroups 413 413 
e 0.140 0.000 0.127 3.850 0.000 0.174 0.000 
rvgth 0.152 0.000 0.174 14.380 0.000 0.168 0.000 
tsg_ 0.489 0.000 0.455 22.580 0.000 0.459 0.000 
Igta 0.086 0.000 -0.098 -2.820 0.005 -0.008 0.749 
sdiv 0.122 0.000 0.097 8.780 0.000 0.101 0.000 
dda -0.188 0.000 -0.256 -11.900 0.000 -0.245 0.000 
crt 0.021 0.191 0.114 5.380 0.000 0.085 0.000 
Idbv 0.006 0.738 -0.047 -2.390 0.017 -0.032 0.080 
cons -0.027 0.047 -0.014 -1.340 0.179 -0.003 0.924 
R-s uared 0.2746 0.2202 0.254 
F value, chi2 182.71 174.64 1442.53 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 0.0000 
chit 7.08 
--- - --- ------ - F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 56.28 
test Prob>chi2 0,0000 
chit 1692.94 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
This table represent the dependent variable: Return on Investment (ROI) 
R-squared values for pooled, fixed and random are 27%, 22% and 25%, respectively; these 
values are not statistically different from previous regressions for the same relationship. ]'he 
results are explained further for the fixed effects model since it is the most appropriate method as 
discussed earlier. 
The results of' this regression do not have significant differences from the previous regression. 
The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000, and debt level is statistically significant at 
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0.017 with a coefficient of -0.047 and t value of' -2.390. Debt level (I, D[3V) also mediates the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and RUI. However, this relationship is 
partially mediated. 
This regression keeps the signs of the relationships between independent and dependent variables 
as before. The results show that there is a positive relationship between PPE, RVGTI 1, 'I'SQ, 
S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on 
the other. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between LGTA and [)DA on the one 
side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on the other. All relationships 
are highly significant at 1 %. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects method: 
ROI = -. 014 +. 127 ppe +. 174 rvgth + . 455 tsq -. 098 
Igta + . 
097 s. div -. 256 dda + .1 14 c. rt -. 047 
Idbv 
Table 8.27 Relationship 4 (ROI & LDBV) including dummy variables: 
ROt - Coef. - z P (Sid) 
Observations 3871 
No. of Grou s 413 
spe 
_ý 
0.178 7.230 0.000 
rvcýth 0.168 14.240 0.000 
tsq 0.461 25.290 0.000 
Igta -0.001 -0.040 0.968 
sdiv 0.101 9.230 0.000 
dda -0.246 -12.800 0.000 
Crt 0.084 4.340 0.000 
Idbv -0.034 -1.840 0.066 
dvind 0.216 2.930 0.003 
cons -0.079 -1.820 0.069 
R-squared 
- _ 
0.2675 
Wald chit 1453 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Dependent vari able: Return on Investment (ROI) 
The above table supports the previous results, and the results also show that industry sector has a 
positive and significant relationship with the return on investment at a 99% confidence level. 
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1-U: Return on investment (1101) and long-term debt market value (1, I)MV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the ROI as a 
dependent variable and LDMV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3887 observations represented by 412 firms. 
R-squared values for pooled, fixed and random are 27%, 21% and 25%, respectively; these 
values are not statistically different from previous regressions for the same relationship. The 
fixed effect model again is the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. Therefore, the 
results are explained further for the fixed effects model. 
The results of this regression do not have major differences fron the previous regressions. The 
model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000; the debt level is statistically significant at 0.001 
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with a coefficient of -0.080 and t value of -3.330. Market value of long-term debt still mediates 
the relationship between the determinants of capital structure and ROI. I lowever, this 
relationship is partially mediated. 
This regression keeps the signs of the relationships between independent and dependent variables 
as before. The results show that there is a positive relationship between Pp[, RVGTH, TSQ, 
S. DIV and C. RT on one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on the 
other side. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between LGTA and I)DA on the 
one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on the other. All 
relationships are highly significant at 1%. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects 
method: 
ROI = -. 014 + . 141 ppc + . 
188 rvgth + . 382 tsq -. 102 
Igta + . 099 s. div -. 245 dda + . 
131 c. rt -. 080 
LDMV 
Table 8.29 Relationship 4 (ROl & LDMV) including dummy variables: 
ROI 
_ 
C. 'oef. 
_- -z 
P (Sig) 
Observations 3887 
No. of Groups 412 
ppe 
__ __ 
0.186 7.470 0.000 
rvgth 0.179 14.910 0.000 
tsq_ 0.411 20.080 0.000 
to 0.002 0.060 0.951 
sdiv 
_ 
0.104 9.370 0.000 
dda -0.236 -12.270 0.000 
crt 
_ 0.095 4.860 0.000 
Idmv _ -0.047 -2.110 0.035 _ dvind 0.215 2.970 0.003 
cons -0.084 -1.960 0.050 _ R-s oared T 
_ 
0.2602 
_ Wald chi2 1389.47 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable- Return on Investment (ROI) 
The above table supports the previous results, and the results also show that industry sector has a 
positive and significant relationship with the return on investment at a 99% confidence level. 
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8.2.6.1 Section summary (1101-Relationship four) 
Fhe previous section represents the relationship between determinants of' capital structure as 
independent variables, ROI as a dependent variable and debt level as a mediating variable. Four 
debt level measures are assigned in this relationship, 1'DBV, i'DMV, l, Dl3V and I. DMV. This 
relationship has been presented by sixteen regressions using the three methods of pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and random effects models. Moreover, all of these relationships have been 
controlled by the industry sector. 
All regressions are highly significant (0.0000), and R-squared values For all static methods 
(pooled OLS, fixed and random effect) revolve around the twenties (20s). The FFM is shown to 
be the most appropriate method due to the specifications tests for these regressions as discussed 
earlier. Therefore, the Iollowing summary table reveals results for the fixed effects models for 
the above relationships. 
Table 8.30 Relationship Four: Determinants ol'capital structure & ROI mediating debt level: 
Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coe. P 
e 0.127 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.141 0.000 
rvath 0.179 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.188 0.000 
tsq 0.431 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.455 
---0.000 
0.382 0.000 
Iota -0.098 0.004 -0.109 0.001 -0.098 0.005 -0.102 0.004 
sdiv 0.095 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.099 0.000 
dda -0.248 0.000 -0.244 0.000 -0.256 0.000 -0.245 0.000 _ crt 0.080 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.131 0.000 
Mediating variable 
Debt 
TDBV 
-0.134 0.000 
TDMV 
-0.186 0.000 
LDBV 
-0.047 0.017 
LDMV 
_ 
-0.080 . 
001 
ROI is the dependent variable 
First, the results of these regressions do not have significant differences from the regressions in 
Relationship three (without mediating fir debt). Determinants of' capital structure-almost --- 
have similar relationships with the return on investment without mediating the debt level. 
Second, debt level still has the highly significant relationship with the ROI as found betöre in the 
second relationship. This can be explained as that the debt level partially mediates the 
relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the Iinancial pertiormance (1«)l). 
Unis 175 
To put it more simply, the P values (sig. level) of debt level are shown in the last row. The 
significant value reveals that the debt level mediates the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and the financial performance represented by ROI. I lowever, the changes in the 
coefficients of the determinants of capital structure after inclusion of' the debt level are small 
(this will be explained in detail in the following chapter). Therefore, this indicates that the debt 
level mediating role is partial and not full (complete). 
These regressions keep the signs of the relationships as betöre (without mediating debt). In 
summary, the results show that there is a positive relationship between PIT', RVGTII, TSQ, 
S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on 
the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between LGTA and DDA on the one side, and 
the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI on the other. All relationships are highly 
significant at 1%. 
The results for industry as a control variable reveal that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the industry type and ROI. 
Takle 8.31 Relationship 4 (ROI), Industry control variable: 
Relationship 4: Industry- Summar 
Mediator Coef. Z P>z 
tdbv 0.226 3.050 0.002 
tdmv 0.232 3.190 0.001 
Idbv 0.216 2.930 0.003 
Idmv 0.215 2.970 0.003 
Dependent variable: Return on Investment RO 
UnIS 176 
2-A: Return on Equity (ROE) mediating total debt book value ('11)ßV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results fir three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the ROI? as a 
dependent variable and TDBV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3762 observations represented by 406 firms. 
i able u. _ /- Keianonsni 4 krcvV; &i ub v) : 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. t PJSig) Coef_ P (Sig) 
Observations 3762 3762 3762 
No. of Groups 406 406 
ppe 0.144 0.000 
--- 
0.144 
- 
4.060 
- 
0.000 
- --- 
0.186 
------- 
0.000 
------ rv th 0.166 0.000 0.185 14.290 0.000 0.180 0.000 
is 0.480 0.000 0.434 19.850 0.000 0.443 0.000 
to 0.149 0.000 0.035 0.940 0.346 0.108 0.000 
sdiv _ 0.136 0.000 0.106 9.030 0.000 0.112 0.000 
dda -0.173 0.000 -0.254 -10.960 0.000 -0.237 0.000 
crt 0.017 0.341 0.077 3.170 0.002 0.061 0.006 
tdbv 0.089 0.000 -0.074 -3.120 0.002 -0.032 0.143 
cons -0.020 0.165 -0.022 -1.910 0.056 0.005 0.887 
R-squared 0.2529 0.1947 0.229 
F value, chi2 158.81 ---- 144.49 1199.12 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 6.38 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chi2 72.35 
test __ Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit - Tý- 1201.39 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
This table represents the dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
These regressions as a whole are signiticant in the three methods as shown in the table. R- 
squared values are 25%, 19% and 23% for pooled, fixed and random, respectively. The FF: M is 
the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. Thereibre, the results are explained further fier 
the FEM 
The results of this regression do not have significant differences From the previous regression in 
Relationship three. The model as a whole is still significant (0.0000), debt level still has the 
highly significant (0.002) relationship with the return on equity as it is fixend before in the 
sccoi d rrlationship, with a coefficient of -0.074 and t value of' -3.120. Debt level (total hook 
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value debt) in this regression mediates the relationship between the determinants of' capital 
structure and the financial performance (ROE). I-lowever, this relationship is partially mediated 
by the debt level (TDMV). 
The relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as before in 
Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The results show that there is a positive 
relationship between PPE, RVGTI-1, TSQ, LGTA, S. DIV and C. RT on one side, and the firm's 
financial performance as represented by ROE on the other side. On the other hand, there is a 
negative relationship between DDA and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROE. 
All relationships are highly significant at 1% except for LGTA, which reveals a highly 
insignificant relationship. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects method: 
riROE = -. 022 + . 144 ppe + . 185 rvgth + . 434 tsq + . 035 Igta + . 106 s. div -. 254 dda + . 077 c. rt -. 074 tdbv J 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that the debt level is still significant at 0.100. Also, industry sector has a positive and 
significant relationship with the firm's financial performance (ROE), as shown in the table that 
follows. 
'f'ahle 8.33 Relationship 4 (ROE & TDBV) including dummy variables: 
RUE C. oet: z (Sig) 
Observations 3762 
No. of Groups 406 
e 0.191 7.290 0.000 
rv th 0.180 14.270 0.000 
is 0.445 22.560 0.000 
Igta 0.117 4.280 0.000 
sdiv 0.112 9.580 0.000 
dda -0.238 -11.550 0.000 
crt 0.059 2.680 0.007 
_ tdbv -0.036 -1.640 0.100 
dvind 0.244 3.240 0.001 
^ cons -0.081 -1.820 0.069 
R-squared 0.243 
Wa6chi2 1212.08 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable Return on equity (ROE? ) 
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2-13: Return on Equity (ROE) mediating total debt market value (TI)MV) 
'Ehe following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the ROE as a 
dependent variable, and TDMV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3760 observations represented by 405 firms. 
Table 8.34 Relationshia 4 (ROE & TDMV) 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P Si Coef. P Si Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3760 3760 37260 
No. of Groups 405 405_ 
e 0.143 0.000 0.147 4.140 0.000 0.191 0.000 
rvth 0.162 0.000 0.186 14.390 0.000 0.179 0.000 
tsq__ 
_ 
0.544 0.000 0.378 13.140 0.000 0.431 0.000 
to 0.154 0.000 0.034 0.910 0.360 0.116 0.000 
sdiv 0.137 0.000 0.105 8.980 0.000 0.112 0.000 
dda -0.173 0.000 -0.257 -11.090 0.000 -0.237 _0.000 crt 0.013 0.460 0.077 3.210 0.001 0.063 0 . 004 
tdmv 0.109 0.000 -0.107 -3.590 0.000 -0,034 0.216 
cons -0.025 0.078 -0.021 -1.780 0.074 0.001 0.981 
R-squared 0.2557 0.1945 0.2339 
F value, chit 161.09 145.04 1204.49 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chit 6.33 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chi2 107.72 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit 1234.85 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
This table represent the dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
R-squared values are 2 6%, 19% and 23% for pooled, fixed and random, respectively. The 
relationship as a whole is significant in the three methods. The FILM is the most appropriate 
method for this regression as discussed earlier. Therefore, the results are explained further for the 
fixed effects model. 
The results of this regression do not have significant differences from the previous regressions in 
Relationship three. The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000; total market value debt is 
statistically significant at 0.000 with a coefficient of -0.107 and t value of' -3.590. Moreover, 
TDMV in this regression mediates the relationship between determinants of capital structure and 
the financial performance (ROE). However, this relationship is partially mediated. 
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The relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as before in 
Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level), and also as the previous model 
regressions (mediating'I'DBV). The results show that there is a positive relationship between 
PPE, RVGTH, TSQ, LGTA, S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial 
performance as represented by ROE on the other. On the other hand, there is a negative 
relationship between DDA and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROE. All 
relationships are highly significant at 1% except for LGTA, which reveals a highly insignificant 
relationship. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects method: 
ROE = -. 021 +. 147 ppe +. 186 rvgth + . 
378 tsq + . 
034 Igta + . 
105 s. div -. 257 dda +_077 c. rt -. 107 tdmv 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that the debt level has an insignificant relationship at 0.149. This insignificant role is 
shown above using the random effects method. However, industry sector has a positive and 
significant relationship with the firm's financial performance (ROE), as shown in the table that 
follows. 
Table 8.35 Relationship 4 (ROE & TDMV) including dummy variables: 
ROE Coef z P (Sig) 
Observations 
-- 
3760 
- -- - No. of Grou s 405 
0.196 7.550 0.000 
rv th 0.179 14.150 0.000 
AS 0.431 16.190 0.000 
I to 0.125 4.640 0.000 
sdiv 0.112 9.610 0.000 
dda -0.238 -11.640 0.000 
crt 0.061 2.810 0.005 
tdmv -0.040 -1.440 0.149 
dvind 0.255 3.490 0.000 
cons -0.089 -2.060 0.039 
R-s oared 0.2485 
Wald chi2 1219.76 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
5-, 
endest variable: Return on equit y (ROE) 
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2-C: Return on Equity (ROE) and (LUBV) 
'Ehe following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of' 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the RUF as a 
dependent variable, and LDBV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3757 observations represented by 406 firms. 
t able Ö. so KeiaUÜnsni + tKU1 ac L, LJrs V) 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. t P Si) Coef. Phi 
Observations 3757 3757 3757 
No. of Groups 406 406 
e 0.133 0.000 0.141 3.960 0.000 0.180 0.000 
rvgth 0.154 0.000 0.177 13.650 0.000 0.172 0.000 
is 0.489 0.000 0.464 21.430 0.000 0.468 0.000 
to 0.131 0.000 0.021 0.560 0.576 0.088 0.002 
sdiv 0.136 0.000 0.107 9.190 0.000 0.112 0.000 
dda -0.176 0.000 -0.261 -11.220 0.000 -0.242 0.000 
crt -0.002 0.914 0.091 3.980 0.000 0.065 0.002 
Idbv 0.111 0.000 0.015 0.660 0.510 0.041 0.049 
cons -0.015 0.294 -0.014 -1.170 0.241 0.011 0.764 
R-s uared 0.2594 0.2117 0.2418 
F value, chi2 164.12 145.46 1224.59 
Prob> F, c hi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 6.3 
F test Prob>chi2 
_ 
0.0000 
Hausman chit 54.48 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chi2 1229.35 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
This table represents the dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
R-squared values are 26%, 21% and 24% for pooled, fixed and random, respectively. The FFM 
is the most appropriate method for the reasons discussed earlier. Thereft re, the results are 
explained further for the fixed effects model. 
The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000, and the results generally do not have 
significantly differences from the previous results in Relationship three. I Iowever, debt level has 
a positive relationship with ROE but it is highly insignificant at 0.510 with a coefficient of'0.015 
and t value of 0.660. Therefore, LDBV in this regression has an insignificant mediating role in 
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the relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the financial performance 
(ROE). 
The results of the relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as before 
in Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The results show that there is a 
positive relationship between PPE, RVGTII, TSQ, LGTA, S. DIV and C. Ri' on the one side, and 
the firm's financial performance as represented by ROE on the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between DDA and the firm's financial 
performance as represented by ROE. All relationships are highly significant at 1% except for 
LGTA, which reveals a highly insignificant relationship in both regressions, before and after the 
inclusion of debt level. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects method: 
ROC = -. 014 + . 
141 ppe + . 
177 rvlnh + . 464 tsq + . 
0? 1 Igta + . 107 s. 
div -. 261 dda + . 
091 c. rt + . 
015 1 dbv 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a positive and significant relationship with the firm's ROE, as 
shown in the table that follows. 
Table 8.37 Relationship 4 (ROE & LDEV) including dummy variables: 
ROE Coef. z P (Sig) 
Observations 3757 
No. Groups 406 
ppe 0.185 7.080 0.000 
rv th 0.172 13.640 0.000 
is 0.470 24.040 0.000 
Itta 0.096 3.480 0.000 
__ sdiv 0.112 9.700 0.000 
dda -0.242 -11.800 0.000 
crt 0.065 3.120 0.002 
Idbv _ 0.039 1.860 0.063 
dvind 0.240 3.200 0.001 
cons -0.074 -1.660 0.096 
R-squared 0.2559 
Wald_chi2 1237.3 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Return on equit y (ROE) 
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2-1): Return on Equity (ROE) and (LDMV) 
I'he Following table summarizes the regression results tör three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the ROI: as a 
dependent variable, and LDMV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented 
by 3759 observations represented by 405 firms. 
Table 8.38 Relationship 4 (ROE & LDMV): 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
___ 
Coef. P_(SJ Coef. t P Coef. P Si )-- 
Observations 3759 3759 3759 
No, of Groups 405 405 
_pp 
0.134 0.000 0.142 3.950 0.000 0.182 0.000 
rv th 0.156 0.000 0.185 14.260 0.000 0.177 0.000 
is 0.531 0.000 0.443 17.740 0.000 0.475 0.000 
Icta 0.146 0.000 0.028 0.750 0.455 0.102 0.000 
sdiv 0.136 0.000 0.107 9.090 0.000 0.113 0.000 
dda -0.175 0.000 -0.258 -11.100 0.000 -0.238 0.000 
crt -0.001 0.961 0.104 4.530 0.000 0.073 0.000 
Idmv 0.108 0.000 -0.009 -0.350 0.725 0.039 0.108 
cons -0.026 0.070 -0.021 -1.770 0.076 -0.002 0.951 
-R-squared 
0.2576 0.2048 0.2409 
F value, chi2 162.64 142.86 1207.19 
Prob> F, c hi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 6.24 4 
, F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chi2 72.36 
test test Prob>chi2 
- 
0.0000 
ý--'T- __. __ - -- chit T 1271.04 
.. __ - LM test Prob>chil . . ._ 0.0000 
This table represents the dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
R-squared values are not different from the last regressions for the same relationship: 26%, 20% 
and 24% for pooled, fixed and random, respectively. The FIM again is the most appropriate 
method for this regression as is shown in the table. Therefi re, the results are explained further 
for the fixed effects model. 
The results are not statistically different from the previous regressions. The model as a whole is 
still significant at 0.0000, debt level still has a negative relationship with ROIL but it is highly 
insignificant at 0.725 with a coefficient of -. 009 and t value -0.350. 't'herefore, also in this case 
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debt level (I, DMV) in this regression has an insignificant mediating role in the relationship 
between the determinants of capital structure and the financial performance (ROL: ). 
These regressions also give mostly the same trends fror the relationships between independent 
and dependent variables as before in Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The 
results show that there is a positive relationship between PPF., RVGTI I, 1 SQ, LG1'A, S. DIV and 
C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by ROI; on the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between I)DA and the firm's financial 
performance as represented by ROE. All relationships are highly significant at 1% except for 
LGTA, which reveals highly insignificant relationship also in these regressions. The equation 
that follows represents the fixed effects method: 
ROE = -. 021 +. 142 ppe + . 185 rvgth + . 443 tsq + . 
028 1 gta + . 
107 s. div -. 258 dda + . 104 c. rt -. 009 
1 dmv 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a positive and significant relationship with the firm's financial 
performance (ROE), as shown in the table that follows. 
"fahle 8.39 Relationship 4 (ROL; & LDMV) including dummy variables: 
ROE Coef z[ P (Sig) 
Observations 3759 
No. of Groups 405 
e 0.187 7.140 0.000 
rýqth 0.177 13.990 0.000 
is 0.476 20.690 0.000 
to 0.112 4.080 0.000 
sdiv 0.113 9.650 0.000 
dda -0.239 -11.690 0.000 
crt 0.072 3.510 0.000 
Idmv 0.036 1.500 0,134 
dvind 0.245 3.350 0.001 
cons -0.089 -2.050 0.040 
_R_ 
squared 2551 
Wald chi2 1221.27 
P ob> chi2 0.00-0-0- 
e Indent varible: Return one uit a (RUE) 
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8.2.6.2 Section summary (ROE-Relationship four) 
I'he previous section represents the relationship between determinants of' capital structure as 
independent variables, ROE as a dependent variable and debt level as a mediating variable. Four 
debt level measures are assigned in this relationship, 'FDBV, TDMV, LD[3V, and LDMV. '['his 
relationship has been presented by sixteen regressions using three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models. Moreover, all of these relationships have been controlled by 
the industry sector. 
All regressions are highly significant at 0.0000; R-squared values for all static methods (pooled 
OLS, fixed and random effects) are 26,20 and 24%, respectively. The fixed effects model is 
shown to be the most appropriate method due to the specifications tests prepared for these 
regressions as discussed earlier. Therefore, the following summary table reveals results for the 
FEM for the above relationships. 
'fahle 8.40 Relationship 4 Determinants of catpital structure & ROE mcdiatint; debt level: 
Coef. P(Si) Coef. P (S ) 
_Coet: 
P (Sig) 
_Coef. 
P Sim 
_pe 
0.144 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.142 0.000 
rvýth 0.185 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.185 0.000 
is 0.434 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.443 0.000 
Igta 0.035 0.346 0.034 0.360 0.021 0.576 0.028 0.455 
sdiv 0.106 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.107 0.000 
dda 
crt 
-0.254 
0.077 
0.000 
0.002 
-0.257 
0.077 
0.000 
0.001 
-0.261 
0.091 
0.000 
0.000 
-0.258 
0.104 
0.000 
0.000 
Mediating 
variable 
TDBV TDMV LDBV LDMV 
Debt -0.074 0.002 -0.107 0.000 0.015 0.510 0.009 0.725 
ROE is the dependent variable 
First, the results of these regressions do not have significant differences from the regressions in 
Relationship three (without mediating for debt). Determinants of capital structure are revealed to 
have similar relationships with the ROE without mediating the debt level. 
Second, total debt level still has the highly significant relationship with the ROE. This has been 
confirmed by Relationship two which reveals highly significant relationships for 'l'l)UV and 
'fDMV. However, book and market long-term debt are shown to become highly insignificant in 
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the relationship with ROE. Even though, in Relationship two, a negative and highly significant 
relationship is revealed for LDBV and LDMV. 3 The reason behind that perhaps is due to the 
inclusion of important variables which can explain the ROE better than the debt level like 
Tobin's Q. 
Additionally, although the TDBV and TDMV have a significant mediating role, changes in the 
coefficients of the determinants of capital structure after inclusion of these debt ratios are small 
(this will be explained in detail in the following chapter). Therefore, this indicates that the debt 
level mediating role is partial, not full (complete). 
These regressions keep the signs of the relationships as before (without mediating debt). In 
summary, the results show that there is a positive relationship between PPE, RVGTH, TSQ, 
LGTA, S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the firm's financial performance as represented by 
ROE on the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between DDA and the firm's financial 
performance as represented by ROE. All relationships are highly significant at 1%, except LGTA, 
which is confirmed to have highly insignificant relationship before and after controlling for debt 
level. 
This relationship is controlled by the effect of industry type, results show that there is a positive 
and significant relationship between the industry type and return on equity ROE for all debt 
measures. These results are shown in the following table. 
3 The results for the relationship between debt level and ROE are not shown in the study for the reasons mentioned in relationship 
two before (low R-squared values). However, regressions show a negative and highly significant relationship between debt level 
(for the four indicators individually) and ROE. Coefficients are -0.172. -0.381, -0.067 and -0.254 for TDBV, TDMV, LDIV and 
LDMV respectively, and all relations are highly significant at 1%. 
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Table 8.41 Relationship 4 Industry effect with ROE: 
Relationship 4: Industry- Duninly 
Mediator Coef z P>z 
tdbv 0.244 3.240 0.001 
tdmv 0.255 3.490 0.000 
Idbv 0.240 3.200 0.001 
Idmv 0.245 3.350 0.001 
Dependent variable: Return on eq jity ROE 
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3. Price to earnings ratio (PE) with four indicators for debt level 
This section contains four groups of regressions representing the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure as independent variables, price to earnings ratio (PF) as a 
dependent variable, and debt level as a mediating variable. These four groups are identified by 
the four debt level indicators assigned in this relationship: "l'I)13V, TDMV, LDBV, and LDMV. 
This relationship has been presented by sixteen regressions using three methods, pooled OLS, 
fixed effects, and random effects models. Moreover, all of these relationships have been 
controlled by the industry sector. 
3-A: Price to earnings ratio (PE) and mediating variable (TDBV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OIL, fixed 
effects, and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by the PE ratio as a 
dependent variable, and TD13V as a mediating variable. 'these regressions have been represented 
by 3385 observations represented by 371 firms. 
Table 8.42 Relationship 4 (PI: & TD[3V): 
-e I vviauWL-%j i 1^%WU vnvvw r%aIIUJIII vnv;. ta 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. t P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) 
Observations 3385 3385 3385 
No. of Groups 371 371 
ppe 
_ 
0.008 0.669 0.066 1.400 0.162 0.033 0.221 
rvgth 0.195 0.000 0.167 10.000 
_ 
0.000 0.184 0.000 
is 0.522 0.000 0.596 22.620 0.000 0.556 0.000 
to 0.090 0.000 0.121 2.600 0.009 0.080 0.004 
sdiv 0.028 0.074 0.059 4.060 0.000 0.047 0.001 
dda 0.016 0.379 -0.133 -4.520 0.000 -0.070 0.003 
crt 0.033 0.097 0.008 0.280 0.783 0.035 0.166 
tdbv -0.015 0.431 0.002 - 
0.080 0.940 -0.008 0.731 - -------- cons -0.051 0.001 -0.064 -4.120 0.000 -0.007 
-- 0.808 
- 
R-sq4ared 0.2 632 
_ 
0.2471 0.258 
F value, chit 150.74 101.26 945.22 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
F test I Prob>chi2 1 0.0000 
test Prob>chi2 
_ 
0.0000 
chit 569_. 75 
A test Prob>chil 0.0000 
s table represents the dependent variable: Price to earnings ratio_ PE) 
UniS 188 
These regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods as shown in the table. R- 
squared values are 26%, 25% and 26% for pooled, fixed and random, respectively. The FEM is 
the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. Therefore, the results are explained further for 
the fixed effects model. 
The results of this regression do not have significant differences from the previous regressions in 
Relationship three. The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000; TDBV has a positive 
relationship with the PE ratio but is highly insignificant at 0.940 with a coefficient of 0.002 and t 
value of 0.080. 
Consequently, TDBV in this regression becomes insignificant, which means that debt level here 
has no mediating role for the relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the 
financial performance (PE). The reason for this might be due to the inclusion of some important 
variables which can explain the price earnings ratio better than other variables, such as the 
Tobin's Q, which has the strongest relationship with PE. Also, perhaps due to the way each ratio 
is measured, TDBV depends on book figures; PE on the other hand depends on the market 
figures. This has been supported in the next relationship (PE with the TDMV). 
The relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as before in 
Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The results show that there is a positive 
relationship between PPE, RVGTH, TSQ, LGTA, S. DIV and C. RT on the one side, and the 
firm's financial performance as represented by the PE ratio on the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between DDA and the firm's financial 
performance as represented by the PE. All relationships are highly significant at 1% except for 
PPE and C. RT, which reveals highly insignificant relationships. The equation that follows 
represents the fixed effects method: 
PE = -. 064 +. 066 ppe +. 167 rvgth +. 596 tsq + . 121 Igta + . 059 s. div -. 133 dda +. 008 c. rt +. 002 tdbv 
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The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a negative and significant relationship with the Pl ratio, as shown 
in the table that follows. 
Table 8.43 Relationship 4 (PE & TOWN) including dummy variables: 
PE Coef. z P (Sig) 
Observations 3385 
No. of Groups 371 
e 0.028 1.020 0.306 
rvgth 0.185 11.570 0.000 
is 0.551 24.780 0.000 
Igta 0.067 2.450 0.014 
sdiv 0.047 3.340 0.001 
dda -0.066 -2.850 0.004 
crt 0.039 1.570 0.117 
tdbv -0.003 -0.120 0.904 
dvind -0.195 -3.210 0.001 
cons 0.064 1.740 0.082 
-scLuared 0.2635 
Wald chit 960.36 
Prob> chit 0.0000 
De endcnt variable: Price to earnings ratio (PE) 
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3-13: Price to earnings ratio (PE) and (TUMV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, Bed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by PF. as a dependent 
variable and 'FDMV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented by 3414 
observations represented by 371 firms. 
Table 8.44 Relationship 4 WE & TDMV) 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
_ 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. t P Si Coef. P Sig)- 
__ Observations 3414 3414 3414 
No. of Groups 371 371 
e -0.015 0.412 0.059 1.230 0.219 0.015 0.573 
rvgth 0.208 0.000 0.187 11.080 0.000 0.201 0.000 
is 0.445 0.000 0.399 14.760 0.000 0.410 0.000 
_I9ta 
0.084 0.000 0.080 1.710 0.088 0.064 0.020 
sdiv 0.027 0.093 0.053 3.600 0.000 0.043 0.003 
dda 0.030 0.091 -0.126 -4.240 0.000 -0.055 0.017 
crt 0.005 0.788 -0.045 -1.480 0.138 -0.008 0.743 
tdmv -0.059 0.017 -0.140 -4.360 0.000 -0.110 0.000 
cons -0.039 0.011 -0.042 -2.770 0.006 0.007 0.813 
R-squared 0.2514 0.2301 
_ 
0.2443 
F value, chi2 142.94 90.1_ 868.03 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
chi2 3.78 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chi2 31.97 
test Prob>chi2 0.0001 
chit 543.04 
LM test Prob>chi1 0.0000 
--- -- This table represents the dependent variable- Price to earning ratio (PEJ 
_ 
In these regressions, R-squared are 25%, 23% and 24% For pooled, fixed and random, 
respectively. These regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods as shown in the 
table. The fixed effects model is the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. Theret. ue, the 
results are explained further for the FEM. 
The results of this regression do not have significant differences from the previous regressions in 
Relationship three. The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000; 'I DMV has a negative 
relationship with the {'f: and is highly significant at 0.000 with a coefficient of-0.140 and I value 
of' -4.360. This might he due to the way that TDMV and PI are measured; both of these ratios 
depend on the market ligures. Consequently, TDMV in this regression mediates the relationship 
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between the determinants of capital structure and the financial performance (III-I'). I lowever, this 
relationship is partially mediated by the debt level (TDMV). 
The relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as beirre in 
Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The results show that there is a positive 
relationship between PPE, RVGTH, TSQ, LGTA and S. DIV on the one side, and the firm's 
financial performance as represented by PE on the other. On the other hand, there is a negative 
relationship between DDA and C. RT on the one side and PE on the other. All relationships are 
highly significant at l% except for PPE and C. RT, which reveal highly insignificant 
relationships. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects method: 
IE=-. 042 + . 059 ppe + . 
187 rvgth + . 
399 tsq + . 
080 Igta + . 
053 s. div -. 126 dda -. 045 c. rt -. 0140 tdmv 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of' the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a negative and significant relationship with the PE, as shown in the 
table that follows. 
"fahle 8.45 Relationship 4 (Pf? & TDMV) includin 
Observations 3414 
No. of Groups 371 
g 0.009 0.330 0.741 
rv th 0.201 12.480 0.000 
tsg 0.411 16.990 0.000 
Igta 0.052 1.890 0.059 
_ 
scdiy 0.043 3.010 0.003 
dda _ -0.051 -2.210 0.027 
crt -0.003 -0.130 0.893 _ tdmv -0.102 -3.580 0.000 
dvind -0.194 -3.230 0.001 
cons 0.078 2.140 0.032 
R-s uared 0.25 
Wald chit 883.99 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
[pendent variable: Price to earnings ratio PE 
g dummy variables: 
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3-C: Price to earnings ratio (PE) and (LDBV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects, and random effects models, and represents the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by I'l; as a dependent 
variable, and LDBV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented by 3371) 
observations represented by 370 firms. 
In These regressions, R-squared are 26%, 25% and 26% for pooled, fixed and random, 
respectively. The Fixed effects model is the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. 
"Therefore, the results are explained Further for the IFFM. 
The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000; LDI3V has a negative but highly insignificant 
(0.394) relationship with the PE ratio with a coefficient of-0.021 and t value of-0.850. This is 
perhaps due to the reasons mentioned above. Consequently, LDI3V in this regression also does 
not mediate the relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the financial 
performance (PE). 
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The relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as before in 
Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The results show that there is a positive 
relationship between PPE, RVG' l 1, 'l'SQ, LGTA and S. DIV on the one side and I'IF, on the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between Dl)A and C. R'I' on the one side and 
PE on the other. All relationships are highly significant at I`% except for PPE and C. Ri', which 
reveals highly insignificant relationships. The equation that follows represents the fixed eliccts 
method: 
P1 = -. 056 + . 053 ppe + . 167 rvgth + . 586 tsq + . 
117 Igta + . 
057 s. div -. 130 dda -. 008 c. rt -. 021 Idbv 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a negative and significant relationship with the PE, as shown in the 
table that follows. 
dummy variables: 
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3-1): Price to earnings ratio (PE) and (LDMV) 
The following table summarizes the regression results for three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models, and represents the relationship hetween 
determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, financial performance measured by PE as a dependent 
variable and LDMV as a mediating variable. These regressions have been represented by 3414 
observations represented by 371 firms. 
Table 8.48 Relationshin 4 WE & LDMVI 
4 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. t P_S L Coef. P Si 
Observations 3414 3414 3414 
No. of Groups 371 371 
__ e -0.017 0.369 0.070 1.450 0.148 0.017 0.535 
rvýth 
_ 
0.209 0.000 0.190 11.230 0.000 0.203 0.000 
tsq_ 
_ 
0.468 0.000 0.425 16.810 0.000 0.436 0.000 
to 0.078 0.000 0.090 1.870 0.061 0.062 0.026 
sdiv 0.028 0.077 0.055 3.750 0.000 0.045 0.002 
dda 0.031 0.086 -0.126 -4.260 0.000 -0.054 0,020 
crt 0.016 0.387 -0.010 -0.340 0.732 0.014 0.558 
Idmv -0.020 0.392 -0.103 -3.410 0.001 -0.070 0.008 
cons -0.038 0.015 -0.042 -2.700 0.007 0.009 0.747 
R-s uared 0.2503 0.2274 0.243 
F value, chit 142.11 88.96 858.73 
Prob> F, chit 0.0000 
-- --- 
0.0000 
- --- --- --- 
0.0000 
---- chi2 3.77 
F test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
Hausman chit 33.91 
test Prob>chi2 0.0000 
chit 535.96 
LM test Prob>chil 0.0000 
Dependent variable: Price to earnings ratio (PE) 
In these regressions, R-squared are 25%, 23% and 24% for pooled, fixed and random, 
respectively. These regressions as a whole are significant in the three methods as shown in the 
table. The fixed effects model is the most appropriate method as discussed earlier. 'I'herelore, the 
results are explained further for the F EM. 
The model as a whole is still significant at 0.0000; LDMV has a negative relationship with the 
I't ratio and statistically significant at 0.001 with a coefficient of -0.103 and t value of -3.4 10. 
Consequently, I, UMV in this regression mediates the relationship between the determinants of 
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capital structure and price to earnings ratio. However, this relationship is partially mediated by 
the debt level (LDMV). 
The relationships between independent and dependent variables are likely as belt re in 
Relationship three (without the inclusion of debt level). The results show that there is a positive 
relationship between PPE, RVGTH, TSQ, LGTA and S. DIV on the one side and Pf-. on the other. 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between DDA and C. RT on the one side and 
PE on the other. All relationships are highly significant at 1% except for PPE and C. RT, which 
reveals highly insignificant relationships. The equation that follows represents the fixed effects 
method: 
PE _ -. 042 + . 070 ppe + . 190 rvgth +. 425 tsq +. 090 
Igta +. 055 s. div -. 126 dda -. 010 c. rt -. 103 Idmv 
The previous relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results 
show that industry sector has a negative and significant relationship with the PE, as shown in the 
table that follows. 
"fahle 8.49 Relationship 4 (P[ & LDMV) including dummy variables: 
PE Coef z P (Sig) 
Observations 
-- 
3414 
--- ----- No. ofGrou s 
__ _ 
371 
e 0.010 0.370 0.710 
rv th 0.203 12.620 0.000 
is 0.435 19.410 0.000 
to 0.049 1.770 0.076 
sdiv 0.045 3.130 0.002 
dda -0.049 -2.150 0.032 
crt 0.017 0.720 0.471 
Idmv -0.065 -2.460 0.014 
dvind -0.204 -3.410 0.001 
cons 0.084 2.320 0.021 
R-squared 0.2493 
Wald chi2 876.29 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
[)ependent variable: Price to earnings ratio (PE) 
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8.2.6.3 Section summary (PE-Relationship four) 
The previous section represents the relationship between determinants of capital structure as 
independent variables, PE as a dependent variable, and debt level as a mediating variable. Four 
debt level measures are assigned in this relationship: 1'DIV, TDMV, LI)1V and I, I)MV. This 
relationship has been presented by sixteen regressions using three methods, pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models. However, the FEM is the most appropriate method according 
to the specification tests as discussed earlier. Moreover, all of' these relationships have been 
controlled by the industry sector. 
All regressions are highly significant at 0.0000; R-squared values for all static methods (pooled 
OLS, fixed, and random effects) are 26,24 and 25%, respectively. The fiillowing summary table 
reveals the results for the fixed effects models for these relationships. 
Tahle 9.50 Relationshin 4 Determinants of canital structure & PE mediatine debt level 
Coef P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) 
pie 0.066 0.162 0.059 0.219 0.053 0.264 0.070 0.148 
rv th 0.167 0.000 0.187 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.190 0.000 
tsq 0.596 0.000 0.399 0.000 0.586 0.000 0.425 0.000 
_ ____ Iota 0.121 _ 0.009 0.080 0.088 0.117 0.014 0.090 0.061 
sdiv 0.059 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.055- 
-- 
0.000 
dda -0.133 0.000 -0.126 0.000 -0.130 0.000 -0.126 0.000 
crt 0.008 0.783 -0.045 0.138 -0.008 0.798 -0.010 0.732 
Mediating TD BV TD MV LD BV LD MV 
variable 0.002 0.940 -0.140 0.000 -0.021 0.394 -0.103 0.001 
Dependent variable: Price to earnings ratio (PE) 
First, the results of these regressions for the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and price to earnings ratio do not have significant differences from the regressions in 
Relationship three (without mediating for debt). Determinants of capital structure -- almost - 
have similar relationships with price to earnings ratio without mediating the debt level. 
Second, market value debt level ratios (T[)MV and LDMV) still have the highly significant 
relationship with PI: as found before in the second relationship. This can he explained as that the 
debt level represented by market value partially mediates the relationship between the 
determinants of capital structure and PE. 
UniS 197 
However, book value debt measures (TDEV and 11)13V) reveal a highly insignificant 
relationship with PE, although these two indicators have highly significant relationships with 11i; 
when they are regressed individually with PI: in Relationship two. As previously stated in 
Relationship two, each debt indicator is regressed alone to find the relationship with the 
perlbrmance (ex. PE); this perhaps is the reason for such a relationship. In other words, the 
inclusion of another important variable which has better explanatory power for PE reduces the 
explanation power of the debt level. Another reason that might be behind this insignificant role 
of the book value debt indicators is the way that these variables and PE are measured. PF 
depends on market values, whereas both TDBV and LD13V depend on hook values. "]'his gives 
the chance to other variables (like Tobin's Q) to have a better role in explaining the PL: and 
minimizes this power for the book measures of debt level. 
These regressions keep the signs of the relationships as before (without mediating debt). In 
summary, the results show that there is a positive relationship between I'PI:, RVG'I'II, TSQ, 
TGTA and S. DIV on the one side and PE on the other. On the other hand, there is a negative 
relationship between DDA and C. RT on the one side and PE on the other. All relationships are 
highly significant at 1% except PPE and C. RT which reveals a highly insignificant relationship. 
The results for industry as a control variable reveal that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between the industry type and PE as is shown in the following summary table. 
'f'ahle 8.5I RclatiOnshin 4 Industry effect with PE: 
Relationship 4 (PES: Industry- Dumm 
Mediator Coer. x P>z 
tdbv -0.195 -3.210 0.001 
tdmv -0.194 -3.230 0.001 
ldbv -0.186 -3.080 0.002 
Idmv -0.204 -3.410 0.001 
Dependent variable: Price to earnings ratio PE 
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8.2.7 Summary (Relationship four) 
Fo summarize the previous section, the aim of Relationship Chur is to test the mediating role of 
debt level for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the lirni's financial 
performance. Moreover, in the following chapter, the mediating role is explained in detail. 
The previous section contains lourty eight regressions using three static panel data methods, 
pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models. These regressions represent the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure as independent variables, debt level as a 
mediating variable and the firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. Moreover, all 
these relationships are controlled for industry sector. 
Three indicators represent the firm's financial performance, ROT, ROE and the PF. Also, four 
indicators are used to reflect the debt level ratio, TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and LDMV. 
All models are highly significant as shown in the probability of F=0.0000 in pooled and fixed 
effects methods and probability of Chi2 = 0.0000 for the random method. R-squared values for 
all static methods (pooled OLS, fixed and random etTect) revolve around the twenties (20s), as is 
shown in the following table. 
Table 8.52 Relationshin 4 R-squared f )r different mediator variables: 
R-squared Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Relationship 
Four Dependent variable 
Mediator 
variable ROI ROE PE ROI ROE PE ROI ROE PE 
TDBV 0 27 0.25 0.26 &21 0.19 0,25 0.25 0.23 0.26 
TDMV 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 
LDBV 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.21 
_ 
0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 
- LDMV 0.27 0.26 0.2 5 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.24 J 0.24 
Average 0.27 0 26 0.26 
_0 _1 -9.20 
0.24 0.25 - 0.24 - 0.25 
The results for the fixed effects models show the same effect direction tier the majority of 
variables using different measures for dependent variables. The lüllowing summary table reveals 
the significance levels for all variables in diflcrent regressions für the relationship between 
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determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance using debt level as a 
mediating variable (Relationship lour). 
Table 8.53 Values: 
From the tables above, four variables are shown to have significant relationship with all financial 
performance indicators even if the debt level is included. 'T'hese variables are RVGTI I, 'I'SQ, 
S. DIV and DIVA. These variables show significant relationship at a 99% confidence level for all 
three performance measures and in all relationships although when mediating by different debt 
measures. In addition, these variables are shown to be the most important variables in 
Relationship three (without mediating debt). 
On the other hand, PPE and C. RT reveal a highly significant relationship with ROI and ROI: but 
highly insignificant relationship with Pf . 
This maybe because of the way that these variables are 
measured, PPP and C. RT depend on book values whereas P1 depends on the market value. 
Three conditions should be net in testing the mediating role of debt level (M) for the direct 
relationship between determinants of capital structure as independent variables (X) and financial 
performance as a dependent variable (Y) (Baron & Kenny I986), as follows: 
" first relationship between the (X) and (M) should be significant 
" second relationship between (M) and (Y) should be significant 
" third relationship between (X) and (Y) directly also should he significant 
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However, in case of a complete mediating role, the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure (X) and the firm's financial performance (Y), when controlled for capital structure (M), 
should be highly insignificant. In other words, the effect is zero. However, in the case of a partial 
mediating role, this effect should be reduced. That is, the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure (X) and the firm's financial performance (Y), when controlling for capital 
structure (M), is still to be significant, but this relationship is less significant than before (without 
controlling for debt level (M)). 
From the above table, the P value (sig. level) of the debt level appears in the last row; the 
significant value reveals that the debt level mediates the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and the financial performance as described below. 
All debt measures mediate the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the 
firm's financial performance measured by the ROI as appeared in the P value for different debt 
measures (0.000,0.000,0.017,0.001) for the TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and LDMV, respectively. 
This means that there is a significant mediating role of debt level in the direct relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and ROI. However, the changes in the coefficients of 
determinants of capital structure 4 after inclusion of the debt measures are low. This indicates 
that the debt mediating role is partial, not full (complete). 
For the relationship with ROE, debt mediates the relationship only when measured by TDBV 
and TDMV (0.002 and 0.000, respectively). This means that total debt, although in book or 
market value, mediates the relationship between determinants of capital structure and financial 
performance (ROE). However, long-term debt (book or market value) is highly insignificant in 
these relationships. This indicates that long-term debt has no mediating role in the relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and ROE. 
° Tables that summarize the changes of these coefficients by the absolute value are presented in the following 
chapter when hypothesis 4 is tested, 
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Meanwhile, in Relationship two, these two indicators reveal a negative and highly significant 
relationship for LDBV and LDMV. The reason behind that perhaps is due to the inclusion of 
important variables which can explain the ROE better than the debt level like Tobin's Q. 
Market value debt (TDMV and LDMV) mediates the relationship between the determinants of 
capital structure and financial performance measured by PE. This has been confirmed before in 
the second relationship which reveals a negative and highly significant relationship with the PE. 
However, book value debt measures (TDBV and LDBV) reveal a highly insignificant 
relationship with PE, although these two indicators have highly significant relationships with PE 
when they regressed individually with PE in Relationship two. As previously stated in 
Relationship two, each debt indicator is regressed alone to find the relationship with the 
performance (ex. PE); this perhaps is the reason for such a relationship. 
To put it more simply, the inclusion of another important variable which has better explanation 
power for PE reduces the power of the debt. Another reason that might be behind this 
insignificant role of the book value debt indicators is the way that these variables and PE are 
measured. Whereas PE depends on market values; both TDBV and LDBV depend on book 
values. This gives the chance to other variables (like Tobin's Q which also depends on market 
value) to have a better role in explaining the PE and minimizes this power for the book measures. 
As a result, debt plays a partial mediating role for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure on the one side, and ROI for all debt level ratios, ROE for the total debt ratios 
only, and PE for the market debt ratios only on the other. 
To sum up, it has been noted that most of the relationships (8 from 12) between debt level and 
the firm's financial performance above are significant. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
mediating role of debt level for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the 
firm's financial performance can be confirmed. 
UniS 202 
8.3 Cross-sectional analysis 
The importance of the cross-sectional analysis lies in several aspects. First, the main advantage is 
to investigate the role of CEO remunerations and ownership structure on the relationship 
between debt level and financial performance due to the unavailability of these data in a panel 
data analysis. Second, the importance of using economic value added (EVA) as an indicator of a 
firm's financial performance. EVA is important as is discussed in the variables' measurement 
chapter, but the unavailability of data for the fifteen years of the study period constrains the 
researcher to use it only in the cross-sectional analysis. In addition, it is worthwhile to compare 
results using EVA with the other three measures of financial performance in relationships one, 
two, three, and four. 
Third, regarding the following results, the cross-sectional analysis gives better R-squared 
especially for the second relationship due to the inclusion of additional variables (i. e., ownership 
structure and remunerations). For example, R-squared values of Relationship one in panel 
analysis are 27,56,21 and 42% for TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and LDMV, respectively. Meanwhile, 
R-squared values in the cross-sectional analysis for the same relationship are 38,64,31 and 53%, 
respectively. Moreover, the maximum R-squared values in Relationship two for ROI, ROE and 
PE are 10,5 and 11% in all panel analysis, respectively. Meanwhile, using the cross-sectional 
analysis for the same relationship gives 18,12 and 15%, respectively and 17% for the EVA. 
The next chapter will combine the results of the two methods, panel and cross-sectional data 
analysis, in order to compare between these two results and to test the study's hypothesis. 
The following section will discuss the results of cross-sectional analysis for the year of 2005. 
8.3.1 First relationship-cross-sectional analysis 
The following table shows the regression results for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure as independent variables, and debt level as a dependent variable. Four indicators 
are used to represent the debt level: TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and LDMV. These regressions have 
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been represented by 386,389,385, and 389 firms for the above indicators respectively for the 
year of 2005. 
Table 8.54 Relationshin 1: cross-sectional analysis: 
Dependent variable 
TDBV TD MV LDBV LD MV 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. PS Coef. 
_P 
(Si9) 
_ 
Coef, P (Sig) 
Observations 386 389 385 389 
e 0.098 0.065 0.096 0.045 0.139 
- 
0.011 0.140 0.005 
rv th -0.142 0.004 
-- 
-0.092 0.034 
- 
-0.063 
-- 0.205 -0.016 0.761 
- 
is -0.126 0.025 -0.709 0.000 -0.109 0.060 -0.629 0.000 
mr -0.177 0.010 -0.181 0.001 -0.099 0.161 -0.135 0.031 
ebitd 0.014 0.859 0.147 0.011 -0.072 0.370 0.118 0.090 
to 0.301 0.000 0.214 0.0 22 0.348 0.000 0.252 0.000 
sdiv 0.104 0.018 0.049 0.226 0.113 0.013 0.070 0.112 
dda -0.035 0.546 -0.031 0.520 -0.008 0.895 -0.024 0.651 
crt -0.382 0.000 -0.264 0.000 -0.234 0.000 -0.447 0.004 
cons 0.039 0.397 0.027 0.460 0.105 0.028 0.103 0.010 
R-squared 0.3 666 0.6284 0.2 992 0.5216 
F value 24.18 71.21 17.79 45.91 
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
B-P-C-W test 
Chi 2 Prob. 0.81 (0.3695) 
Robust standard 
error 10.45 (0.0012) 0.61 0.4341 
Robust standard 
error 9.05 (0.0026) 
B-P-C-W. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test 
This study tests the heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test. The results 
for "I'DBV and LDBV are free from such problems. Ilowever, the results l )r "l'UMV and Ll)MV 
are robust tier heteroskedasticity using the (White 1980) process. 
The model as a whole is significant in all regressions as shown in the probability of F 0.0000. 
According to the R-squared, using the market value of total debt gives the highest value of 63%, 
and for the LDMV gives 52%. However, R-squared for hook value indicators are 37% and 30% 
für TC)13V and LDBV, respectively. 
The results in general show that there is a positive relationship between I. G'I A and S. DIV 
on one side, and all indicators of' debt level on the other side. Also, a positive relationship is 
apparent between FBI"I'D and i'D13V, TDMV, and LI)MV. I lowever, this relationship is highly 
insignificant using LI)RV. On the other hand there is a negative relationship between RVG'I'I I. 
l'SQ, MRG, DDA and CR"1' on one side, and all debt level indicators on the other side. 
Regarding the significance, PPE, T'SQ, LGTA and CRT predictors reveal signilicaint 
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relationships in all regressions. However, Dt)A reveal highly insignificant relationships in all 
regressions. Other indicators have different significances as shown above. 
The previous relationship has been controlled for two variables: industry sector and ownership 
structure. The results show that industry sector has a positive and significant relationship with 
TDMV and LDMV. However, ownership structure seems to have no clear role in this 
relationship; it reveals a highly insignificant relationship with all debt variables. The following 
table summarizes this relationship. 
Fable 8.55 Relationship 1: cross-sectional analysis summary: 
De enden t variable 
TD BV TDMV L[) UV l. l)MV 
Coef. P Si Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P Si Coet.. P (Sig) 
Observations 258 261 258 261 
e 0.085 0.213 0.135 0.010 0.108 0.125 0.167 0.004 
rvgth -0.172 0.005 -0.102 0.027 -0.073 0.247 0.008 0.878 
is -0.150 0.076 -0.528 0.000 -0.157 
_ 0.074 -0.444 0.000 
mr -0.193 0.030 -0.154 0.025 -0.097 0.292 -0.114 0.129 
ebitd 0.048 0.651 0.060 0.467 -0.080 0.473 0.009 0.919 
Tta 0.340 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.408 0.000 - 
0.389 0.000 
sdiv 0.110 0.045 0.046 0.272 0.123 0.031 0.062 0.182 
dda -0.019 0.798 -0.028 0.614 0.036 0 635 -0.010 0.875 
crt -0.357 0.000 -0.237 0.000 -0.211 0.001 -0.112 0,025 
ntssno 0.053 0.332 0.050 0.239 0.044 0.436 0.048 0.307 
dvind 0.165 0.151 0.226 0.011 0.132 0.265 0.172 0.074 
cons -0.029 0.705 -0.127 0.030 0.017 0.831 -0.056 0.384 
R-squared 0.366 0.5638 0.3073 0.4648 
F value 12.91 29.26 9.92 19.66 
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
B-P-C-W test Chi2 0.25 0.82 0.05 1.00 
Prob. Chit 0.6143 0.3660 0.8312 0.3167 
B-P-C-W. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test 
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8.3.2 Second relationship 
This relationship represents the relationship between debt level as independent variable, and the 
firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. Other control variables are included in the 
regressions and consist of ownership structure, remunerations, firm's size and industry, as is 
discussed afterwards. 
Four indicators are used to represent the firm's financial performance: ROI, ROE, PE and EVA. 
Moreover, four indicators are used to represent the debt level: TDBV, TDMV, LDBV and 
LDMV. 
Because of the massive multicollinearity found among debt variables; sixteen regressions have 
been investigated for this relationship includes one debt ratio in each. However, this study 
chooses the regressions which give the highest R-squared values. Two regressions are chosen for 
this target depend on the dependent variable, ROI and EVA. Moreover, TDMV is an 
independent variable, and the other control variables are industry sector, firm's size, ownership 
structure and CEO remunerations. R-squared values are 16% in both regressions. 
Additionally, there is a high multicollinearity among the ownership structure indicators, and also 
among the indicators of CEO remunerations. This gives highly insignificant relationships with 
financial performance. Although the values of VIF and Tolerance are found to be less than 10 
and more than 0.1, respectively, this is acceptable in most statistical books, such as (Miles & 
Shevlin 2001) and (Pallant 2005). Therefore, the researcher runs all possible regressions to find 
any significant relationship between any of the three proxies of ownership structure on the one 
side, and the four performance measures on the other. Additionally, the researcher runs all 
possible regressions for the CEO remunerations' proxies with the financial performance. 
As appears in the following correlation matrix, there is no any significant relationship between 
any of the ownership structure variables and any of the financial performance indicators. This 
has been supported by the regressions have been run for the relationship between these proxies 
and financial performance. 
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The number oltotal major shareholders (NTSSno. ) is chosen to represent the ownership structure 
variable. This is because it is the only proxy that gives a relationship with one of the financial 
performance measures (EVA), although the correlation matrix does not show any significance 
relationship in this concern. 
Other benefits given to the CEO (total income minus basic salaries) are chosen to reflect the 
CEO remunerations variable. In addition to the advantages mentioned hebre, this indicator gives 
clearer results with the financial performance measures. 
Table 8.56 Correlations of remunerations. ownershin structure and performance: 
ROI ROE PE EVA 
SAL 
% 
1-SAL 
% 
TSS 
% 
LTSS 
% 
TSS 
no. 
ROI 1 
ROE 
. 
910(**) 1 
PE -. 028 -. 021 
EVA 
. 656(**) . 
678(**) -. 063 1 
SAL% -. 135(*) -. 137(*) -. 036 -. 223(**) 1 
1-SAL% . 140(*) . 152(*) . 023 . 231(**) -1.000(**) 
1 
TSS% -. 042 . 062 . 
059 
. 060 . 001 . 
027 1 
LTSS% -. 027 . 
037 
. 
070 -. 009 -. 077 . 
092 
. 
731(**) 1 
TSSno. . 003 . 
075 
. 000 . 118 . 171(*) -. 
138(*) . 582(**) . 085 1 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
F he following table shows the relationship between debt level as an independent variable, and 
the firm's financial perförmance as a dependent variable. Other control variables that are 
included in the regressions consist of ownership structure, CEO remunerations, size of the firm, 
and industry sector as is discussed afterwards. Debt is represented by the 'FDMV, and financial 
perförmance is measured by ROI and EVA. "these regressions represent 200 and 190 firms for 
the two dependent variables above respectively. 
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'fable 8.57 Relationship 2 regressions using i'DDMV- Cross-sectional: 
Dependent variable 
ROI EVA 
Observations 200 190 
TDMV -0.399 0.000 -0.300 0.000 
nlsal 0.200 0.004 0.255 0.000 
ntssno 0.015 0.828 0.109 0.120 
dvind 0.287 0.039 0.103 0.463 
dvisze 0.260 0.069 0.417 0.004 
cons -0.235 0.038 -0.189 0.098 
F value 7.51 7.13 
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 
From the above table, it has been confirmed that there is a negative and highly significant at 1% 
relationship between "1'DMV on the one hand, and ROl and EVA on the other. Also, the negative 
relationship has been confirmed For all other regressions which are not mentioned in this section 
due to the low R-squared values. These results support the panel data results which give negative 
relationships in all related regressions. 
This relationship has been controlled by töur variables, remunerations, ownership structure, 
industry sector, and firm's size. Remunerations measured by other benefits given to the CEO 
(total income minus basic salaries) and denoted by (nisal) have a positive and highly significant 
relationship at 1% with ROI and EVA. Ownership structure as measured by the number of total 
major shareholders (N"I'SSno. ) has a positive relationship with financial performance, but these 
relationships are highly insignificant. A firm's size as it appears in the above table has a positive 
and significant relationship with ROI and EVA. However, industry sector has a positive and 
significant with ROI, but a positive and highly insignificant relationship with INA. 
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8.3.3 Third relationship-cross-sectional analysis 
The following table shows the regression results for the direct relationship between determinants 
of capital structure as independent variables, and financial performance as a dependent variable. 
Four indicators are used to represent the financial performance, ROI, ROE, Pf: and ? VN. "These 
regressions are represented by 388,371,334 and 375 firms, respectively. This relationship has 
been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. 
Although all models are significant as a whole, they reveal different R-squared values. The best 
model is the ROI with the determinants of capital structure which gives 29°%,, ft llowed by f? VA 
gives 25%, ROE gives 21% and P[; gives 18%, respectively. 
There is a positive relationship between 1'1111, RVG'I'I I, TSQ and S. I)IV on the one side, and all 
four financial performance indicators on the other. I lowever, LUC'I'A, 1)DA, and CR'I' have 
contradicted results. Significance levels are shown in the above table. 
This relationship has been controlled for the effect of the industry sector. The results for the 
cross-sectional analysis show a positive and significant relationship between industry sector and 
ROI and ROI:, positive but highly insignificant with INA. I lowever, it shows a negative and 
significant with PE as is shown in the following table. 
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Table 8.59 Relationship i cross-sectional analysis including dummy vam iahlcs: 
Denendent variable 
3 ROI ROE P E EVA 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sib) Coot. I' (Sig) 
Observations 388 371 334 375 
e 0.132 0.007 0.130 0.012 0.092 0.049 0.053 0.337 
rvgth 0.215 0.001 0.187 0.003 0.253 0.000 0.142 0.005 
is 0.582 0.000 0.489 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.453 0.000 
to 0.137 0.031 0.184 0.011 -0.081 0.120 0.369 0.000 
sdiv 0.058 0.240 0.092 0.090 0.020 0.714 0.090 0.052 
dda -0.150 0.006 -0.155 0.005 0.020 _ 
0.687 -0.136 0.007 
crt -0.030 0.542 -0.125 0.02 0 0.052 0.276 -0.015 0.755 
dvind 0.172 0.063 _ 0.205 ____ , _ 0.037 -0.165 0.061 0.092 0.279 
cons -0.061 0.347 -0.018 0.792 0.123 0.049 -0.102 0.061 
R-s uared 0.2 959 0.2213 0.1 957 0.258 
F value, chi2 11.3 8.76 10.55 11.95 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Regressions with robust standard errors 
8.3.4 Fourth relationship-cross-sectional analysis 
'[his section represents the cross-sectional analysis for the mediating role of debt level. This has 
been tested through sixteen regressions to investigate the mediating role of' debt level in the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance. 
Determinants of capital structure are included as independent variables, debt level as a mediating 
variable and the firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. 
Four indicators are used for the firm's financial performance: ROI, ROF, PI and INA. 
Additionally, lour indicators are used for the debt level: "1'1)ßV, TDMV, [l)l3V and I. l)MV. 
The following table summarizes the regression results for the relationship between determinants 
of capital structure as independent variables, the lour indicators of a firm's financial performance 
as a dependent variable, and "I'D[3V as a mediating variable. This regression has been represented 
by 386,371,333 and 371 firms for ROl, ROF, PF and EVA, respectively. 
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able 8.00 Relationship 4 Lrft s-sectlonaI ; ºn; ilý', iý (I I)13V): 
Dependent variable 
4 ROI ROE P E EVA 
Coef. P (Sig Coef. P Si Coef. 
-__ __P 
(Sig). Coef_ P (Sig). 
Observations 386 371 333 371 
e 0.118 0.021 0.118 0.032 0.100- -. 10.0141 
0.066 0.201 
rvýth 0.187 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.268 0.000 0.126 0.010 
ts 0.529 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.481 0.000 
to 0.121 0.038 0.141 0.028 -0.068 0.237 0.437 0.000 
sdiv 0.081 0.066 0.093 0.056 0.007 0.866 0.085 0.054 
dda -0.144 0.003 -0.154 0.004 0.020 0.691 -0.121 0.016 
crt -0.079 0.141 -0.093 0.108 0.065 0.207 -0.033 0.543 
TDBV -0.080 0.124 0.090 0.140 0.035 0.495 -0.091 0.090 
cons 0.011 0.820 0.059 0.250 0.057 0.214 -0.085 0.077 
R-s uared 0.2647 0.2167 0.1 862 0.2759 
F value 16.97 12.52 9.27 17.24 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The following table summarizes the regression results for the relationship between determinants 
of capital structure as independent variables, the four indicators ofa firm's financial performance 
as a dependent variable, and TDMV as a mediating variable. This regression has been 
represented by 387,370,334 and 375 firms for ROI, ROE, PE and EVA, respectively. 
Table 8.61 Relationship 4--cross-sectional analysis ("I[)MV) 
Dependent-variable 
4 ROI ROE P E EVA 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P Si Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P Si 
Observations 387 370 334 375 
e 0.131 0.009 0.120 0.026 0.093 0.056 0.052 0.310 
rv th 0.203 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.131 0.007 
is 0.647 0.000 0.702 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.387 0.000 
to 0.146 0.010 0.170 0.007 -0.080 0.165 0.382 0.000 
sdiv 0.074 0.089 0.094 0.047 0.008 0.849 0.097 0.028 
dda -0.154 0.001 -0.162 0.002 0.018 0.720 -0.130 0.011 
crt -0.002 0.969 -0.046 0.420 0.073 0.146 -0.039 0.460 
TDMV 0.058 0.387 0.236 0.003 0.090 0.187 -0.086 0.208 
cons -0.016 0.726 0.040 0.429 0.062 0.180 -0.069 0.151 
R-s uared 0.3 13 0.2482 0.1 912 0.2593 
F value 21.53 14.9 9.6 16.01 
_ Prob> F chit 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The l llowing table summarizes the regression results for the relationship between determinants 
ofcapital structure as independent variables, the tour indicators ol'a firm's financial performance 
as a dependent variable and I. UI3V as a mediating variable. This regression has been represented 
by 385,371,332 and 370 firms for ROI, ROH PE and I VA, respectively. 
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"fahle 8.62 Relationship 4 cross-sectional analysis (I .I 
)ITV): 
Dependent variable 
4 ROI ROE P E EVA 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P Si Coef. P Si Coef. Si 
Observations 385 371 332 370 
e 0.117 0.022 0.116 0.036 0.090 
--0.964 
0.071 0.165 
_rvgth 
0.189 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.274 0.000 0,129 0.008 
is 0.531 0.000 0.492 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.474 0.000 
to 0.119 0.043 0.143 0.028 -0.096 0.100 0.455 0.000 
sdiv 0.076 0.084 0.094 0.052 -0.002 0.957 0.087 0.047 
dda -0.144 0.003 -0.154 0.004 0.021 0.664 -0.120 0.017 
crt -0.072 0.155 -0.110 0.046 0.072 0.137 -0.032 0.534 
LDBV -0.073 0.151 0.068 0.257 0.106 0.032 -0.130 0.013 
cons 0.020 0.666 0.052 0.307 0.052 0.264 -0.074 0.123 
R-s uared 0.2643 0.2148 0.1957 0.2 816 
F value 16.89 12.38 9.82 17.69 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The following table summarizes the regression results for the relationship between determinants 
of capital structure as independent variables, the tour indicators of firm's financial performance 
as a dependent variable, and LDMV as a mediating variable. This regression has been 
represented by 387,370,334 and 375 firms for ROI, ROE:, PE and INA, respectively. 
Table 8.63 Relationship 4-cross-sectional analysis (I, DMV): 
Dependent variable 
4 ROI 
Coef. P (Sig) 
ROE 
Coef. --P-(Si g) 
P 
Coef. 
E 
P (Sig) 
EVA 
Coef. P 
Observations 387 370 334 375 
spe 0.126 0.012 0.112 0.038 0.078 0.107 0.057 0.267 
rv th 0.199 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.138 0.004 
is 0.653 0.000 0.643 0.000 
------- 
0.376 0.000 0.391 
---- 
0.000 
- --- to 0.139 0.015 0.165 0.009 -0.109 0.061 - 0.388 - 0.000 
sdiv 0.071 0.101 0.095 0.046 0.003 0.943 0.099 0.025 
dda -0.155 0.001 -0.161 0.002 0.019 0.698 -0.131 0.010 
crt -0.006 0.894 -0.081 0.133 0.070 0.136 
-0.029 0.564 
LDMV 0.076 0.208 0.186 0.007 0.168 0.006 -0.091 0.140 
cons -0.022 0.632 0.025 0.622 0.053 0.246 -0.062 0.197 
f! -squared 0.3145 0.2447 0.2056 0.2605 
F value 21.68 14.62 10.51 16.11 
Prob> F, chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The researcher uses all measures of' debt with all measures of performance to capture any 
mediating role ol'the debt on the direct relationship between determinants of'capital structure and 
the firm's financial performance. 
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The results show that in the ROI regressions, all debt measures are insignificant. This means that 
the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance is 
direct and not through the debt level. Consequently, the debt level does not mediate the 
relationship. 
However, regressions using the ROE reveal highly significant results using the market debt 
measures for the mediating role of debt at a 1% significant level. Moreover, PE regressions 
reveal significant relationships in the long-term debt book and market values, but highly 
insignificant using the total debt measures. 
Finally, EVA regressions reveal significant relationships using the book value debt measures 
(TDBV and LDBV) but highly insignificant effect for market value debt measures (TDMV and 
LDMV) 
8.4 Summary of the chapter (panel & cross-sectional) 
The next chapter joins the two methods, panel and cross-sectional, together to achieve a 
comparison and targets the study upshot. 
The previous chapter presents the regression results for two methodologies: panel data and cross- 
sectional data analysis. Three static methods are used in the panel data analysis: pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and random effects models. These represent the four relationships tested in this 
study. 
The first relationship is between determinants of capital structure as independent variables and 
the debt level as a dependent variable. The second relationship is between debt level as 
independent variables and the firm's financial performance as a dependent variable. The third 
relationship is between determinants of capital structure as independent variables and a firm's 
financial performance as a dependent variable. The fourth relationship aims to test the mediating 
role of debt level for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's 
financial performance according to the procedures of (Baron & Kenny 1986) of the mediating 
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role. Additionally, where applicable, the above relationships are controlled for several variables, 
industry sector, firm's size, ownership structure and remunerations. 
Three indicators are used to reflect a firm's financial performance in the panel analysis, ROI, 
ROE and PE in the panel analysis. EVA is added as a fourth indicator for the firm's financial 
performance in the cross-sectional analysis due to the lack of the data availability. Moreover, 
four indicators are used to reflect the debt level ratio in both methodologies: TDBV, TDMV, 
LDBV and LDMV. 
For the first and third relationships, the effect of each variable is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter to allow for comparison between panel and cross-sectional data analysis 
methods. 
Regarding the second relationship, because of high multicollinearity among debt variables, this 
study exercises all possible regressions for this relationship between each debt measure 
individually as an independent variable and the firm's financial performance as a dependent 
variable. The results of the second relationship for panel data and cross-sectional data methods 
show a negative and significant relationship between the debt ratios and this indicates that the 
higher the debt ratios, the lower the financial performance. 
Panel and cross-sectional methods show to an extent for the fourth relationships that debt plays a 
slight partial mediating role for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and 
financial performance in different measures. In general, it has been noted that most of the 
relationships between debt level and a firm's financial performance are significant. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the mediating role of debt level for the relationship between determinants 
of capital structure and the firm's financial performance can be confirmed. 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
DISCUSSION OF 
REGRESSION 
RESULTS & 
HYPOTHESES 
TESTING 
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9.1 Introduction 
The former chapter presents the panel and cross-sectional regressions for the four relationships 
assigned in this study. Based on these regressions, this chapter combines all these regressions 
and presents discussions for the study results including testing of the study hypotheses. Moreover, 
in order to organize this chapter and to provide an efficient discussion, the researcher categorizes 
regressions according to the related relationship and hypothesis. In addition, discussion of panel 
and cross-sectional analysis are pulled together according to the related relationship and 
hypothesis. 
This chapter starts with discussion and testing of the first group hypotheses denoted by (H1); this 
represents the relationship between determinants of capital structure and debt level. The second 
section is followed by testing and discussing the second group hypotheses denoted by (H2), this 
investigates the relationship between debt level and a firm's financial performance. The third 
group hypotheses denoted by (H3) will be tested and discussed in the third section. Those 
hypotheses investigate the direct relationship between determinants of capital structure and a 
firm's financial performance. The fourth hypothesis denoted by (H4) will be discussed and tested 
at the end of this chapter. This hypothesis is to conclude if there is any mediating role for the 
debt level in the direct relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's 
financial performance. 
9.2 First group hypotheses (Hi) 
9.2.1 Assets structure 
In Chapter Four, hypothesis (HI-1) suggests a positive relationship between assets structure and 
debt ratios. The results of fixed and random effects methods for all debt-dependent variables 
from Relationship one regressions support this hypothesis. All these regressions are statistically 
significant at the 1% level except one regression which represents the relationship between assets 
structure and the book value total debt using the pooled OLS regression gives a highly 
insignificant relationship (the significance level is 0.936). 
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fahle 9.1 Regression results ol'assets structure-panel data: 
DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
tdbv 
tdmv 
Coef. 
0.0013 
0.099 
P Sl 
0.936 
0.000 
_Coef. 0.064 
0.103 
P (Sig) 
0.018 
0.000 
Coef. 
0.0683 
0.118 
P (Sig) 
0.002 
0.000 
Idbv 0.069 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.144 0.000 
Idmv 0.144 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.197 0.000 
Also the cross-sectional results show the same elect for the assets structure as is shown in the 
following table. 
Table 9.2 Reeression results of assets structure-cross-sectional data: 
DV Coef. P (Sig) 
TDBV 0.098 0.065 
TDMV 0.096 0.045 
LDBV 0.139 0.011 
LDMV 0.140 0.005 
This study confirms the positive relationship between the tangibility of assets and the firm's debt 
level. The results show that tangibility of' the firm's assets structure för non-financial listed 
companies in our sample is an important criterion in determining financing policy since it has a 
positive effect in all models used in the suitable regressions. This result is coniinned graphically 
in the descriptive statistics for this variable; a positive trend for the relationship has been noticed 
between tangibility of assets and debt level. 
A positive effect supports the trading-off model regarding that firms with more tangible assets 
are stronger to face financial distress clue to their liquidation value. These firms have easier 
excess to finance and lower costs of' financing. Also it supports the suggestion of' (Myers & 
MAJI. UF 1984) that firms prefer to issue debt secured by property with known values more than 
to issue costly securities. In addition it supports the positive elTect of the Agency theory by 
(. Jensen & Meckling I976); in their model they suggest that stockholders of levered firms have 
an incentive to invest sub optimally to expropriate wealth from bondholders. In this case if the 
debt can be collateralized, then the borrower is restricted to use these funds in specific projects. 
Assets act as a guarantee for debt, and also because collateralized assets can be used as a 
monitoring instrument. This reduces the agency costs ol'deht. 
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Phis study supports those who lind a positive relationship between assets structure and debt level, 
including (Rajan & Zingales 1995), ("Thies & Klock 1992), (l)cssi & Robertson 2003), (Colombo 
2001), (Chen 2004), (HUANG & SONG 2006), (Krishnan & Moyer 1997), (('hung 1993), 
(Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis 2004), (Akhtar 2005), (Fattouh, Scaranlo7. ziiio, & 
I larris 2005) and (Wald 1999). 
Weak coefficients indicate that assets structure is important as mentioned in determining the 
financing policy, but might be weakened by the dependence on hank-guaranteed loans. Also it 
indicates that the UK capital markets are effective at reducing moral hazard. 't'his supports (Wald 
I 999)'s results who find that assets structure in the UK is less important than in other countries. 
'Ehe reason is that managers in the UK might not be as effective at investing borrowed funds in 
physical plant as managers in other countries. Another possible reason is that the UK capital 
institutions have fewer restrictions on shareholders and more active shareholders' groups. 
9.2.2 Growth opportunities 
In Chapter Four, hypothesis (1-I1-2) suggests a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and debt ratios. Tobin's Q (TSQ) proxy is used to measure the growth 
opportunities. The results of pooled OLS, fixed and random effects models fier all dependent 
variables support this hypothesis for TSQ and these results are highly significant at 1% as is 
shown in the following table. However, using RVGTH provides contradicted results and most of 
them are highly insignificant, therefore regression results are not shown here. 
Table 9.3 Re ression results of growth onportunhties (Tobin's Q) - Panel data: 
DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P Sig) Coef. P (Sig)_ 
tdbv -0.088 0.000 -0.074 0.000 -0.080 0.000 
tdmv -0.541 0.000 -0.403 0.000 -0.446 0.000 
Idbv -0.099 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.083 0.000 
Idmv -0.450 0.000 -0.308 0.000 -0.350 0.000 
Also the cross-sectional results show the same effect for the growth opportunities for the Tohin's 
Q as is shown in the following table. 
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'fahle 9.4 Regression results of growth opportunities (Tohin's Q) --cross-sectional data: 
TSQ Coe-f. P (Sig) 
TDBV -0.126 0.025 
TDMV 
... _...... LDBV 
-0.709 
0.109 
0.000 
0.060 
LDMV -0.629 0.000 
This study confirms the negative relationship between the firm's debt levels and growth 
opportunities. The results show that the firm's growth opportunities measured by Tohin's Q fier 
our sample are an important criterion in determining linancing policy since it relates significantly 
in all models. This result has been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics For this 
variable, and a negative trend has been noticed for the relationship between growth opportunities 
and debt. 
Ehe negative and significant effect gives support to the argument of trade-ol'l'theory. This theory 
considers future growth opportunities as intangible assets which cannot be collateralized. Also, 
firms with greater growth opportunities might have lower leverage ratios due to the fear of' 
debtholders that firms may forgo valuable investment opportunities and expropriate wealth to 
their benefit. Another potential reason is that firms have a tendency to issue stock when their 
stock price is high relative to their earnings or book value. This is as (Rajan cv, Zingales 1995) 
state that the negative relationship between market-to-hook ratio and leverage ratio is largely 
driven by firms that issue significant amounts of equity. 
In the UK, Tobin's Q is a good indicator for the firm to survive (I lall 1987); it rellects how 
investors regard the company (Brigham & F. hrhardt 2005), plus il is a proxy Im future growth 
opportunities (I MANG & SONG 2006). Those who use Tohin's Q as a growth indicator include 
(Rajan & Zingalcs I995), (Bevan & Danbolt 2002) and (Laster 1995). 
This study supports those who find a negative effect for the explanations mentioned above 
include (Rajan & Zingales 1995), (Ozkan 2001), ("Pitman & Wessels 1988), (I larris & Raviv 
991), (Aklitar 2005), (Chung 1993), (Deesomsak, I'audyal, & I'escetto 2004), fier Asian 
countries except Australia, (Ghosh & Cai 2000 Ozkan 2001 ), (I Il1AN(; & SON(; 2006) and 
(Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002). 
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9.2.3 Profitability 
I lypothesis (111-3) suggests either a negative or positive relation between profitability and debt 
level. Using MRG as a profitability proxy, results of pooled OLS, fixed and random eficets 
models for all dependent variables support the negative relationship between MIZ(i and debt 
level. These results are highly significant at 1% as is shown in the following table. 
Table 9.5 Regression results of tahi lit margin: mr-) - Panel data: 
Coef. P Si Coef. P (Sig)___ Coef_ P (Si) 
tdbv 0.137 0.000 -0.101 0.000 -0.107 0.000 
tdmv -0.115 0.000 -0.096 0.000 -0.098 0.000 
Idbv -0.092 0.000 -0.083 0.000 -0.088 0.000 
Idmv -0.072 0.000 -0.091 0.000 -0.090 0.000 
Also the cross-sectional results show the same effect for the profitability as is shown in the 
following table using the mrg. 
"fahle 9.6 Regression results of profitability (profit margin: mrg) - cross-sectional data: 
Dependent variable Coef. mm P (Sig) 
TDBV -0.177 0.01 
TDMV -0.181 0.001 
LDBV -0.099 0.161 
LDMV -0.135 0.031 
This study confirms a negative relationship between protitability and a firm's debt level. The 
results show that a firm's profitability for our sample is an important criterion in determining 
linancing policy. '['his result has been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics liar this 
variable, and a negative trend has been noticed for the relationship between profitability and debt. 
A negative effect supports the pecking-order theory that firms prefer internal funds in financing 
decisions and by that strategy will have less debt. '['his is supported by the debt ratio in the 
sample of this study, which is 23% on average. Also, this supports that the 
dominant source ui 
external finance in the UK is equity which is Found also by (Rajan & Zingales 1995). There is 
another possible explanation, that the UK firms are successful at reducing the information 
asymmetries problem between a firm and outsiders. Managers prei r internal financing if they 
cannot convey credible information to these outside parties. One more justification from the 
Ut11s 2U 
corporate governance point of view for a negative relationship is that debt might be used more 
frequently as a management discipline device in the UK. Therefore, more debt reflects more 
monitoring activities; these activities include expenses which may reduce the firm's prof its, so 
debt is not favourable. 
This study supports those who find a negative relationship tier the reasons mentioned above and 
who include (I larris & Raviv 1991), (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004), (Bevan & Danbolt 
2002), ("pitman & Wessels 1988), (Akhtar 2005), (Allen & Mizunot 1989), (Chen 2004), 
(HUANG & SONG 2006), (Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiornirgianakis 2004), (Ghosh & Cai 2000), 
(13railsford, Oliver, & Pua 2002), (Cassar & Holmes 2003), (Dessi & Robertson 2003), ('I'hics & 
Klock 1992), (Wald 1999) and (Baker 1973a). 
9.2.4 Firm's size 
I lypothesis (I 11 -4) suggests either a negative or positive relationship between a firm's size and 
debt level. The results of pooled OLS, fixed and random effects methods fier all debt-dependent 
variables reveal a positive relationship between the firm's size and the debt level. All these 
regressions are statistically significant at the 1% level as is shown in the Following summary 
table. 
Table 9.7 Regression results of firm's size - Panel data: 
_Igta Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Rand om effects 
_ 
Coef. PAS_ Coef. PS Coef. P CSig_ 
td6v 0.203 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.148 0.000 
tdmv 0.184 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.186 0.000 
Idbv 0.300 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.348 0.000 
- Idmv 0.259 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.333 0.000 
Also the cross-sectional results show the same elThct for the size as is shown in the following 
table. 
Table 9.8 Repression results of f irm's size - cross-sectional data: 
TDBV 
_0 
301 
_0.000 TDMV 0.214 0.002 
LDBV 0.348 0.000 
0.252 
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This study confirms a positive relationship between a firm's size and debt level. The results show 
that a firm's size for non-financial listed companies included in the sample is an important 
criterion in determining financing policy since it has a positive relationship in all models used in 
the regressions. This result has been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics for this 
variable; a positive trend has been noticed for the relationship between firm's size and debt. 
A positive effect in the UK supports what is described by Jensen (1986) and Williamson (1988), 
which is that firms need the debt to monitor the managers' behaviours. Also, it supports (Rajan 
& Zingales 1995) for the USA and (Wald 1999). This gives evidence that the UK's large firms' 
ownership is more widespread and owners are too far away to take the primary role in 
controlling activities. Also, since our sample represents the large companies in the UK, this 
supports the trade-off theory, which assumes that large firms are stronger to face bankruptcy and 
financial distress, and the public debt markets are mostly accessible to the large firms. This is 
supported by (Ozkan 2001) for the UK and (Wald 1999) for the USA, UK and Japan. 
For the mentioned explanations above, this study supports those who find a positive effect for a 
firm's size, which include (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto 2004), (Krishnan & Moyer 1997), 
(Colombo 2001), (HUANG & SONG 2006), (Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis 2004), 
(Chung 1993), (Maris & Elayan 1990), (Singh & Nejadmalayeri 2004), (Cassar & Holmes 2003), 
(Dessi & Robertson 2003) and (Bhaduri 2002) for long-term borrowing. 
9.2.5 Risk 
Hypothesis (H1-5) suggests either a negative or a positive relationship between a firm's risk and 
debt level. Cross-sectional results show contradicted results, and the results of panel data 
analysis of fixed and random effects methods for all debt dependent variables reveal a negative 
but highly insignificant relationship between a firm's risk and debt level as is shown in the 
following summary tables. This study-as discussed earlier-finds that using the FEM is the 
most appropriate method as supported by the specification tests discussed earlier. Therefore, the 
results of the fixed method are more appropriate. 
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Fable 9.9 Regression results of a Ifirm's risk (standard deviation cif annual income) -- panel data: 
sdiv Pooled OLS. Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P Si Coef. 
-P 
(Sig) Coef. P (Sig) 
tdbv 0.002 0.908 -0.004 0.708 -0.003 0.786 
tdmv 0.000 0.986 -0.004 0.609 -0.004 0.584 
Idbv 0.003 0.822 -0.002 0.835 -0.001 0.908 
Idmv -0.001 0.938 -0.002 0.800 -0.003 0.745 
Also the cross-sectional results show contradicted effects fier a firm's risk as is shown in the 
following table. 
Table 9.10 Regression results of firm's risk (standard deviation of annual income) - cross- 
sectional data: 
Dependent variable Coef. P (Sig) 
TDBV 0.104 0.018 
TDMV 0.049 0.226 
LDBV 0.113 0.013 
LDMV 0.070 0.112 
The negative relationship between a firm's risk and debt level supports the trade-ol, l' theory, 
which assumes that costs of bankruptcy and financial distress reduce the firm's incentive to use 
debt financing. This is because firms may not he able to fulfil their debt commitments as 
supported by (Panno 2003). Meanwhile, the positive effect supports the agency theory and the 
managerial risk aversion as supported by (Chung 1993). From the agency theory perspective, 
debt is used as a disciplinary device to prevent managers from transfer resources to their own 
personal benefits or invest in negative projects. The more the probability of agency costs, the 
more the debt needed 
Those who find unclear or insignificant relationships between a firm's risk and debt level include 
(Allen & Mizunot 1989); (Cassar & Ilolmes 2003) tier Australian firms, ('Pitman & Wessels 
1988), who suggests that the risk measures might not capture the relevant aspects of risk; and 
(I IUAN( ;& SONG 2006; Maris & Flayan 1990), who find it negative but not significant in all 
models. Additionally, (Thies & Klock 1992) find a negative effect on long-term debt, with at the 
same time a positive effect on short-term debt. Finally, (Ghosh & Cai 2000) Lind a quadratic. 
relationship, first increasing and then decreasing. 
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Although, all panel results are insignificant, the cross-sectional analysis shows Im significant 
results with the book value debt measures; this might he due to having taken place in the year 
2005. Therefore, the researcher could not conclude a specific relationship between a firm's risk 
and debt level for all debt measures. Consequently, this study concludes that a firm's risk fier 
non-financial listed companies included in the study sample has an unclear role in determining 
financing policy. This result has been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics for this 
variable; an unclear trend has been noticed for the relationship between a firm's risk and debt. 
9.2.6 Non-debt tax shield 
I lypothesis (111-6) suggests a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt levvel. 
Fhe results of fixed and random effects methods for book values debt ratios ('1'1)1W and LDBV) 
reveal a positive and significant relationship. However, the results using the market debt ratios 
reveal a positive relationship in the FEM and a negative one in the REM, and both are highly 
insignificant as is shown in the following summary table. 
Table 9.1 1 Regression results of nun-debt tax shields-vaneI data: 
dda Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
tdbv 
Coef. 
-0.013 
P (Sig) 
_ 0.430 
Coef. 
0.044 
P (Sig) 
0.022 
Coef. 
0.031 
P (Sig) 
0.080 
1dmv 
-0.032 0.014 0.000 0.981 -0.012 0.418 
Idbv 0.029 0.083 0.055 0.006 0.047 0.011 
Idmv 0 0.006 0.648 0.002 0.908 -0.001 0.930 
The cross-sectional results show a highly insignificant relationship between non-debt tax shields 
and debt level as is shown in the hollowing table. 
Table 9.12 Regression results of non-debt tax shields- cross-sectional data: 
-0.035 0.546 
-0.031 0.52 
-0.008 0.895 
-0.024 0.651 
This study does not provide support For the negative relationship between non-dcht tax shields 
and debt level. Therefore, the researcher does not support the previous hypothesis that there is a 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt level. 
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A possible reason for the positive relationship is related to the measurement used. The measure 
used in this study (i. e., DDA/TA) might be a proxy for some other effects. Ikcause there is a 
high correlation between DDA and fixed assets (0.33 **)--as in the correlation matrix - firms 
with higher depreciation ratios are more likely to have a higher proportion of tangible assets. 
This in turn implies a positive relation between the non-debt tax shields and debt level (Ozkan 
2001). 
Additionally, although the measure used in this study covers most of' the attributes of the non- 
debt tax shields, it is still partially captures it. This is because it excludes tax deductions that are 
not associated with capital equipment, such as research and development and selling expenses 
("Pitman & Wessels I998). Also, (Bradley. Jarrell, & King 1984) suggest that the positive 
relationship is due to the omission of an important variable which may have a relationship with 
the non-debt tax shields. 
The insignificant effect for the non-debt tax shields supports some results oF(Krishnan & Moyer 
1997), who find that tax rate is significant in the total debt but insignificant for long-term debt. It 
is also supported by (Akhtar 2005) and (Brailsiord, Oliver, & l'ua 2002). 
9.2.7 Liquidity 
I lypothesis (III-6) suggests either a positive or negative relationship between a firm's liquidity 
and debt level. The results of pooled OLS for all debt measures, fixed and random effects 
methods för all debt measures except LDMV reveal a negative and significant relationship 
between a firm's liquidity and debt level as is shown in the li llowing summary table. I lowever, 
using LDMV reveals a positive and significant relationship fier the F FM and a positive but 
highly insignificant one in the REM. 
'Bible 9.13 ReLressiun results of I. iuuidity--Panel data: 
crt Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef_ P Coef P tSiq) Coef_ P 
tdbv -0.413 0.000 -0.347 0.000 -0.360 0.000 
tdmv -0.236 0.000 -0.21_1_1 _____0.000 -0.218 
0.000 
Idbv -0.221 0.000 -0.042 - 
0.023 -0.080 0.000 
Idmv 0.113 0.000 0.041 0.008 0.005 0.718 
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Cross-sectional results show a negative and significant relationship between a lirm's Iiquidit\ 
and debt level for all debt measures, as is shown in the IbIlowing table. 
Table 9.14 Regression results of Liquidity - cross-sectional data: 
Dependent 
variable 
Coef. P (Sig) 
TDBV -0.382 0.000 
TDMV -0.264 0.000 
LDBV -0.234 0.000 
LDMV -0.147 0.004 
The positive relationships are overridden by the majority of' negative effects. 'T'herefore, this 
study confirms the negative relationship between a firm's liquidity and debt level. Consequently, 
the researcher accepts the previous hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between a 
firm's liquidity and the debt level. This result has been confirmed graphically in the descriptive 
statistics for this variable; a negative trend has been noticed for the relationship between liquidity 
and debt 
The negative relationship between the firm's liquidity and debt level supports the pecking-order 
hypothesis that firms with greater liquid assets may use those assets to finance their investment 
instead of' issuing debt. 't'his result supports the findings of' (Panno 2003) fier the UK and 
(Vuulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiornirgianakis 2004) for Greece. Another reason for the negative 
relationship is due to the potential conflicts between debtholders and shareholders of firms. The 
liquidity of a firm's assets can show the extent to which these assets can be manipulated by 
shareholders at the expense of dehiholders. This supports the findings of (()i. katt 20(11) für UK 
lirms. 
9.2.8 Industry sector 
The industry variable has a positive relationship with all dependent variables in this set of 
regressions. The table that ü)Ilows presents the correlation signs and significant levels of' the 
industry as a dummy variable; the results in the first relationship show that industry is significant 
at 1%. From the above results the researcher indicates that industry is an important variable in 
determining the financing decision in the sample. 
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Table 9.15 Reuression results of Industry -- panel data: 
Dependent variable Coef. P>z 
tdbv 0.211 0.005 
tdmv 0.209 0.000 
Idbv 0.117 0.118 
Idmv 0.135 0.022 
Also the cross-sectional results show the same effect for industry as is shown in the following 
table. 
'Fahle 9.16 Regression results of Industry - cross-sectional data: 
Dependent 
variable 
Coef. P (Sig) 
TDBV 0.166 0.150 
TDMV 0.224 0.012 
LDBV 0.134 0.261 
LDMV 0.175 0.071 
Industry characteristics are found to have a relationship with debt level in the l1K environment. 
Graphically, it has been noticed before in the descriptive analysis chapter that debt level is higher 
fir the industrial firms than non-industrial firms in the study sample. This positive result means 
that these companies follow and support the trade-off theory which assumes that firms within the 
same industry have similar capital structures since they have equivalent types of assets, business 
risks and profitability (Phillips & Sipahioglu 2004). This result is also supported by (Ferri & 
Jones 1979) for US firms, (Akhtar 2005) for Australian firms and (Allen K Mininot 1989) for 
Japanese firms. 
9.2.9 Ownership structure 
Cross-sectional results show a highly insignificant relationship between ownership structure and 
debt level. Moreover, it shows contradicted results, a positive relationship with total debt 
measures and a negative one with the long-term debt measures. I luwcver, all relationships are 
insignificant as is shown in the following table. 
Table 9.17 Regression results of Ownership Structure cross-sectional: 
Dependent Ownership Structure 
variable Coef. -P>z 
TDBV 
TDMV 
0.154 
0.079 
0.058 
0.175 
LDBV -0.060 0.462 
LDMV -0.068 0.300 
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fhe insignificant relationship between ownership structure and debt level is supported 
graphically by the trend between them in the descriptive analysis chapter. Also, it has been 
supported by the R llowing correlation matrix which shows the correlation between diflcrent 
ownership structure measures and all debt level measures. None of these figures shows any 
significance. 
'Table 9.18 Correlation matrix between Ownership structure and lebt: 
TDBV TDMV LDBV LDMV NTSS% NLTSS% NTSSno. 
- --- TDMV 0.800 1 
LDBV 0.922 0.752 1 
LDMV 0.738 0.929 0.828 1 
NT--SS% 0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.002 -- 
1 
TSS /0 NL . 
050 --6. G5--0- -0.009 -----O-. 009- 0.03-1-1 - -0.024 0.731 1 _ NTSSno. -0.048 -0.018 -0.044 -0.009 0.582 0.085 1 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
To conclude, because of the highly insignificant results, the researcher indicates that ownership 
structure has no clear role in financing policy in the study sample. This might he due to the tact 
that the UJK firms have strong control mechanisms with an immaterial role to the large 
stakeholders. I lowever, another reason that might apply is that institutional investors do not 
monitor managers because they have joint benefits with the firm, and also due to the ditThrent 
goals between short and long-term holdings as suggested by (Mehran 1995). 
Others who find no or insignificant effect include (Ilsiang-tsai 2005), (Akimova & 
SCI I WODIAUER 2004), (De Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre 2005) and (I WANG & SONG 
2006), who lind that state or institutional ownership is not significant in the debt decision, while 
(l3railstord, Oliver, & Pua 2002) lind a non-linear relation between the level ot'managerial share 
ownership and leverage. ([vans, Evans, & Loh 2002) find no relationship between declining 
perf'ormance and insider ownership levels and (Mehryin 1995) finds no significant relationship 
between firm performance and the ownership of block holders. This is due to the dit'ierent goals 
between short- and long-term holdings. Concentrated ownership has insignilicant effect in 
(Chaganti & Damanpour 1991) and (Chang Aik I. eng 2004). Control type (i. e., owner-control or 
manager-control) is unrelated statistically to perü)rmance in (McKean & Kania I978), 
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Therefore, this study concludes that ownership structure has an unclear role in determining the 
debt level. This insignificant role of ownership structure might be due to-as mentioned 
before-the fact that UK firms have strong control mechanisms. Therefore, they possibly 
determine their mix of capital structure according to some variables other than ownership 
structure. 
9.3 Testing the second hypothesis (Relationship two: H2) 
Hypothesis (H2) suggests that debt level influence the financial performance following this 
hypothesis: 
H2: Debt level influences the firm's financial performance. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, panel data results for the three analysis methods of pooled, 
fixed and random effects models and the cross-sectional results show a negative and significant 
relationship between the debt level and a firm's financial performance in all regressions. 
Therefore, this study confirms a negative relationship and then accepts the previous hypothesis 
that there is a relationship between debt level and a firm's financial performance. This result has 
been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics for this variable, and a negative trend has 
been noticed for the relationship between debt level and financial performance for all three 
measures of financial performance and debt level in all measures .5 
This result is consistent with (Jensen 1986) that if debt acts as a bonding device in terms of 
forcing managers to commit free cash flows to service debt, then higher debt will lead to lower 
funds available for managers in profitable investments and then lower performance (Singh & 
Faircloth 2005). Also, (Shergill & Sarkaria 1999) suggest that the negative relationship between 
debt level and a firm's profitability might be due to the large interest expenses related to debt, 
s Graphs which summarise the trends between debt and financial performance are in the appendix attached at the 
end of Chapter Six. 
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stating that if a firm is highly levered and its rate of return on the company's assets is lower than 
the cost of debt capital, this will lead to lower profitability. 
This negative relationship suggests that the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
are the main reason for such a relationship. Possibly UK firms are employing a more than 
appropriate level of debt in their capital structures thus negatively influencing performance. 
Higher debt ratios lead to higher debt burden, which might then limit the ability of the firm to 
take on more risky projects which may also be profitable (Chang Aik Leng 2004). 
Firms may have more debt than appropriate for two reasons: First, higher levels of debt align the 
interest of managers and shareholders, according to (Harris & Raviv 1991) and (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997), who state that debt financing is a mechanism for solving agency problems 
because of the ability of creditors to exercise control. (Degryse & de Jong 2006) state that bank 
debt can be considered as a disciplinary mechanism which controls the managerial discretion and 
reduces the agency problem. Second, managers may underestimate the costs of bankruptcy 
reorganization or liquidation. Both of these factors suggest higher than appropriate levels of debt, 
which then leads to lower performance (Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur 2000). 
The study results are consistent with the cross-sectional study of (Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur 
2000), who confirm a negative relationship for financial and operational performance measures 
for 14 European countries including the UK, France and Germany. They use total debt, ROA, 
pre-tax profit margin and growth in sales, justifying this relationship by the agency conflict 
discussed earlier. The results also support those in the cross-sectional study by (Singh & 
Faircloth 2005) for US manufacturing firms which indicate a strong negative relationship 
between leverage (total debt to total assets) and level of R&D expenditure, which then inversely 
affects the performance. Higher leverage leads to lower long-term capital investments and that in 
turn leads to lower corporate performance. This supports the free cash flow theory of (Jensen 
1986) above. Their negative relationship is for all drivers used to reflect performance (growth 
rate of earnings per share, future growth opportunities, net profit margin and operating cash 
flow). 
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In addition, our results are consistent with the panel study of (Chang Aik Leng 2004), who finds 
that gearing ratio (total debt to total capital) has a negative effect on earnings performance 
(return on equity and dividend payout) for Malaysian listed companies. He states that highly 
geared firms have statistically significant lower financial returns, and asserts that debt limits the 
ability of the firm to take on more risky projects which may be profitable. 
The above relationship has been controlled for four variables: remunerations, ownership 
structure, industry sector and firm's size. 
This study finds a positive and highly significant relationship between remunerations and 
financial performance measured by ROI and EVA. This result supports the pay-performance 
strategy in that remunerations enhance the managers' performance and then the firm's 
performance will be improved. Furthermore, the positive relationship between remunerations and 
financial performance is supported graphically by the positive trends confirmed in the descriptive 
statistics chapter discussed before. 
This result supports those who find a positive relationship between remunerations and 
performance. These studies include (Tai 2004), who finds that the salary part of compensations 
has a weaker association to performance than the bonus part. ([zan, Sidhu, & Taylor 1998) and 
(McConaughy & Mishra 1996) find a positive pay-performance relationship, also (Laing & Weir 
1999) for UK firms find that the existence of remuneration enhances the firm's performance. 
Additionally, (Xianming 2000) finds that compensation of chief executive officers (CEO) 
depends on the firm's size and industry type. Lower remunerations are found in utilities firms, 
and there is an elasticity of CEO compensation in larger companies which may reflect higher 
performance. 
For the ownership structure, this study finds a positive but highly insignificant relationship 
between ownership structure and financial performance (RO1, PE and EVA). This insignificant 
relationship is supported graphically by the straight line trends confirmed in the descriptive 
statistics chapter discussed earlier. 
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This is possibly due to the fact that UK firms have strong control mechanisms and the firm's 
performance is less connected to the ownership structure. Also, the insignificant relationship 
exists perhaps because these major shareholders may not monitor the management team since 
they transact business with the firm. Another possible explanation for the lack of relationship is 
that this study does not distinguish between major shareholders who invest on a short-term basis 
and those who invest for a long-time period which suggests that those long-run investors have 
more incentives to monitor managers. 
The positive relationship has been supported by (Mehran 1995), (Krishnan & Moyer 1997), 
(Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006) and (Chang Aik Leng 2004), who find a positive effect for 
the outsider institutional stockholdings with financial performance. Also, (De Miguel, Pindado, 
& De La Torre 2005) state that concentrated ownership makes manager monitoring easier, and 
thus positively affects a firm's performance. (Chaganti & Damanpour 1991) find that 
stockholdings by executives increase the relationship between outsiders' stockholding and the 
firm's performance. 
For the industry sector, panel data results show a negative and significant relationship with a 
firm's financial performance. However, cross-sectional results show contradicted relationships. 
Therefore, the researcher cannot conclude any clear role for industry in this relationship. 
Also, the firm's size shows contradicted results. Meanwhile, panel analysis reveals negative but 
highly insignificant relationships; the cross-sectional analysis reveals positive and significant 
relationships. Therefore, the researcher concludes no clear role for a firm's size. 
9.4 Third group hypotheses: Determinants of capital 
structure and financial performance 
This section tests the proposed hypotheses for the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure as independent variables and a firm's financial performance. From regressions made in 
the previous chapter for the third relationships, the model as a whole is significant in all methods 
used, pooled OLS, fixed and random effects models for all performance measures used. R- 
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squared values are around the 20s for these three methods with dificrent dependent variables 
used. 
I lypotheses for the determinants of capital structure will be tested in the I flowing section in 
order to determine the relationship of each factor with a firm's financial performance. 
9.4.1 Assets structure 
Hypothesis (1-13-1) suggests a relationship between assets structure and a firm's Iinancial 
perförmance. 
113-1. There is a relationship between assets langJihilily and a. /irm 's. financial /wrjornzunce. 
Table 9.19 Regression results of' Relationshp3 assets structure j tnel: 
DV Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects Jppe ý DV OLS: Pooled Fixed effects Random effects 
ef. S) Cf. 
_ 
Si Cof. P i9) 
ROI 
_ 
. 
136 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.172 0.000 
ROE . 142 
0.000 0.140 0.000 0.184 0.000 
: ional 
The results of pooled OLS, fixed and random effects methods reveal a positive relationship and a 
highly significant level at 1% between assets structure and both ROI and ROl'. Also, cross- 
sectional results support these results for ROI, ROE, and PE, but highly insignificant with INA. 
In general, these regressions support the hypothesis; consequently, this study confirms the 
positive relationship between tangibility of assets and the firm's financial performance. 
As was previously discussed in the empirical studies chapter, it has been noted that, apart from 
(Shergill & Sarkaria I999), there are no studies targeting the assets structure and its relationship 
with performance. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate this relationship For this study 
sample because of the importance of the role of' tangibility of assets on determining the firm's 
financial performance as it results in this research. 
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According to trade-off theory, such a relationship might be due to the fact that firms with high 
tangible assets are stronger to face financial distress; because of their liquidation value, these 
assets are considered as productive resources. A further possible reason might be due to the fact 
that firms which have these assets have a good reputation in getting funds, especially if they are 
used as a guarantee for external debt. These funds are used in profitable projects that result in 
higher performance. Another possible reason is that the majority of our sample are industrial 
(inns which are considered to be capital-intensive (those companies who rely mainly on their 
fixed assets to make their products), not labour-intensive technology. This would speed up the 
production process as well as improve the quality of product (Shergill & Sarkaria 1999), and 
then improve the financial perlwrmance. 
9.4.2 Growth opportunities 
I lypothesis (113-2) suggests a relationship between growth opportunities and a firm's financial 
performance. 
f13-2: There is a relationship between growth opportunities and u. jirm's financial perfornuunee. 
Two proxies are used to measure growth opportunities, TSQ and RVG'I'I I. Results of' pooled 
OLS, fixed and random effects models for all dependent variables support a positive relationship 
for "fSQ and RVGTI I, also these results are highly significant at 1% for all regressions. Also, 
cross-sectional analyses support these results for all pertormance measures used. The following 
summary tables prove this relationship for I'ohin's Q and sales growth, respectively. 
"fahle 9.21 Regression results cat' Relationship 3 growth opportunities (Tohin's Q): 
DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effe cts Random effects 
Coef. PJSI) 
- 
Coef. P (Sig) C oef P 1Sigj 
ROI 0.474 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.426 0.000 
ROE 0.463 0.000 0.447 0.000 0.449 0.000 
PE 0.4-7 0.000 0.462 0.000 0.464 0.000 
"fable 9.22 Regression results of' Relations hip 3 growth opportunities (sales growth): 
Coef. 
-P 
ýSigý Coef: P (Sig) Coef. P kSi9) 
OI 0.163 0.000 0.187 0.000 0.179 0.000 
OE 0.165 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.180 0.000 
E 0.209 0.000 0.189 0.000 0.202 0.000 
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Fable 9.23 Regression results of Relationship 3 growth opportunities (TSQ & RVG'I'I I) cross-sectional 
Dependent variable 
ROI ROE PE 
_ _ 
EVA 
_ Coef, P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P(Sig) _ Coef. - P (Sig) 
rvgth 0.209 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.139 0.004 
tsq 0.576 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.449 0.000 
this study confirms that there is a relationship between growth opportunities and a firm's 
financial performance, and this relationship is positive. The results show that a firm's growth 
opportunities for our sample are an important criterion in determining financial performance 
since it relates significantly in all models. This result has been confirmed graphically in the 
descriptive statistics for this variable, and a positive trend has been noticed between growth 
opportunities and performance. 
Tobin's Q in the UK is a good indicator for the firm to survive (I lall 1997), and reflects how 
investors regard the company (Brigham & Fhrhardt 2005); also it is a proxy för future growth 
opportunities (I IUANG & SONG 2006). (Rajan & Zingales 1995), (Bevan & [)anbolt 2002) and 
(Laslcr 1995) use the Tobin's Q as a growth indicator. 
Trading-off theory considers growth opportunities as an indicator for the firm's success; these 
firms are stronger to face financial distress. Firms with good growth opportunities have a good 
reputation in getting funds, easier access to the finance market, and this could he reflected in 
better performance for these fines. 
According to the agency theory perspective, firms with high growth opportunities have lower 
agency costs. These firms might have lower debt ratios due to the tear of dehtholders that firms 
may forgo valuable investment opportunities and expropriate wealth to their henelit, and this 
outcome would be reflected in lower agency costs (I lutchinson & GuI 2006). 
Another reason according to the agency theory is that growth opportunities enlarge managers' 
power. This can be treated as an advantage for the company in that these managers use this 
power to enlarge the firm's performance, although they increase their own wealth at the same 
time. Additionally, high-growth firms have easier access to the finance market, and this can he 
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translated in higher performance, because banks are more likely to lend to companies presenting 
a superior growth rate or having future valuable growth opportunities (Chen 2004). 
This result is supported by those who find a positive relationship for growth opportunities with 
performance in different measures. Those who find a positive relationship between growth in 
sales and performance include (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx 2000) for Maryland-USA for the 
period 1988-1995. Their study investigates the agency argument that sales growth in firms with 
free cash flow (in conjunction with corporate governance) is less profitable than sales growth for 
firms without free cash flow. They find a strong positive relationship between growth and 
financial performance. Additionally, (Hutchinson & Gul 2006) for the top 500 Australian 
companies find that firms with high investment opportunities are associated with lower agency 
costs measured in terms of better accounting performance for firms which have executives' share 
option plans. Also, (Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith 1996), using Hewitt Associates' 
compensation surveys of public domestic companies, find evidence that individual performance 
evaluation increases with growth opportunities. Using Ontario and Michigan (USA) data and 
investigating the managerial perceptions and its effect on performance, (Axinn 1988b) finds that 
export-based growth opportunities link positively with firm export performance. Finally, (Amidu 
2007a), using return on assets (ROA) for Ghana supports the fact that growing firms have a 
prospect of generating more returns for their owners. 
9.4.3 Firm's size: 
Hypothesis (H3-3) suggests a relationship between a firm's size and its financial performance. 
H3-3: There is a relationship between af rm's size and its financial performance. 
The results of the size-performance regressions are contradictory. Pooled OLS regressions show 
a positive and highly significant relationship for all dependent variables, while fixed and random 
effects methods regressions reveal contradicted effects. The fixed effects model shows a negative 
and significant relationship for ROT, but is weak and positive for ROE and PE; however, both of 
them are highly insignificant. On the other hand, random effects models show a negative and 
highly insignificant relationship with ROT, positive and significant with ROE and positive and 
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insignificant with PF; as is shown in the tbllowing summary table. I lowever, cross-sectional 
analyses give to an extent significant relationships for ROI, ROE, EVA, but highly insignificant 
with PE;. Panel results for all performance measures used. 
Table 9.24 Regression results of Relationshin 3 firm's size- panel 
DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P (Sig)__ 
ROI 0.088 0.000 -0.127 0.000 -0.027 0.294 
ROE 0.165 0.000 0.025 0.496 0.102 0.000 
PE 0.073 0.000 0.045 0.329 0.040 0.132 
Table 9.25 3 firm's size- cross-sectional 
Consequently, this study cannot confirm any relationship between a firm's size and its financial 
performance. A possible reason for this relationship in this study sample, that it is not important 
for a company to be large or small in order to have a superior performance. It is well known that 
in the UK, there are many small technology and services companies which depend on few assets 
and/or small numbers of employees and accomplish superior percentages in their performance. 
Moreover, this study result for a firm's size has been confirmed graphically earlier; that is, no 
clear trend is found for the relationship between a firm's size and perfornmance. Additionally, it is 
also supported by previous studies which find no clear role fier the firm's size on the performance 
measured by different methods (to be discussed shortly). However, these studies usually use only 
one indicator to reflect the financial performance and also many studies depend on the number of 
employees to reflect the firm's size, perhaps because ol'the simplicity to obtain this measure. 
Those who find a positive relationship between firm's size and perfbrmance support the 
arguments of trade-off theory that size reflects greater diversification, economies of' scale 
production, greater access to new technology and cheaper sources of' funds. These studies 
include (Orser, I logarth-Scott, & Riding 2000), who use the number of employees and gross 
revenues changes fier Canadian firms to find that less than one quarter of the sampled businesses 
reported revenue increases. Also, those who find a positive relationship supporting the 
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suggestion that investors believe that large companies are less risky include (Wing & Yiu 1997), 
who investigate the effect of size (employment) on performance (technical efficiency) for 
Chinese firms, and (Tsai & Wang 2005), who do similar research for the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange using R&D performance, total assets and employment. 
On the other hand, those who find a negative relationship between a firm's size and performance 
support the argument that a firm's size does not reflect its performance. Small firms are more 
productive than the large firms and this reflects the firm's performance. (Forbes 2002), 
investigating the effect of large depreciation on a firm's performance using firms from 42 
countries, finds that larger firms in terms of total assets frequently have worse performance in 
terms of ROA than smaller firms. This is because larger firms have larger depreciation expenses. 
Also, (Chakrabarti & Halperin 1990), for US firms show that performance (R&D expenditure) is 
different in firms of different sizes (annual sales). They confirm that small firms are more 
productive in innovation than large firms. Also, (Goodman, Peavy III, & Cox 1986), using a 
random sample from Standard & Poor's 400 firms, find that portfolios containing small 
capitalization firms provided positive abnormal returns, whereas stocks of large firms tended to 
underperform. 
Those who find no relationship support the proposition that the competitive advantages among 
firms are their products and technology, and not the size of the firm. (Wolff & Pett 2000), for US 
firms, find no significant difference in export performance (export sales to total sales) across 
three size categories (employment). Also, (Moen 1999), for Norwegian companies finds that 
export performance is not subject to the firm's size (employment). He finds that small firms are 
just as successful as large firms, and the main competitive advantages are their products and 
technology. Furthermore, (Chang Aik Leng 2004), for Malaysian firms, finds that earnings 
performance increases with increases in the firm's size, but after a certain point negative returns 
are shown. 
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9.4.4 Risk 
I lypothesis (113-4) suggests a relationship between a frm's risk and its financial perli rmance. 
113-4: There is a relationship between risk and affirms, /financial performance. 
The results of pooled OLS, fixed and random effects methods regressions reveal a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between a firm's risk and all its financial performance (ROI, 
ROE and PE), as is shown in the following summary table. Also, cross-sectional analyses 
support these results for ROE and EVA. 
Table 9.26 Regression results of Relationship 3 firm's risk-panel 
DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects sdiv 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. P KS Coef. P (Sig) 
ROI 0.125 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.105 0.000 
ROE 0.136 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.112 0.000 
PE 0.028 0.072 0.057 0.000 0.046 0.001 
Table 9.27 3 firm's risk-cross-sectional 
This study confirms a positive relationship between a firm's risk and financial perlörmance, so 
the researcher accepts the previous hypothesis that there is such a relationship. This result has 
been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics for this variable, and a positive trend is 
found for the relationship between risk and performance. It has been noted that the majority of 
the previous studies targeted the return of stock as a performance measure. I lowever, this study 
confirms this relationship using the financial performance measures of different firms. 
Me reason for such a relationship in the UK sample is due to the theoretical prediction of the 
agency theory; the required return from investors should be suitable to their risk in the firm. 
Shareholders will require high return in order to hold the risk related to the bankruptcy and 
financial distress since the debtholders have the priority in the case of' bankruptcy. Also, the 
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debtholders will require such return to hold the risk of agency conflicts with shareholders and 
management. 
In addition, the standard relationship between risk and return in the CAPM model is positive, the 
higher the risk, the higher the return. There are many studies that support this relationship. 
Among others, (Ser-Huang & Taylor 1992) for the UK stock market report a positive 
relationship, (Ludvigson & Ng 2007) for US markets, (Loudon 2006) for 15 markets, comprising 
a mix of developed and emerging markets, (Assaf 2005) for the Canadian stock exchange, 
(CORHAY, IIAWAWINI, & MICFIEL 1987) and (Guo 2006) using international evidence, 
(Dewan, Shi, & Gurbaxani 2007) using the Fortune 1000, (BALI T. & Peng L. 2006) for the 
S&P 500 index, (Tang & Shum 2004) for the Singapore stock market, (Tang & Wai 2006) for 
the Hong Kong stock market, (Girard, Rahman, & Zaher 2001) and (Shergill & Sarkaria 1999) 
for Indian firms. 
9.4.5 Non-debt tax shield 
I lypothesis (113-5) suggests a relationship between non-debt tax shields and a firm's financial 
performance. 
113-5: There is a relationship between non-debt lax shields and a, /imz '. c, fin vial perli, rnul gee. 
The results of pooled OLS, fixed and random effects methods regressions reveal a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between non-debt tax shields and a firm's financial 
performance for ROI, ROE and IT. Also, cross-sectional analyses support these results for ROI, 
ROE, and EVA. The following table summarizes this relationship. 
Table 9.28 Regression results of Relationshi 3 Non-debt tax shields- panel: 
DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects dda DV Pooled OLS: Fixed effects Random effects 
ROI 
Coef. 
-0.183 
P ýSi9 
0.000 
Coef_ 
-0.247 
P (Sig)__ 
0.000 _Coef. -0.237 
P (Sig) 
0.000 
ROE -0.169 0.000 -0.258 0.000 -0.239 0.000 
PE -0.127 0.000 -0.054 0.020 
Table 9.29 3 Non-debt tax shields- cross-sectional: 
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This study confirms a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and financial 
performance. Therefore, the researcher accepts the previous hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between the non-debt tax shields and the firm's financial performance. This result 
has been confirmed graphically earlier, and a negative trend is found between non-debt tax 
shields and performance. 
According to the trade-off theory, the main advantage of NDTS is the tax savings which have 
been obtained by the use of debt. These savings may have been used in profitable projects which 
may indicate a relationship between NNDTS and the firm's performance. However, more NDTS 
reduce the benefits of the tax shields from the use of the debt and consequently may indicate a 
negative relationship with the performance. 
A possible justification for such a relationship considers that the benefits from these non-debt tax 
shields for the UK firms might be obtained in the long run. However, the immediate impact on 
performance might be negative. This reason was adopted by (Forbes 2002), who uses firms from 
42 countries. He finds that firms have significantly higher growth in market capitalization in the 
year after depreciations. He suggests that depreciations increase the present value of a firm's 
expected future profits. Conversely, significant lower growth in net income suggests that, 
although firms benefit from depreciations in the long run, the immediate impact on performance 
could be negative. 
However, there are no previous studies in regards to the non-debt tax shields and their effect on 
the financial performance. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate this relationship for this 
study sample, and this importance is confirmed by the significant results appeared above. 
9.4.6 Liquidity 
Hypothesis (H3-6) suggests a relationship between liquidity and firm's financial performance. 
H3-6: There is a relationship between liquidity and a firm's financial performance. 
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Fixed and random effects models reveal a positive and highly significant relationship between 
liquidity and a firm's financial performance (ROl and ROE), as is shown in the l llowinp table. 
I lowever, cross-sectional analyses give contradicted results. 
Table 9.30 Reeression results of Relationshin 3 liquidity- panel 
DV Fixed effects Random effects crt 
Coef. P (Sig) Coef. 
__ _P 
LSi2ý_ 
ROI 0.130 0.000 0.098 0.000 
ROE 0.103 0.000 0.073 0.000 
cross-sectional 
This study confirms a positive relationship between a firm's liquidity and financial performance, 
so the researcher accepts the previous hypothesis that there is such a relationship. To the 
researcher's knowledge, no studies highlight the relationship between a firm's liquidity and 
performance apart from (Wang 2002), who addresses the liquidity management. 
A possible reason for this relationship in this study sample might be according to the trade-uff 
theory; the firm's high liquidity position indicates that this firm is strong enough to läce any 
short or long-term financial problems. Therefore, this strong firm can perlorm better than a weak 
firm which has low current ratios in its financial statements. The reason that there are no studies 
targeting liquidity and its effect on the performance might be that liquidity is also used as a 
performance measure; this depends on each study's objectives. I towever, this research considers 
liquidity as a determinant of the capital structure. 
9.4.7 Industry as a control variable 
Table 9.32 Regression results of Relationship 3 industry control variable-panel 
Indust 
Dependent variable Coef. P>-z 
RO 0.234 0.002 
ROE 0.261 0.001 
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i'he above table presents the panel analysis results for industry as a dummy variable. The results 
in the third relationship show that industry has a positive and significant relationship with ROI 
and ROE. 
In the cross-sectional analysis, this study tinds also a positive and significant relationship 
Table 9.33 control variable-cross-sectional 
This result is consistent with trade-off theory, which assumes that firms in the same industry 
should have the same capital structure since they have the same assets, business risk and 
profitability. 
From the above results the researcher indicates that industry is an important variable for financial 
performance, and that industrial firms perii)rm better than the non-industrial companies in the 
UK sample targeted in this study. This result is supported graphically in that the industrial firms 
have better performance (an average for all performance measures) than non-industrial firms in 
this study sample. 
A possible justification for this result might be found in light of the nature of' productive assets 
suitable for the industrial UK firms. "These firms are considered to he capital-intensive and to 
depend mainly on fixed assets not labour-intensive technology. This perhaps speeds up the 
production process as well as improve the quality of product, and then this is reflected in a higher 
performance (Shergill & Sarkaria 1999). This is also supported by (I litt & Ireland 1985), in that 
production/operations activities have been found to be related positively with performance. 
9.4.8 Summary 
To sum up the previous section, apart from a firm's size, determinants ot'capital structure have a 
strong significant direct relationship with the financial perfiormance. 'T'hese factors have a vital 
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between industry sector and ROI, ROE and PF. 
role in forming the optimal mix of capital structure suggested by the trade-off theory to achieve 
the minimum cost of capital of financing. Therefore, financial managers should devote their time 
and effort to these determinants in order to maximize the welfare of the shareholders. 
9.5 Testing the debt mediating role (Relationship four) 
Hypothesis (H4) suggests that debt level mediates the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and firm's financial performance. 
H4: Debt mediates the relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's 
financial performance. 
The mediating role of debt level is tested following the procedures specified by (Baron & Kenny 
1986) and (Miles & Shevlin 2001), According to these procedures, a series of analyses are 
conducted to test if whether or not debt level mediates the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and a firm's financial performance. 
The following discussions represent the results of the panel analysis first, and then the results of 
cross-sectional data analysis will be followed. Additionally, to prevent redundancy, these 
procedures will be discussed in detail for the first regression in Relationship four. This regression 
represents the total book value debt level (TDBV) as a mediator. However, other measures of 
debt as mediators in all regressions have been run in the previous chapter will be followed in less 
detail afterwards. 
Applying the above procedures for the TDBV, the following results are confirmed by this study: 
1. Using fixed effects regression, determinants of capital structure (X) are found to be 
significant predictors of a firm's financial performance (Y) represented by ROI: (R-squared = 
20%, F= 188.23, p<F0.0000). 
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2. Using fixed effects regression, determinants of capital structure (X) are found to be 
significant predictors of debt level (M) represented by TDBV: (R-squared = 27%, F= 87.52, 
p<0.0000). 
3. Using fixed effects regression, debt (M) is found to be a significant predictor of financial 
performance when determinants of capital structure (X) are accounted for (R-squared = 21%, 
F= 179.74, p<0.0000). 
When the influence of debt on financial performance is accounted for, very small changes 
occurred for the coefficients of determinants of capital structure after controlling for debt level. 
This study uses the absolute value to check for these changes. 
The use of absolute value is to see how much the changes will be in the coefficients of 
independent variables to prevent negative changes. This is consistent with the objectives of this 
study to find whether the debt level will change the relationship between the determinants of 
capital structure and a firm's financial performance regarding the sign of this change. 
This is called the difference of coefficients approach suggested by Judd and Kenny (1981) who 
recommended computing the difference between the two regression coefficients. 
The approach involves subtracting the partial regression coefficient (B)) obtained in Model I 
(with the mediator), from the regression coefficient (B) obtained from Model 2 (without the 
mediator). Note that both represent the effect of X on Y but that B is the zero-order coefficient 
from the regression and BI is the partial regression coefficient from a multiple regression. The 
indirect effect is the difference between these two coefficients: 
B indirect =B-Bi 
An equivalent approach calculates the indirect effect by multiplying two regression coefficients 
(Sobel, 1982). The two coefficients are obtained from two regression models. 
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B tniwec! = (Bz) (B) 
As it turns out, the Kenny and Judd difference of coefficients approach and the Sobel product of 
coefficients approach yield identical values for the indirect effect (MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 
1995). 
The relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance is 
significant before and after the inclusion of debt level. However, this does not mean that debt 
level has no mediating role for this relationship. Therefore, this study extends to test the 
coefficients of independent variables to find any changes after the inclusion of the debt variable 
in this relation. 
In the full role of mediation, the relationship between the independent variable/s and dependent 
variable/s should be insignificant, and the relationship should be through the mediator. However, 
in this study the debt mediating role is confirmed to be partial; this makes the direct relationship 
between independent variable/s and dependent variable/s less significant, and/or the coefficients 
which represent the relationship have been affected. These changes will be discussed shortly. 
As a result, although the debt mediating role is small it cannot be ignored. Therefore, the 
researcher accepts hypothesis four and concludes that there is a mediating role for the debt level 
on the relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance 
in the UK market. 
Furthermore, the mediating role of the other indicators for debt level has been tested. Regarding 
this concern, all four debt level indicators have been employed with all four financial 
performance indicators. This has been tested for three panel data models and cross-sectional data 
analysis controlling the industry sector. 
In total, fifty-two regressions have been done to test the mediating role of debt level. Generally, 
the above results are found (i. e., a partial mediating role for debt level for the relationship). 
Moreover, F values have been affected due to the inclusion of debt level. In addition, the biggest 
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change in the panel and cross-sectional results is found in the coefficient of the 'I'obin's Q as a 
growth indicator. This will be discussed in detail shortly. 
The following summary table shows the changes in the independent variables' coefficients 
caused by the mediating role of debt level. ROI is used as a dependent variable and tour 
indicators of debt level as mediating variables; each debt level indicator is used individually. 
Table 9.34: Testing the Debt mediating role (ROI ): 
ROI + 
TDRV I TDMV I LDBV LDMV 
e 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.015 
rvgth 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.001 
is 0.015 0.106 0.038 0.035 I d d ' 
to 0.029 0.018 0.030 0.025 n epen ent variables Coeffi i t ' Ch 
sdiv 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.001 
c en s anges 
dda 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.002 
crt 0.051 0.046 0.016 0.001 
Coef. -0.134 -0.186 -0.047 -0.080 
t value -6.480 -7.100 -2.390 -3.330 
P (Sig) 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.001 
cared- without debt 0.2072 
0.2111 0.2025 1 0.2202 
188.23 
179.74 173.38 174.64 
The following table shows the changes in the independent variables' coefficients caused by the 
mediating role of debt, using the ROE as a dependent variable and four measures of debt as a 
mediating variable; each debt measure is used individually. 
Table 9.35: Testint the Debt mediatine role (Rol, ')-. 
ROE+ 
TDBV TDMV LDBV LDMV 
0.004 0.007 0.001 0.002 
rv th 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.000 
is 0.014 0.069 0.016 0.004 
to 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.003 
sdiv 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
dda 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.000 
crt 0.026 0.026 0.012 0.001 
Debt Coef. -0.074 -0.107 0.015 -0.009 
Debt t value -3.120 -3.590 _ 
0.660_ 
- - -0.350 _ Debt P (Sig) 0.002 0.000 . 510 0.51 0 
- 0.725 
R-s uared- without debt 0.2 033 
R-s uared-with debt 0.1947 0.1945 0.2117 0.2048 
F value- without debt 163 . 31 F value- with debt 144.49 145.04 145.46 142.86 
_ _. 
Independent 
variables' 
Coefficients' 
Changes 
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The following table shows the changes in the independent variables' coefficients caused by the 
mediating role of debt, using the PE as a dependent variable and tour measures of debt as a 
mediating variable; each debt measure is used individually. 
Table 9.36: Testing the Debt mediating role (IT'. ): 
PE+ 
TDBV TDMV LDBV LDMV 
ppe 0.019 0.012 0.006 0.023 
rv th 0.022 0.002 0.022 0.001 
is 0.134 0.063 0.124 0.037 
Independent 
i bl ' 
to 0.076 0.035 0.072 0.045 var a es i t ' C ffi 
sdiv 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 
en s oe c 
Chan es dda 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.001 g 
crt 0.023 0.031 0.007 0.004 
Debt Coef. 0.002 -0.140 -0.021 -0.103 
Debt t value 0.080 -4.360 -0.850 -3.410 
Debt P (Sigh 
- 
0.940 0.000 
_ 
0.394 0.001 
R-s uared- without debt 0.2299 
R-s uared- with debt 0.2471 0.2301 0.2491 0.2274 
F value- without debt 99.67 
F value- with debt 101.26 90.1 100.1 88.96 
The Ibllowing table shows the changes in the independent variables' coefficients caused by the 
mediating role of debt, using the EVA as a dependent variable and the four measures of'debt as a 
mediating variable; each debt measure is used individually. 
Table 9.37: Testiw. the Debt 
0.016 
0.014 
0.032 
0.074 
0.009 
0.015 
0.019 
-0.091 
0.090 
without debt 
with debt 0.276 
thout debt 
th debt 17.240 
role (I; VA): 
SVA+ 
0.009 1 0.011 0.001 
0.058 
0.026 
0.005 
0.006 
0.015 
-0.091 
0.140 
0.261 
16.110 
ndependent variables' 
Coefficients' Changes 
0.061 0.026 
0.020 0.093 
0.003 0.007 
0.006 0.017 
0.025 0.018 
0.086 -0.130 
0.208 0.013 
0.256 
0.259 0.282 
18.04 
16.010 17.690 
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From the tables above, generally debt level has a significant relationship with the firm's financial 
performance. Also, F values after including the debt level become less; this means that the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and firm's financial perliorruance has been 
changed. 
In addition, these results have been confirmed to an extent using cross-sectional data analysis. 
The results of the significance levels for the debt variables in different cross-sectional analysis 
regressions are summarized in the following table. 
Table 9.38 Relationship 4: Significance lcvels of debt as a mediator: 
Dependent variables 
According to the results of cross-sectional data analysis in the previous chapter, debt is 
significant in few regressions as in the above table. This also includes that the mediating role of 
debt is partial, not full (complete). With one exception to be explained shortly, there are no 
material changes in the coefficients of independent variables as shown in the 11ollowing summary 
tables-using the same procedures above. The following table presents the changes in the 
coefficients of independent variables caused by the inclusion ofý"I'DI3V. 
Table 9.39 Rclationshih 4-Cross-sectional analysis: Mediating effect ofTUBV: 
( TDBV Oe endent variables 
R()I RUE PF EVA 
e 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
g. th r 0.02 0.02 
- 
0.01 0.01 
- is -- 0.05 -- 0.02 0.01 0.03 Independent bl ' i 
to 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.07 es var a fficients 
sdiv 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
_ 
coe 
es Chan dda 0. -0 0.00 0.00 0.02 g 
crt 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 
The following table presents the changes in the coefficients of' independent variables caused by 
the inclusion of TDMV. 
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Tble 
9.40 Relationship 4 Cross-sectional analysis: Mediating effect ol"I'DMV: I 
De op ee ndent variables 
ROI ROE PE I EVA 
-- ------ 
__ppe 
0.00 
--- 
0.00 
--- 
0.01 
---- 
0.00 ----- 
rv th 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Independent is 0.07 0.22 0.06 0.06 l ' lgta 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 es variab 
coefficients 
sdiv 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 es Chan g dda 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
crt 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.03 
The following table presents the changes in the coefficients of independent variables caused by 
the inclusion of LDEV. 
Table 9.31 Relationship 4-Cross-sectional analysis: Mediating effect of LDl V: 
ROI ROE PE EVA 
e 
th 
0.01 
-- 0.02 
0.01 
--- 0.01 
0.01 
---- - 0.01 
0.02 
--- - 0.01 
I d d t is 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 
_ 
n epen en 
i bl ' 
to 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09_ var a es ffi i t 
sdiv 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
coe c en s 
Chan es dda 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 g 
crt 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 
fhe following table presents the changes in the coefficients of independent variables caused by 
the inclusion of LDMV. 
Table 9.42 Relationshit 4 Cross-sectional analysis: Mediating eIicct of l. DMV: 
LDMV De endent variables 
ROI 
f- 
ROET PE IEVA 
ppe 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
rvgtth 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
is 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.06 Independent i bl ' 
to 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 a es var ffi i t 
sdiv 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
c en s coe 
es Chan dda 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 g 
crt 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 
From the tables above, the only significant change is for the relationship between fohin's Q and 
ROE using the TDMV or LDMV as a mediator. 
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I'he relationship between Tobin's Q and ROE is significant before and aller the inclusion ofdebt 
level. However, the relationship through the debt level strengthens this relationship. The 
following table presents these changes. 
Table 9.43 Relationship 4 (TSQ & ROE mediating the TDMV): 
This effect also appears to some extent in the panel data analysis; the change of the Thin's Q 
(0.069) happens also in the relationship between Tobin's Q and ROE mediating the Tl)MV. 
Although this change is not too large, it was the biggest change among the coefficients of' 
independent variables in all regressions done in the panel data analysis. 
A possible reason for a strong mediating role of debt level for the relationship between "Tobin's 
Q and financial performance (ROE) might be due to the way that all these variables ('I'ohin's Q, 
TDMV, LDMV and ROE) are measured. All of these variables are concerned with the equity in 
its denominators. Tobin's Q has the market value of equity in its dominator and the hook value 
of equity appears in the denominators of Tobin's Q and ROE. Also, TI)MV and l. flMV have 
market value of equity in its denominators. 
9.5.1 Is mediating effect is statistically significant? F test: 
In order to find if the debt level inclusion in the fourth model make a difference statistically, we 
run F test according to Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan (1986). This test investigates the 
significance of the difference between two R-squareds? The first model is relationship three in 
our study, which is the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the financial 
perfiormanee directly without the inclusion of the debt level (interaction effects). The second 
model is decoded by relationship four in this study; this relationship is between determinants of' 
capital structure and debt level (interaction effects) in one hand, and the financial pcrtürmance in 
the other. 
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For the F test of differences between two regression models where one includes interaction 
effects and one does not, use an F test: 
F=[(R22-R12)/(k2-k1)]/[(1-R22)/(n-k2-1)] 
Where 
R22 = R-square for the second model (ex., one with interactions or with an added independent) 
Rig = R-square for the first, restricted model (ex., without interactions or without an added 
independent) 
n= total sample size 
k2 = number of predictors in the second model 
k1 = number of predictors in the first, restricted model 
F has (k2 - k1) and (n - k2 -1) degrees of freedom and tests the null hypothesis that the R2 
increment between the two models is not significantly different from zero. 
The above equation gives the F value; we find the probability of this F value from Stata using the 
following formula: 
. di 
F prob (1, n- k2-1, F value) 
The result will give the probability of F value, which is the base to decide that the inclusion of 
the debt level makes a difference or not. The significant value of the probability of F value will 
reject the null hypothesis that the two models are the same, and on the other hand it will accept 
the alternative hypothesis that they are different significantly. 
The following table represents the R-squared values for regressions of ROI before and after the 
inclusion of the debt level and the significance change for these two values. 
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From the above table, we can see that the inclusion of debt is significant when we include only 
the debt in a book value; TDBV and LDBV, meanwhile the inclusion of the market value debt 
are not significant. Although the debt level was significant in relationship four for all debt 
measures used (summary in table 8.30). 
The following table represents the R-squared values for regressions of ROE before and aller the 
inclusion of the debt level and the significance change for these two values. 
able 9.4J dillerence between two Ic-squareas-KEUL. 
TDBV TDMV LDBV LDMV 
R2-2 0.1947 0.1945 0.2117 0.2048 
R2-1 0.2033 0.2033 0.2033 0.2033 
K2 8 8 8 8 
K1 7 7 7 7 
n 3762 3760 3757 3759 
Nominator -0.0086 -0.0088 0.0084 0.0015 
Denominator 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
F value -40.0792 -40.9793 39.9381 7.0737 
Prob F 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0079 
From the above table, we can see that the inclusion of'debt is significant Ihr the long-term debt 
(L[)RV and LDMV) not in the total debt. Although the debt level was significant in relationship 
four for TD[3V and TDMV, and LDl3V and LDMV were highly insignificant (summary in table 
8.40). 
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'fable; 9.44 diticrencc hetween two R-squareds-ROI 
The following table represents the R-squared values for regressions of Pl: before and alter the 
inclusion of the debt level and the significance change for these two values. 
Table 9.46 difference between two R-sauareds- PE; 
PE 
TDBV TDMV LDBV LDMV 
R2-2 0.2471 02301 0.2491 0.2274 
R2-1 0.2299 0.2299 0.2299 0.2299 
K2 8 8 8 8 
K1 _ 7 7 7 7 
n 3385 3414 3379 3414 
Nominator 0.0172 0.0002 0.0192 -0.0025 
Denominator 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
F value 77.1247 0.8845 86.1686 -11.0180 
Prob F 0.0000 34703053 0.0000 1.0000 
From the above table, we can see that the inclusion of debt is significant when we include only 
the debt in a book value (TDBV and LDBV), meanwhile the inclusion of the market value debt 
are not significant. Meanwhile, debt level was significant in relationship four for market value 
debt, but highly insignificant for the book value debt (summary in table 8.50). 
UniS 254 
CHAPTER TEN: 
SUMMARY & 
CONCLUSION 
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10.1 Introduction 
The main concerns of this study are represented in the following goals. The first purpose is to 
investigate the direct relationship between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial 
performance from the perspective of capital structure theories. The second purpose is to test the 
mediating role of the debt level in the previous relationship. 
In order to accomplish these objectives, this study has been classified into four parts. The first 
part investigates the relation between determinants of capital structure and debt level. The second 
part examines the relationship between debt level and firm's financial performance. The third 
part investigates the direct relation between determinants of capital structure and firm's financial 
performance. The fourth part concerns the mediating role of debt level for the relationship 
between determinants of capital structure and a firm's financial performance. 
The sample of this study includes 425 non-financial UK firms listed in the London Stock 
Exchange; this sample represents the FTSE All-Share Index. Two methodologies are employed 
in this study, panel data analysis over a fifteen-year period from 1992 to 2006 and cross-sectional 
data analysis for the year 2005. Study data are collected from two sources: DataStream database 
and the firms' annual reports. 
The main findings of this study can be grouped to represent the above four relationships. First, 
assets structure, growth opportunities, profitability, firm's size, liquidity and industry are 
important determinants of capital structure. We find that a firm's debt level has a positive 
relationship with assets structure, firm's size and industry. On the other hand it has a negative 
relationship with growth opportunities, profitability and liquidity. However, the study shows 
diverse results for a firm's risk and non-debt tax shields. Moreover, there is a positive but highly 
insignificant relationship between ownership structure and debt level, 
Second, the results reveal a significant negative relation between debt level and a firm's financial 
performance. This relationship has been controlled for remunerations, ownership structure, 
firm's size and industry sector. A positive and significant relation has been confirmed between 
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remunerations, firm's size and firm's financial performance. Nevertheless, the results reveal a 
positive but insignificant relationship for a firm's ownership structure, and unclear industry 
sector role. 
Third, the results confirm that assets structure, growth opportunities, firm's risk and liquidity 
have significant positive relations with a firm's financial performance. On the other hand, non- 
debt tax shields have significant negative relation with financial performance. However, the 
research shows diverse results for the firm's size and industry relations with the firm's financial 
performance. 
Fourth, debt level has a significant mediating role for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and financial performance; this role is weak but highly significant. Additionally, 
a strong mediating role for debt level is apparent for the relation between Tobin's Q and return 
on equity. 
This chapter discusses the study findings and conclusions; it also describes study contributions 
and gives various managerial implications. Limitations and suggestions for future research are 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
10.2 The main findings 
The results for this research have been confirmed by two methodologies; static panel data models 
using pooled OLS, fixed effect, and random effects methods, and cross-sectional analysis. 
The first relationship represents the relationship between the determinants of capital structure 
and a firm's debt level. This study uses four indicators for debt level as a dependent variable, 
TDBV, TDMV, LDBV, and LDMV. 
The results in summary confirm that assets structure and firm's size have a significant positive 
relationship with the firm's debt level. On the other hand, the results confirm that growth 
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opportunities, profitability, and liquidity have significant negative relationships with the firm's 
debt level. However, the study shows diverse results Ihr a firm's risk and non-debt tax shields. 
In addition, this relationship has been controlled by two variables, industry sector and ownership 
structure. The results reveal that industry sector has a positive and significant relationship with 
the debt level in both panel and cross-sectional analysis results. I lowever, the results confirm an 
insignificant relationship between ownership structure and firm's debt level. This has been 
supported graphically earlier and also by the correlation matrix discussed in the previous chapter 
which reveals a poor correlation between ownership structure and different debt indicators. A 
summary is shown in the following table and details in depth have been discussed in the last two 
chapters 
Table 10.1 Results summary of relationship I representing the relation between determinants of 
capital structure and debt level (dependent variable): 
Researc h Results 
Variable Panel Data 
anal sis 
Cross- 
sectional 
analysis 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
prediction 
-- ----- 
Approved 
Assets structure + + H1-1 - -- --- Yes 
Growth opportunities - - H1-2 - Yes 
Profitability - - H1-3 +, - Yes 
Firm Size + + H1-4 +, - Yes 
Risk ? ? H1-5 +, - No 
Non debt tax shields ? H1-6 No 
Liquidity - - H1-7 Yes 
Industry + + Significant 
Ownership structure + + Insignificant 
The second relationship represents the relation between debt level and a firm's financial 
performance. The panel data results in all three methods (pooled OLS, fixed and random effects 
models), and also the cross-sectional results reveal a negative and significant relationship 
between the debt level and the firm's financial performance. 
In addition, this relationship has been controlled for four variables: remunerations, ownership 
structure, firm size and industry sector. The results reveal that remunerations have a positive and 
significant relationship with a firm's financial perlormance in the cross-sectional analysis results. 
Nevertheless, a firm's ownership structure is shown to have a positive but ii1, iL'niticant 
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relationship with the firm's financial performance. The firm's size has a positive and significant 
relationship with the firm's tinancial performance in the cross-sectional analysis, but negative 
and highly insignificant in the panel data analysis. Moreover, industry sector has an unclear role 
in the cross-sectional results, but negative and significant relationship in the panel data analysis. 
Such a result for the cross-sectional analaysis perhaps depends on specitic reasons related to the 
targeted year (i. e., 2005). The following table summarizes the results of the second relationship, 
and a full discussion has been presented in the previous chapters. 
Table 10.2 Results summary of relationship 2 representing the relation between debt level 
(independent variable) and firm's financial perlörmance (dependent variable): 
Research Results 
Variable Panel Data 
analysis 
Cross 
sectional 
analysis 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
prediction 
Approved 
Debt - - H2 +- Yes 
Remunerations + Significant 
Ownership 
structure 
+ Insignificant 
Size - Insig + Sig 
Indust - Sig ? Unclear 
The third relationship represents the relation between determinants of' capital structure and the 
firm's financial performance. This relationship has been tested by the three panel methods and 
the cross-sectional analysis. For the panel analysis, this relationship has been represented by 
three indicators for the firm's financial performance (ROI, ROl:, and Ill') as a dependent variable. 
Additionally, four indicators are used in the cross-sectional data analysis (Itt)I, ROk, PF, and 
I; VA). These regressions are explained extensively in the previous two chapters. 
The results of the static panel data models and cross-sectional analysis confirm that assets 
structure, growth opportunities, firm's risk and firm's liquidity have a significant positive 
relationship with the firm's financial performance. On the other hand, non-debt tax shields have 
significant negative relationship with the firm's financial performance. I lowever, the research 
shows diverse results for the firm's size relationship with the financial perliºrmance in both panel 
and cross-sectional analysis. 
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In addition, this relationship has been controlled by industry sector. The results reveal that 
industry sector as a dummy variable has diverse results in both panel and cross-sectional data 
analysis. Therefore, we conclude that there is no clear relationship between industry sector and a 
firm's financial performance. The following table summarizes results of Relationship three 
which has been discussed in detail in the previous two chapters. 
Table 10.3 Results summary of Relationship three representing the relation between 
determinants of capital structure (independent variables) and the firm's financial performance 
(denendent variahle)' 
Research Results H th i 
Variable Panel 
Data 
Cross- 
sectional 
Hypothesis ypo es s 
prediction 
Approved 
Assets structure + + H3-1 +, - Yes_ 
Growth opportunities + + H3-2 - Yes 
Size ? ? H3-3 - No 
Risk + + H3-4 +- Yes 
Non-debt tax shields - - H3-5 +- Yes 
Liquidity + + H3-6 +, - Yes 
Indust (Dummy) ? unclear 
The fourth relationship tests whether debt level mediates the relationship between determinants 
of' capital structure and the firm's financial performance. The mediating role of' debt level has 
been tested using tifty-two regressions, (36 in panel and 16 in cross-sectional analysis) in order 
to report any mediating role. These regressions use four indicators of debt level as a mediating 
variable in panel and cross-sectional analysis, three indicators for the firm's financial 
performance tier panel analysis and four indicators for cross-sectional analysis, respectively. All 
of these regressions are summarized in Chapter Eight (pages 194-panel and 206 cross-sectional). 
This gives the researcher a clear role for debt level in the relationship between determinants of' 
capital structure and the firm's financial performance. Summaries for the fourth relationship 
using panel analysis for the three financial performance indicators (ROl, RUE: and PI, ) are 
located in pages 170,180, and 192 respectively. 
The results in general reveal that debt level does mediate the relationship between determinants 
of' capital structure and the firm's financial performance. I lowever, this mediating role is 
confirmed to be partial as is explained before. The mediating role of debt does not change the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure and the financial performance in regard to 
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its significance. However, the mediating role appeared as small changes in the coeflicients oI 
these determinants in the relationship with the financial perFormance. 't'his indicates that debt 
plays a partial" mediating role for the relationship between determinants of capital structure and 
financial performance. 
In general, even though both regressions before and after controlling debt level are significant, it 
has been confirmed that debt level has a mediating role on the relationship between the 
determinants of capital structure and financial performance. 
As a result, this significant mediating role of the debt level cannot he ignored. 'therefore, we 
conclude that there is a significant mediating role for the debt level on the relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and financial performance. 
Table 10.4 Results summary of Relationship four representing the mediating role of' debt level 
for the relation between determinants of capital structure and firm's financial perfbrmancc: 
Research Results H th Variable Panel Cross- Hypothesis ypo esis 
prediction 
Approved 
Data sectional 
---- Mediating role of debt Yes Yes H4 mediate Yes 
10.3 Study contributions 
There are several important features of this study that the researcher believes advance the 
knowledge in the area of capital structure and perlbrmance both theoretically and empirically. 
First, this study is the first-to the researcher's knowledge-----that investigates the mediating role 
of' the debt level For the relationship between the determinants of' capital structure and the 
financial performance. Iiowever, this research finds that there is a highly significant mediating 
role for the debt level but this role is weak and the relationship is partially mediated. 
" In the full role of mediating; the direct relationship between determinants of capital structure and financial 
performance becomes insignificant. However, in this research the role is partial. 
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Second, there is no study-again, to the researcher's knowledge-that investigates the 
relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the firm's financial performance 
under the perspective of capital structure theory. 
Third, although the first and second relationships have been investigated before, this is the first 
study - to the researcher's knowledge- that use three methods in panel data for fifteen years for 
the UK firms using all industries to prove the expected relationships assigned for these two 
relationships. There are no previous studies that investigate the above relationships using the 
large data set used in this research. This gives confidence to the results revealed by this research. 
Fourth, choosing a performance measure that represents the shareholders' value and reflects the 
definition of agency costs is considered a challenge. However, (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti 
2006) choose the profit efficiency, while (Florackis & Ozkan 2005), following (Ang, Cole, & 
Lin 2000) and (Singh & vidson 111 2003), use two proxies, namely the assets turnover and the 
ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales. Also, agency costs have 
been proxied by Cash and Marketable Securities to total assets in Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Akhtar (2005), free cash flow in Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Akhtar (2005), Growth 
in total assets in Jensen, Donald and Thomas (1992), Mehran (1992) and Akhtar (2005). 
Most of previous studies have focused on a single measure of performance; this may produce 
different results on the relationship between debt and performance and depends on the measure 
used which follows the perspective of a researcher's part even inside or outside the firm. Other 
researchers concentrate more on the market returns to examine this relationship. This can reflect 
the market expectations about the firm's future and thus may not be able to capture managers' 
current performance. This current in addition to the historical managerial performances is 
reflected in the shareholders' value which is the main attention of this research. Therefore, this 
research picks four performance measures which represent the point of view of the shareholders 
as has been discussed in detail in the previous chapters. 
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Fifth, in addition to the other financial performance measures, this study uses the economic value 
added (EVA) as a financial performance indicator in the cross-sectional analysis due to the 
unavailability of data for the targeted panel period. However, besides its advantages explained in 
the variables measurement chapter, EVA is the financial performance measure that comes closer 
than any other to capturing the true economic profit and the shareholders' value creation. The use 
of this indicator gives important results compared with other performance indicators applied in 
this research. 
Sixth, this study gives an evidence for the homogeneity of using the book or market measures of 
debt which generally gives the same trend for the study's relationships which supports the 
perspectives of (Titman & Wessels 1988) and (Bowman 1980), who state that there is a large 
correlation between book and market value of debt. 
10.4 The Study Implications 
According to the above results which are confirmed by this study and discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter, the following implications can be stated. 
First, regarding the highly significant mediating role of debt, this indicates that debt affect the 
relationship between the determinants of capital structure and the financial performance in the 
UK firms. The nature of this relationship described by the trading off theory should be 
understood by the managers of these firms. This theory states that determinants of capital 
structure should be assigned in a way to minimize the total cost of capital, which consequently 
maximizes the shareholders' value. 
Second, regarding the negative relationship between debt and performance, this possibly 
indicates that the UK firms do not use debt as a control mechanism to maximize the performance 
as stated by agency theory. This has been supported by the reasonable debt percentage in the 
study sample. It is possible that these UK firms use other mechanisms like remunerations which 
have been confirmed in this study to have a positive relationship with the financial performance. 
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Third, it is not possible to recommend high leverage levels to managers within the study sample 
because of the negative relationship between debt and performance. It explains that borrowing 
hastens the separation between the shareholders and lenders, and also restricts the firm's ability 
to utilize more profitable projects. This possibly indicates that the UK firms are attempting to 
grow through less risky routes (Phillips & Sipahioglu 2004), and especially that the UK is 
considered to be a "market-oriented" not a "bank-oriented" country (Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
This should be well understood by the CEOs within the study sample that borrowing does not 
necessarily lead to higher performance, but could contribute to low financial performance as 
stated by the agency theory. The negative relationship suggests that more efforts should be taken 
regarding legislative rules and policies to help firms in reducing the dependence on debt in their 
capital structures. 
Fourth, according to the results of this study, using the book or market measures for debt level 
generally gives the same results. This has been supported by the perspectives of (Titman & 
Wessels 1988) and (Bowman 1980), who state that there is a large correlation between book and 
market value of debt. This implies that researchers should not spend their time and efforts in 
testing both measures, as one of them will be a substitute for the other. 
Fifth, lenders of the UK firms put greater emphasis upon the assets structure of the firm and its 
size. This can be an implication that firms invest in fixed assets instead of intangible assets to get 
more debt. 
Sixth, regarding the negative relation between growth opportunities, profitability and liquidity on 
the one hand, and debt level on the other, debt is recommended to be a refuge for some firms. 
Those who have fewer growth opportunities are recommended to benefit from debt issuance in 
maximizing their future investments in order to enlarge their profits and enhance their liquidity 
position. 
Seventh, regarding the negative relationship between profitability and debt level, this possibly 
suggests efforts towards decreases of the UK tax rates. Therefore, this will assist firms in 
generating cash flows and self-financing, and accordingly resulting in a healthier debt structure. 
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Eighth, regarding the positive relationship between remuneration of CEO and firm performance, 
this predicts that performance-based compensation reduces agency conflicts, and can be a clear 
implication of the relevance of incentive compensation to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers. 
Ninth, the insignificant relationship between major shareholdings and performance indicates that 
these major shareholders may not monitor the management team since they transact business 
with the firm. Firms are recommended to benefit from these large shareholders as a controlling 
mechanism. Theory proved the important role of the major shareholders in aligning the benefits 
of managers and shareholders. 
Tenth, regarding the strong significant direct relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and financial performance, managers should devote their time and efforts on these 
determinants in order to minimize the weighted average cost of capital, and consequently 
maximize the welfare of the shareholders. Efforts should be paid for the importance of each 
determinant and accordingly its effect on the upshot of the firm (i. e., shareholders' benefits). 
Eleventh, regarding the positive relationship between growth opportunities and performance, 
investment might be stated to be one of the most favourable alternatives for the firm. From the 
standpoint of investors and shareholders, investing in profitable projects is a primary policy that 
should be pursued by managers. Therefore, investment policies and procedures should be clear 
and prepared in a way that control managers' investing behaviour. 
Twelfth, regarding the positive relationship between tangibility of assets and performance, this 
also suggests that firms may consider investing in the fixed assets (capital-investments) in order 
to enlarge the shareholders' welfare. 
Thirteenth, regarding the positive relationship between risk and performance, firms in the study 
sample may reduce their risk by increasing and diversifying their operations. 
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Fourteenth, as has been confirmed, higher performance is related to higher liquidity position and 
this contributes to make a stronger solvency position. This gives the management guidance to 
build a clear and controllable investment policy which leads to investment in profitable projects 
to create and preserve the interests of their shareholders. 
10.5 Limitations and future research directions 
Even though this study has achieved its objectives and has been able to answer the research 
questions, it is still subject to several limitations. These limitations can be summarized as follows. 
The primary lack of this study is the lack of complete data availability, mainly due to the 
incomplete data sets provided by the databases used to collect the research data. The available 
databases as well as the annual reports did not provide information about certain variables like 
EVA, remunerations, and ownership structure indicators, besides that it has missing data for few 
variables used in this study. Remunerations and ownership structure are important variables in 
the content of agency problems and firm's performance, and including these variables for a 
longer period could help the researcher to explain its effect on the firm's financial performance. 
However, we collect data for these two variables in a cross-sectional analysis for the year of 
2005 due to the availability in the annual reports. 
Additionally, this study does not take into account the endogeneity of debt. This becomes 
important if there are firm characteristics, unobserved variables, which affect the firm's capital 
structure and its financial performance, for example, market power and managerial ability and 
entrenchment (Zwiebel, 1996). 
The presence of such unobserved influences is likely to generate biased estimates for the cross- 
sectional analysis. However, this study uses panel data, assuming that the unobserved firm 
characteristics affecting capital structure decisions and financial performance are relatively stable 
over time, and then we can then use panel data techniques to obtain consistent estimates of the 
coefficients of interest, since these unobserved variables can be treated as firm-specific fixed 
effects. 
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However, it is not clear that the endogeneity problem can be addressed simply, and maybe some 
of the unobserved determinants of capital structure and financial performance are likely to 
change significantly over time, for example, the market power of a firm may change over time. 
This will generate a correlation between debt and the error term in the performance equation, 
even when fixed effects are allowed for. In this case, further studies may instrument the debt 
level in the performance equation. Dessi and Robertson (2003) find that when debt is used as an 
instrumental variable, it reduces the estimated coefficient for debt essentially to zero and 
eliminates its significance. 
According to the study objectives, conditions and what we achieve in its results, we can 
recommend future studies which spotlight the following areas. 
First, apart from this study, there is no evidence for the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and the firm's financial performance. Future studies can use other indicators for 
these determinants and re- investigates this relationship. Some suggestions may include the use 
of other indicators to reflect growth opportunities and re-investigate its relationship with the 
financial performance. 
In addition, the role of non-debt tax shields on the financial performance has been empirically 
tested in this research and appeared to be negative and significant. However, this study uses 
depreciation which represents the majority of the NDTS; future studies can use other indicators 
and re-test this relationship. 
Moreover, regarding the relationship between the firm size and financial performance, many 
studies depend on the number of employees to reflect the firm's size. The reason behind the use 
of this measure perhaps is the easiness to get the number of employees, or the suitableness of this 
figure for these studies' objectives and nature. However, it is well known that many small 
technology companies depend on few employees and accomplish high percentages in their 
performance. This makes it interesting to investigate the size in different measures with the 
performance for the UK market. 
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Second, conclusions that are drawn in this research regarding the effect of remunerations on the 
relationship between debt and performance are subject to re-validation once more data are 
available. This study and because of the data unavailability tests the effect of CEO remunerations 
in a cross-sectional analysis and prove that it has a positive and significant relationship with the 
financial performance. 
Third, results for this study show positive but insignificant relationship between ownership 
structure and financial performance. However, because the data unavailability this relationship 
has been tested in cross-sectional analysis. Future studies can re-investigate this relationship for 
longer period once more data are available. 
Fourth, also because data unavailability, this study tests the relationship between ownership 
structure and debt level for cross-sectional analysis. The role of the ownership structure in 
determining capital structure decision is still an interesting topic once this data becomes 
available. Moreover, this study uses major shareholders to reflect ownership structure, more 
studies are needed using other indicators like managerial ownership. 
Fifth, this research for simplicity uses industry as a dummy variable (industrial and non- 
industrial). However, future research can be foreseen for this research model among industry 
sectors to see if there are any differences in the study relationships among different industries, 
and if so, further detailed analysis on a specific industry would be interesting. 
UnIS 268 
~ ö 
Z u Ä 
a 
-le 
ui 
rn vý 
2N 
'- 
o 
U) 
w 
41 
E 
(? _0 
(m .rcU 
N 
a 
d 
U) 
N 
O 
c on- m& 0 
ö.: z a t 
M 
> cNo oäMuo b aý 
U) '7 > 
') 
c? aý 'a) 
2 ` 
(D M 'a L) Q) 
.x 
4 5) C -- " L> Ur ¬"C L 
ý= w > vY cc aýxrn°co(u c 3vÖ c °>oo 
g 
>° 
_ý 
c 
0w =a1-ß o. 5 a a0Z E (5 0 
c (ý 
m 131 
U 
) 
C w 0 0 
G1 : Wm WZ 
m 0) 
0 4) CD 4) 2 
Qm 00 
CL cl Of 
D O O 
Od 
rn0 
' 
0)00 C 
OocMo 1 
0))8 
a (3) CD rN rn0 rN (7) (1) 0) C) r (y 
'o a) - 
V 
C NN O Vl 
_ 
w 
f0 
-CCE ti 
E Cp 
aN 
°E cN > o ý' 
a) 
ac 
C U) 
oO 
moL 
E v,, Mmo ü) wY co 0 
- 
. a"c 
(D 
)ä 
_tc m oo 
cZNc8 
0) v c E 
N' O -Y C LnE NO 
- 
> 
Ln NCC ý 
Ocnt-C cu r- 7pO7C 
N NN ' U NLo:. ,Uw to tr- 
ad 
f1J 
E 4) COE 
NC 
O 
C: NVt 
8 (D N CE CC 
O 
0 
ým rn Mcöm E 
o 
E 0)0 fl3 m NmC 
(L) 
>0 
' 
Q. 
C C) C 
c(0 0 
Em 
7O pUO c <WM 
q. 
ui 
> (0 C_ C 
c2lý E 
oC 
LA. 
p 
0 
00C: 
T 
"a 
 O 
m 
cc 
Co 
rn 
T 
i C) a . Vi? Qc L ` 
U) c a -cL 
c mý 
O 
ö 
uý N u) ca 
2 
wN ý 
m o' m ¬t'' 
ý>ý 
0 ¬"- 
' 
2 
R. = 3ü 
m s c 
N 
Nc 
NtC 
3O ý 
ya in C 
0 , L Z. a 
_ co ¬ LI) 0Eý' cý¬ ý 
caw 
Ti .c2 E4)(1) co c> 
02 Wö 
a> 
c- 4) c 
E°' o 
m "' :, 
Ev, 
V, -o 
U) rn 
Hö 
äv 
Woo 
ý 
w ö 
c 
J 
16. 
O 
Q c 
°5 
r 0 Q 
0 
0 N 
O N > 0 
06 
N 0 
.c 
-I 
0) 60 
Q Q Q QN 
N M LD 
rn 
\lo 
N 
U 
C 
Z) 
d 
6 }> c cf z 'D c 
ai 
0) 
ca 
i 
n O f. - O 
ä 
o Cu 
N c s n aß äm m 44) ý E 4) 
> ° `°, ýE"(--° "0 
Ni 
V N 'Fu 
L. c boo t C ýýN 2 a r c 0 NXM O N 'E y U 
0 m. >>Ný 
pi 
Ü ö 
NV cÜNVaN 
10 
N V 
CO & Q 
0 v1 
U on 
muO 
N wL 
U) OU 
N 3 0 c) 
y 
ä 
(n 
2 
C to °' ` t 0 
4) > cl 
1 o w v 8 
(D co 0) 
LO 
0 It 
0c) 
I- 
CL rr 0 N a) rr a) r r 
41 o8 4) - u 'n 0 E 
t 0 Z) 
m 
cu c 
w 
V) ¬ cH 
CU C: 
° c0 = jn -c U) 
¬ 
0 c: = 
co (/) N( Q 'J >( (n C- - f0 'o 
LO 
(7) 
CC) 
It) 
`-iD0-, -E TLu 0. N2. E N 
t0 
C 
4) 
06 
°ý °ý 
y 
c 
N 
_ 
o 
°N yD V) 
ýu'v"v, 
L 
- 
CO_ 
O 
3 
VE 
W 
0 
aý 
O 
-a 8 
`Cc? 
=3m Fa 
°a; ö ö . 
c? 
ý ý 
(öE ` Ec c EC c 
a< 
3 
000 a )g iuw -"'o w -°, °)U. °ii 
(n - 
E 
CO N C 
U) 
to C 
yý-.; 
i 0 
O O 
. 2-1 X cu myL 
_ (u (D 'a N 
C 
a -0 Y 3 
cl CN 
c 
Ul O 
N (Ö .C +. 
N 
OCv 
N 
V 
(A 
C 
0 a) 4 
E !E (1) 0 Oc N C TD i N 
.2 c) c: E N°°ý°ý r E-E cn 
Ca- ý ý v y' 
aý 
(D a)u, 
p) m 4 ý 
a 2 
L3 yý '" 
°t 
dC 
.ý ( 
E 
(0 
ý 
w 
C 
aß ) 
t C 
ý 
°(p o ä LU 
e E°y d) e ow cý a i 
cc ýc ý, ý 
m v o 
rý D¬ 
ym ,ý N 0 S" m 
c 4) 
ö 
` n m t-- vý ý ° o 
N 
c (D ý pm 
öE 
aUi m0 cý .E Uv 
E aE) 02Em ö Qs ca w cý. w 
ui 
axi 8 
o O 
Co 
N 
00 M 
C 
(p 
ä 
C) 
N 
M j 
Ö 
. 13 C 
0 ý 
Ö 
(p 
C 
c O Y 
Y 
(U 
g Q oci m co 
co ti Co C 
0 
r 
r 
r 
0 
N 
C 
C 
D 
COC (U a CU 
N 0- aL yx `° N a 
V- 9 E 5 
p- 
U N 
N C_ -+ 
Q1Ly C 
o (D NCL Qý v'o C 0) v N YN. 
-0 Ne O 
L : ]3 ý. C N O UNN + 
i 
- N 
3cvO IS in 
NN 4) O yOa C . 
O 
'Uý öp a) Om ' 
e a O pip 'NN n LJ 
rn i0Nm ýO> CF) º- 
0 L (L) cM (n L) CL - z, U) 
d D (0 U 
(U 
_ 
CU -0 =3 2 y 
. N wC "Z >o a) >O o ca o 
=U7 v= 
oN ür cv 
CCY UN 
m (A v°öx ýý min ü--vE I- a ämv ND E Ow EQ!. - 
°'aN B 
C: -; Z 6Ev cm :3 
13 . C .C 
C 3.1 -L w dm 
MIC EI 
pU 
- 
ca"C 
4) cc ßoä o 000 co0 (1) 
O 0) 0) 
O 
'C 
0 
)rn 0 a) 00 =5 Lr) )0c r) 0) :1 Ln 00) 
a) rn 0) L 0) a) rn L rn 
CL rr - rYr r ý. d r 
NC 
U) 4- 
` N m R3 
0 ao O 
u' EY 
YC 
D 
ýa v 
E EC NE M 
H 
Qy 
IRT 4= 
N 045 
C 
pm 
Cy 
Il . 
ý? 
vý 
p 
.U 
CY) 
C 
0) (D 
f0 CÜ 
E 
O NEo O 
C 
ö 
cYC 
m _c ý 
Ecc 
ý ö 
Qc 
c ö c t c c cý. c 
7 -) CO LL w -I -. ) wU- QLL 
(D 
U 
ca cn 
c 
"c 
r- O 
a 
O 
q) c: 
m 0) a0- N_ ä 
O 
°' c 
` 
N> 
L_ 
xy 
O cep 
O N L a_ L 
CL N 't C 
äaß - 
W NÖO rn 
. 
tr) 
a> c .0 
7 
4) CO 
') 
N 
(1) = in C L' Ti 
C 
o 
a 
NN` N 
CW 
a 
ENNCW 0) 
ca CN O- 
c 
ä N ö C 
7 
OL c 
NLy 
Eo o 
0 xoca 
ý' 
O C 
(Dts 
CL 
E 11) 
xý°ö 
i 
a iýcýoo 
ý N EE 
ýLNNa 
a S 82 
4) 
'D 
a Xm 
wE Z u E) ý. > - . U) o U 
ýEi a 
ý ca a ý° (D 
> 
05 0 
0 
oö 
O 
C14 I- 
>ý $ 
N 
-6 C) p 
v U 
O 
C 
C 
>N 
7 
N 
Oa) 
`Ö 
N 
j 
(1) ö - E E°a mco mN m mY ýoti 
M 
r r 
LO 
r 
(D 
r r 
N 
( 
C 
O 
fA O) 
C- 
p 0 
C 
° ul 0) o C 
N V 
eO N (U 
4) : O C 
c 
A! N 
o 
N 
0 
0 
CL ° a W 
- U) Y 01 
E 
MOC 
C 
L 
a 
(3) 
N d C OL 
13 
ZN ýo L) M 75 (L) 
O O'er 2 maa)0 ýý 
c 
u c 
ý 
13 pN > - (1) L C. 0 
. QVj '. ' 
¬ 
70 -O Cl) 
N 
° 
c.. CL r_ 
cu to O> 
Ooh 
mi ' 
0 mI-- 4) M E 
ýca 
ß ý n- a a 0 
.o LO 
00 
O 
0 
O m 
= a - 0 0 Qmm) _ 000 Q) 
'- C) 
f- 0 
CO N 
0 T Oa) 
rn ö r rn rn rr rn rn rr 
N 
< 
O 
N C V1 - 
N 
N (nom p OQ C- C 
C Oý 
C C 
aO 
, G1 in 
Zý öc 
C U) 
0 ý' v a 
ý 
EE 16 
(n 80 m 
7 2 _m 
U) 
m 
U 
r- 
0 
N° 
U) Lo ONO7 
2Q 0 (0 
r0 co 
U pOO. OO r-- , "Ucna- U 
U) ---- -------------- -- 
IC 
c 02N 
0 
C coo E `E 
.E C E :3R :3m 
° Cm 
- jU- 
0C 
'O 
NC .ry f9 O 
fl 
I! 
1 
Ä 
% 
D 
C 
Q O. 
O 'C L D) 
N C¬ 3 
_ 
wO 
CC 
TCN 4- CU E 
O 
Cý 
E 
0 
N 
CL) -S 
Ul 
ýp 
m 
15 U- U 
Lý 
a- C O Q 
f0 N'o 
C 
r- 
. 
C Q `t +-ý 
n. U 
C 
O 
-) . O co «, O a) to 
C 0) ON 
(U m E 00 
O 
L- 
N" 
N8NC}, u 
NC 
. Om a) u) 
C: 
iLn (1) N 
. 1NjCL (u 
m 
2 :1 
L¬ C C¬ 0I 
o t° 0 =0 > ° EE °t o ' pp äý 
u`Öi 33 
rna oo <a äff' cýv° C7ä 
m ca t 
wý 
cIö 
E 
ii 
CY) O N 
06 
L. 
Ü -D M 
c r- C O C 
o s' 
C 
tm E 
0) E -T 0 :ý ( N 
Q m= mV m m 00 CY) U Uý 
co a) C) N N N N ce) N 
r! 
N 
Cl) 
C 
D 
M 
c rn + + rn 
s Ö oc vi rn n "C 
ýZ 
LNv, 
C7 
t 
mu 
°c 
vý 
a OpX 
.0 
M '0 N+ NN V) 7N 
a Ü- -a üNND o 
- 
>O 
O-0 Nt - ?N . 
8- 
c O 0 
7 . 
ý.. CNC 
Ul 
N 
ECCt 
N 
Z, 2Nt 
gy w 
N' ý. N ;Qy 
N 
> N °OOpO Np 
c+ - Cp 0N 
U) m 
L` LOL :3 X VOC tý O. O. VV fC t: 
to Ö NMOEN cU -ca >C p cn l9 CNM Vl > yG 8 
Qa (A U) 2O .s 
o 
cNcUc8. a. mwv l- 
öU 
U) Ov W U) 
d1 
ÜW 
ccoO77 . &¬ 
Ü 
im 
c 
IC 
OY 
° 
D 
O7 
O 
mmN 
CL N Q o NWÖ 
WO 
0 
rn >> p> 
G) 
D> -o aßä ü, 
>m 
w ,va O 2. j? ý 
0 t 
to 7 CO C) U') O) 
0 
LI) O d" 
O 00 Gt 
Q, 
O) 0) 
r- r 
rn O> 
rr 
O) O) 
r r- 
O) O 
rN 
0) O) 
-r 
C C 
O 
7 
OC E "y 
N 
to 4F1 mNCN 
E7N 
c to 70 c 
d 
p a 
fA J ca 
(n 7 
L= mc 
(0 
° 
cC 
= l9 
Cl 
ý 
cm E w ý_ ` 
n 
T 
rn 4 
N 
(ý0 E 
O 
> 
E L", U) LO U) =i D 
D 
a) E U - E 
( 0) o 
'MC rn O, 
7 
,0 -0 
ä 
Ul In .ý C -- (A 10 
Cl) LO - 
. - m0E p ý- 
fý to N 
Iý 
N- 
0 - 
. -. - c. cc 
O >. t U) cý .E 
U 
E 
°6 
C 
V ° 
CY) 
° °ö 
U) 
,g p- O 4) 
rnm 
E 
W u) U 
M F E 
ý 
ýtOOc 
C: 7 S 
a 
mE 
C: ° om 
o ý 
mc 
`(t 
WN 
(n 
"u i (h 
7 aý 
` 
m pý ý 
co E 
oU p 
7 . QLL 
p co 
- Qm 
p 
-ýa , -ýmLL. -ýlLL W 
C 
°Q) 
N 
C N 
- a)o 
ö 
0 C 
c (1) 
. a 
75 > 
o o (n m ago a -r 7c N«rnm 
rn 
oýcm b 
c; 3v t 
N 
(1) c 
m 
N 
s 
It: 
m Y cc a j> pCÖoj 
C c 
.s CY) 
"L a't a NNcCm 
cN ONüN 
N Gý Ö 
0 
, 
(n 
-"`3 
ä' ca i,. - äcß E ö¬7 ö u`ýi m 
c' ¬ mý °i , C I- 70 w cm WE v> o cl- 
15 m'mý 
cam m 
Eß ä' 
w C-0 o (/) o. 0 w U) 
p Q" wU co 0) Wt W (4C- tU .2 W U) 
aNm 
0) 
cm c in c 
O 
= 0j 
°6 O 
CD 
) (3 
O 
-A V 
O 
0 
ca N 
T 
06 
I- 
p ca 
C 
. Q c v >' C 
t 
M 
g 
M 
(0 C " 'C 
O 
0) N 0) 
C 
Q 
.6 
v l N M m sý o 
N 
Jr- 
> 
OO Q 
N 
U U= C) ° 
N 0 C) UM U CA 
N 
co N 
N 
co (3) 
N 
0 
() M 
04 
M 
f1 
r 
ui 
ai 
ca - L co 0° 70 c ,4 "- x COO 
-0 
E te ° ,.. z, r 
- 
o °N D cy) C 
O 
v- mC 
o , o N>° c c c C) 0 
ýý? E i i °) > , 
ýgö 
ass c 'ý 
ý oý 
v>>t 
cm m o N CL -U cn d 
c 
C: o 
o ' 
0'5U 2 
ýo t= ýn rn ý°' c 
0) 0) 
(1) ö rnýn. C3) L)) ( L-) 
o w 
Uin rn 
0ä cu M ~ t 90 w (4 oo n E 
(U n m r 
(D CL I m _ Z 
0 
> 
o 
c) v o 
.o 0 0 0 N CO 
O) 0) 
N Cl) 
CO Co UA 
0) ) 
cp a0 
MI 
0O 
Q. 
rnrn rna> c0) 
- .- (Ur 
0)0) a) 0 
N 
U 
i; - ccc _ T E EEC N m 
d 
C' C: OON a "- 
m 
- a asCA N 
- . -xc u>. 
T co ° 5r 
45 C: 7 LO 0E :3 Om O o O N ýn ýp c U) I N. ý. cC. C .- cn O 0 rQ 
N E 
OE 0N NL Ö 4) 
` NC 
ý 
CCO 
l-° ö 
C E E° ° 4) 
O 
Elc 
f6 
CC fÖ EK, 
0 o C °wow C 
ü 
c ÜÜ 
me 7 ° 
. n MiZZ- 
E (D CW ý- ý 0 t_ 
(A O ý 
U (U to 
ýc 
E 
cd 
ý a 
c% 0 Q' "0 
y" 
Za0 
tin ý 
i c2 
CL `) 
m0 cmm 
CC cý öL O° to. 2 o 
aý 
°' o 
w_o ý aý 
U c 
(0 -Lý _. - C U) ý md o ° 
Ný N 
N 
o ä, °'D 
N (D & 
c 2: = C¬ 
>= " (1) 2 tC cO , 
ý ac 
s 
m cv c 
m 
m 
ýTi o ä E° o 
C2 
o °M=m .ß 
L'i ü, Z ý 
a) > mE >ý? xO am-0- ovv 2xcc oc. 
oo ° co cat >3 
, 
>ý' 2 LY. müý wý o o) ,.. w co o aas cv co _o 
uý E"v N 
c 
CD m 
O O (S 
- co 
L 
O 
ý 
p NcaÖ 
m06N 
E 
SÜ 
IQW "2 ON 
Ö 
0 
v 
0m Oý_ ý '° 
C 
ý 
tý'Aý 
a ý v ý iää 
M M M 
rt N N 
(1) 
C 
D 
N 
x c 
a) 
E 
61 - (o 
C 
aý °' mc i `CU 'o 8 o 
o 
N mpN 3 rn aa) 
VC 
>OOC (9 " $ >. 
0) c Om 
73 O 
0) 
-a 
(D 
NS U O ä yCC N . ö= 
ä 
` j LCO 
(n 
O 
C NC 
UC (p 'ate 
cM 
C >O (D 
' . - E 16 -Fu 
° 
(n -0 6.2! 
I 
CF) > 
L7 (a 
M 
I- uo( a? ca - 
` 
Uni `cý 
U 
ý a ýy 3T m > °' Uw 
ý. m 
,a a) o E - 
- 
o 
Cy 
oNXE 
2 
y 
N rn 
NCLc 
NY 
c U) > (n 0do i a 0a aEw8 Ow inn , vg' LT- m v, 4º 
'' 
ýn _0 o 
c g c 
c 
r- L) 
G1 ß Y M m -D 
Ü -ý? `- 
o 
C wa N y 
O> 
. C: 4) 0-00 
OCN `ý äEýn . -. m2 Oö 
.p 
C N 0) 
CO co 
ý" 
C0 O 
ýp co 
O) 0) 
co 
(3) 
CN r- O O) 'c - i- cD 
" ' () Q) O) O) Q) 0) Q) O) 
0) O 
0) O 
C ýp N D 1N 1- 0 
O) (Y) C Q) (7) a 
E p p c ÖN 
cn m 
L« - 
0 
- 
) 
co NN 
` 
0 
mN 
¬ 
q 
((U 
O 
0 
>ý C CON 
C 
4) Y'a ° c 
U(1) ;c 
M 
- 
(n y y 
mm 
:3 75 th - :3 r- C cr) Cý l 
Q E -3 Vl +L 
6 
g 
C(l g 
1ý C 
ýä 
A C ) 
r- ' N 
0o 
co o¬ ü ch 
E co 
Cl) 0°. CD 8 Ü ) cý cc -o c :3 g_- 
U O 
U 
E C p 
7 C 
C° 
N 
E 
C O) 
(O C °ü 
C (1) 
°. - ov 
U 
" 
N tIý `ý U ° 0 
'° Um rnU i -a (L) Ur i (0mß E -Co 
aE 
moo 
(L) 
ý C U) 
E ý C: 0ý >> ý >>ý om 0 H Ü) :3 0mLLQ c. 0ý E WW gý ýO W c oiLL 
E u, c 
r 
O 
L_ 
-C c a a ß°. 
i5 
c 
N 
cN 
O y cý cý 
> :3 rn 
T 
CL 
Ö 
- 
¬ .-o oI 
a 4) C 
>m Y 
ö NÖ 
- C- 
N výM 
$ CE, > 0 CM L) Q) 
C . 4 
"a 
Qf U) C U) C . aCi dj` 
U) mC to C ". C -) o (U ý .MUv 
m " ;ý Xö 2 - >z (, ) N 0 -- ön ä' äý 8C > E8m 
Q) v -o 8a E (a m w i = ä vuo 
ii 
ad 
06 
06 
p 
ofS -0 L 
Ö 
a 
c c c 
.^ t Ö 
w 
C 
. 
06 WN NO 0 
ö Nt ý(a > cn ýE SEN s (n 
.2ö 
ý. e C0) mN 
0m 0 Cý 'E (D 
ýQ'N ýCýi ýý wJ LL(nN ý(n= U- O 
Cl) 
in 
N- 
(1 
_ 
(I) 
C 
O c ai 
LLJ 
U 
o E> ýN v 
C N 
Cl. 
yO r_+ 
>-0 
OC 
2 N N QI j( V 
N 
M 
> 
O 
` 
n 
K 
C0 ý tý cx 
, N 
_ äOCw 
' 9.0 
.0 
4) 
Q 
'ý 
c (L) 
I 
N 
O1 - 
LV 
'ý 
C 
0-0 
'ý N 
N 
3 
> 
ýp CC 
OC 
ä> 
O 1] 
D) 
ý"' 
V 
O 
U> in O 
J 
Y 
M70. 
m (D 
O 
C 
,0 Gj 
O0 f0 Nj 
m ,CNC 'o 
c 2C (0 
_Ö cä 
ä Ir 
EC >m d, cä ä ö C cý > 
w act NE 
- 
(n ßa 
ö Y ac vx ca 
a °0 m° C E o a) v aý m O co o cu a> > m} US 0) ca a) w . U) u rn. _ rn n aý V V E 0) (a a 
v t Q1 
0) O O)O 
M 
C) Va 
r 7(3) 
o) Oa) CC) 70 0) _ 0)O (3) d CT) C) Q)0 Q) C0) 
- 
a> o) (3) CQ) a) O C) 
f0 . r-- r .- (0 r rN r 
'C3 C 
u! V C - 
(A C M 
d CD ný c Lr- ¬ >, C 
< N (n MON 
oaýicnrn ö° 0 u=. 9 ca Q " 
N m (U O 
0 ` 
NM 
f- 7 
ý 
OE 
(0 O 
0 
(NO 
N-Q 
C (0 (/% 
LLJ C 
00 :3 
O 
Cl) 00 . . t; = ýý ia U) M Z E:: ) -U 
aý 
0) M 0 
_ 
ý a a U 
O 
cm 
O 
. '( 
( .C 
U) 
N 
CN 
(Q (n 
O (A V 
N 
C 
1. 
V jc 
- 0` 0 OO` 
Ecc 
CJ C 
o i- 
ia 4) 
EEC- 
o 
C 
omc o30 
Fn 
Z3 i E> 
M 
>a) 0 E ? 000 Qm W 
o O c 0 ýn 
a) o m 
, ý... f9 ONc 
C 
O 
C 
NM 
CC 
m 
O U rE E 
¬ 
a 
Cx 
öNo 
IO 
2 
N 
ý 0) cý 
O -l C o't 
t ý U) UNEay O ö co N pý O Yc a) m2 0 w `ý N cZ c) c 
Cc R (L) I - 0 ca cm CCc - 00 n. cm M ü) 
NON 
E 0 Cc pa E NN 
d 
NN >ö2 rn N Q1ý 
>Cö 
. 
x> 
U) 
Q. 2 
to 
> °ýý 2 
OE fa m in- w c Couo cy w (D N , Qo CNLU CUN 
aö 
C 
C 
I- 
7_ 
0 
N ° 
o 
N U 
E 
m 
r= 
N 
ý 
a) 06 r- 
C 
0 
-2 OO NN wM 
CD c) N m 0 oö 
LO v N. co 0) 
UU) 1n 
Cl 
c 
D 
E 
w 
N 
Ü 
c 0 4) sa X .E 
ý, 
Un 
>. 
iu (Dc 
."ý. N> .. o me ýý 
OCC 
._ 
E> 
a)- cl) EQ (° o a) r ar) 
rw 
rn'D Q Cmcv; E 6a 
" 
(D 4) C- V) :3 A= i c co 
C: xo 13 
L. C CU a. =p 
C "ý p 
(A ;r .`.. "O C f0 >- 
p 
O 
>. OLN 
'p Y7N 70 
m 
U) Nt7LC 
+_ IOt 4) "O 
ONE 
N 
'n 
d 
C 
c 
o7NC 
' 
mLO a L ' 
L 
7E 
(1) 
> 
O 
o n. (0 L O U) m to to Q d F- MO U) C .C 7- 
U 
CD 5 aý ,) C 
yC 
c .0 CDZM m. m ro W -C 
aai`m 
It _ > OO)O O O 
q 13 cý'C 
c'C O> d -j vF-- F-- w mma 
.o o O p p C) C) 
N- 00 
co (D 
OO O 
C') 
0) O 
000 
(T) O 
N-N 
co (3) 
IL rnrn r (3) C) N O (V 
rn0 r CV Cl) C) N a)rn r' r 
Y 
c F- 
E 
0 
U) 
c 
(p ü O a 
"- 0 
a 
N °as0 - 
-0 q 
U) G) a) (DU) 
'FU W U) C v, 
ID CO (j) CC 
O 
Jr- CC 
(o 
LC 
0m 
(0 
"m 
2. -Fa 
. 
La C 
CL 
E 
E 
CNX. EOO 
-0 0 
aO ÖEU L a-D 
Ln EO 
O-0 a 
OOE M (1) .- 
V) 
a 
to E 
( 
U) 
N0O 
- UU)d. 
C U 
O0 r' 
'- UCO 
N0 
N U_ 
Njp 
'-- U 
- K) 
I- 0N< 
O) Oo 
0) <U 
o E 
c 
O cu J O 0 C p) O 
Ä v W a m c cw mE 
c c O L N 
3 c 
9- 
p CC Oc OE 
O 
LO CN OO G) 
", it< N -ý<<c Vý m<w UCH _c 
Y 
ö 
O 
of oý 
Uf 
oo`v 
O to CUÜ p) NC C c'- N 
CC 3 pQ 
'7 
NpN '0 l0 
E N) NNo U OQ 
C Evcm 
f0 Np 
p 
OapLEp 
. 
m C N 
CL 
y 
U) E p CL 
r- . > 
os a D) 
U `t 
o ý, »- aO C 
L 
NC 
CLpý. r 
°) pa) L O v; 
Y 
c L 
L O L V r . v- O 
Q 
c0 
o aC-0 ow 
c 
°'C m 3t 
t 
0) c0c `Ow c s 
Es `0 (1) c¬ 
O 
s 
CL 
m 
ENE 
m- N c0 O7 
oOO 
m 2--a _O 
UNN 
aM>C 
O 15 p rn ti 'n 
cp 
O 010 NU 
EO 
It f0 
N j U pý IX (n W n. > CN8NO W 
rn: 
O ov üý 4=. 
Nmm 
.s m 
N 
c] U 
75 N 
0) (D 
CL CO 
_ 41) 
O 
0 
N 
Z 
0 
06 
T C 
O 
N 
m 
N 06 
C 
Q 
7 co 
LO 
o 
(0 X 
EO ý- ? 
+ - 
pJ Z 
vi C 
:c -00 0 06 ý' 
C 
vom 
D : m 0 } , _ O =N 3 = >>1 N 
N 
U) LO 
r 
LO 
("a 
C_ 
C 
4,0 O°j, 4) LLJ (D > 
> >O L o ýöaýa E 
CL z 
C 
zo ' 
>1 
41) O m C3) (3r) 
Cl 
cC 
1- 0 
OCOC 
Ul 
NC 
ý cp C COO 
t0 
'0 
COO 
N0 
' NNc 
3. 
O .ýO O` U 
(v It= 
U 
:3O 
Y p (n O CO 
.O 
aNNN 
o 2 
TaC 
E (a aý ONnNE 
>C N C fn O7 
M mö 'ö nom ýGc E c-a Cl. 
ö >>a ýEö c`a o ýý yý c 
>ýý o ü > Ntiýý p : s0 U aUv c4 
c>> Ü) c. = a .a a) 
E o m> . Q in cc 
a) 
C 
Ü Ü 
'a 
c .0 
0) 
m 
m 
E I' E O. !a 
It 
rU C 0 
> 
OcE O 
G> ä° ä ä äýý ä 
.g C g o : 
= CD 00 O) 
) c+) 
(0 00 
(D 
C) 
N (D 
OO co 
U) C) 
Co OO 
00 N 
00 0 0) 
Q) O) Q) O C) Q) C) (3) O) Q) O) 
CL rr . - r rr rr r ý, r 
E_ "ern C 
N 
°' m')4) C: " 
N 
Cm r C > 5 
N 
CC 
c0 ' 
c 
OO U) 
O m7C 
a I-=: O 
- 
. c "N 
O 
a) in 
cm Üo OÜrn w c0 E 
Ný 
0 
c 
O 
Epüý 'm 
Ö O=m` E ý 
E -go LN 
0 tr_ C 
)N 
wm Fo CN co 
. 
ý? s 
O3U r- 
UO 
Up in `- 
c0 a 
o C, M M 
Uý CON 
U) 
O in 
Nc, c N3 
ýcn C Eý coEa, x ýQzw 
cUat) Yew c oCo coYCnY 
V 
ö 
c m 
ö : -' ö >> 
ö v, 
i a 
ö (n 06 c 
(0 
Ö f0 
Ö f0 (D 
a) tD "ý m aai 
ÖC U 
i6 fU 
O 
CC 
:3 
OO "c 
CYC 
0 ÖOU 
CC 
Ö MÖ Ö" 0Ö 
-' -)UL- --, o w -, ao (n2--, ýmlQ ý (ý 
ao aý > 
6O 
w Tc °-ß äi' 
Z` ä 
UO 70 ä cn cc $ cCOO 
Qý 
ý jC E 
ýp m 
NU 
+L Ö0 
Ca)i 
'D " 
0CQo 
m 
C8 
2 G 
oaf aD ý, `t E 
Q 
"" 
CL 0o 2 °) cý 
L 
mUM 
Nc 
uDý' m 
i din >. 
L 2' Lo 'a 
> 
m0 
3ý 
o o ö 2- - 8 
C +ý .j 
NýME OE NN 0) O 
NL 13 UCt CC tc 
C 
> N 
c 
N M (L) O 
`° 
7 N¬ ý_ C t/1 US 
O C"a 
CCU 
Op m 
NÖ tN 
O fit ,,, 
a 4. `9 . 
' 
N 
A 
`° 
L¬ 7C 
a Y ßo 0=It° C >m °'a m 12-0 
x mm 
öv s3ý .c C 
ý 1) (U o cl. (D (n caE. a ca ac aýom °' Om W 
w. 
CLM OC m"v 
ä1s 
L 
3 ° = 
v_ >. 0 
C) C, 6 a ( 
2 
'a C) 
2 
(i CN ad 06 08 N ýtS >O 
O U) c 
` 
t Y 
' 
C > N O 
C 
m 
- DL 
CY 
In 
CO 
077 N 
U O> 
Lco 
O 
t5 O . N fý 
C 
ZY °) Y rn Y rn 
co U) 
(0 
0 0 
(ND (M0 
00 
N 
N 
C 
C 
D 
7LL 
- - 
1] w 
N 
13 
Mg Fu >0 L) 
o 
V 
N 
ý ö cu YO a+ 
3 
N 
0 
0) 
rný c. 3 
ÜC (ý j 
`ý N ý c U) N aaNN NXN O CL >% aiS ýp 
fp 
6. 
>L ]> 
yO 
0( tV 
7 2 0- 
MO 
0 0 
V1 
N 
£p LoCO 
p- a) 
-c 
N 
t m 3 
. O 
` 
C ö 
Ö ° äög f0 < aoc wE : om m U> 
o C] 
3M°äc 
0oEc. rn, c m 
Cy 0 
N 
C 
+ OX Vp 
.1 
N 
D E >o 
N 
E 
N 
2c 
CN in 
¬ 
rn a 
ä'E ` L) aci ýo C 
(IS M F: äß't0 
4) 
Ö> vn (3)cc äý ä Ix ö as 70 
a C -C 0) ^ 
0M 
M00 
CO VC)) 0))va) N0) 
CF) 
-000 
OD 1ý co ä rnýrn 0) ca) M_ (3) ca) r to r 0) CD r rnrn 
Nw 
Ct) C) 
CN 0 LU 
G) 
a`ýi 
c 
¬3 
(a cy) a :3 
ö öý 
"D CM 
öMM 
NO 
_0>_c CU 
co c 
rnZ Q 
ý 
. ! 
YO Owc 
cp 
pON rn 
E C'') pcN c p to Co 
E 
M 
E üýä 
p ýn 
WEuLo 
Yt -0ý0 
m äý LLJ 
Q 
N E a co O 
co u 
NNO 
(D-2 ums f- 
N 
.- ch C: 
Lo c , mQ -c m v) oo<z 
O °Q $ 
m 
U 
C C (O OS 
N 
CE 
O) 
p C°ý 
w 
N 
E 
c 
CU 
U_ -Y 
p cV 
C 
(0 (0 O 
äc 
c 
cý C c 
O 
m 0 O 
°' ö 
M 
acoc 
_. om 
FA 
Co ýö 
C ým " cr V 
O 
-! 
OCM 
Wu 
p0Oc 
ýQQU 
NN c, ý V 
QW .c ýU. SOW 
c0 (D u_ o -o a) > 
ÖÖ 
tE 
W 
(1) 
M Z` 
- a uý c t5) '0 c2 
N ýj N i Q 0o 
3a>> f° ý Xoü, `O -0c 
¬ 
a ý c ö a o 
co 
0M Na oo O C 0 
U) ý° Oooa ýn a c>i cVC 
4 U NC 'n p tý-u 
C 
C 
O- 
U) 5 :=U (p 
cÜU 
a) tC 
CNp 
M-0 O 
EC 
a 
y( N' 
y( 
¬m ¬ c 
, 
lp >OOcN 
ý O f0 _ Oo iA 
oö rn 
+oaypo 
O 
tJ 
o-Ea) 0 X3a) 
öý't¬ Y T) ýtEUn-ot 2 
w (L) L) m: r_ wo cD (n 
ät. 
=. c 0 
äcý mMo vn 
ä) 
Y 
a) ö 
of 
0ö CA 
Q) Y 
3: N 
C 
N 
0 
o O O 
) 
L 
O)N 
O 
? 
O>. 
ä 
J 
Jpý Mý 0 JO) OF-- 
r _. 
j 
06 
I 
CO 
C 
CD CO (co CD (D 
rn 
N 
C_ 
C 
p (U u US -T pO OO 
ö l0 CöaT EtrAYc- 
n 
ö ä ' ä m 
- 
O 
. i ß IVI iH il 
` - -, L 
¬Ü. 
> 
COTN2 f9 
E 
r 
0 (D (u 75 - 4) 
C ) 
ß- ¬ 
'U o (n ncö (n 
ac N 
0¬O0 GE 
LL .U0 > c0 CE 
OvN 
- 
OCMM 
C 
C 0). C: 
To 
NEoE 
LL (0r- 
voi 
L z (0 l0 ý. Y 
M 
YMNý. 
. ina`°iE 
1hUi 
Uoýývuýi Üö. SA? U) E 
C CN C C 
f0 O 
c in 
NC ýp 
D. 0ä 
m 
¬5 E 
ä-'I_ nco cý 
o > 't c 't O 
4) m 
> ü ä_0 0 CL ä 
L 
O 
p 
0 
_ 
d 
-J r- 
00 0 00 
ÖM 
CD 0 
M 
OD a) 
MN 
0 
OL 0) 00 O) 0) Q) 
O. NN r r- rr 
N 
JÖ 
Ul N 
C 
D) 
C O Vl aC 
a' Cl 
0 
(0 OJy 
U)NpN jVwO 
p 
f0 
rN ;¬ 
14--s -r +r- 1ý 
u) ca 9)0)0) C 
(n 
NQ 
Qf U) )d N cy) 
M (L) =3 CO U') 
(n 
:3 Cl Cl 
to C ýp 
QWC F- mO 
MO 
N O_ 
NNvMO 
M3 ýt r 
00 
rw .C 
-C 
L_ Oý ýC C 
ro 0 
Em 
C 
°W'EI- maE) 0(A 
Cwcp 
a) m 
ENcQ 
cm mc 
EN 
O O Ein 
o0 
ý<Ui WQ 
a0N EQWW 
CM 
L-ý 
p 
-gym 
c-0 O)-D. 
a 
Ö Mo 
c 
I 
>, 
Ö> 
tp T 
L 
L 
o D 
t (n _ 0) C In 
N 
T 
1) uU 
c 
r 
pCN 'D J 
pJ 
od 
3JUO C U 
C f0 4) M L C 
RL 
N O7Ö 
Q 
0 Q) Cl NJ to OE 
äý 
NU 
,p 
(n 
C 
Ö 
p 
C 
O_ wNtJ _o 'a 
¬ 
:. Cr 
C: ain 2a 
>o 4)o- =mö ý8 > cm 
LC iý cý ü - oa C: r o$ cý E 
c ca C 
M 
W ö = a) °ö 
N C 
0 rn J O2 
L) r- 
O N N 
O 
00 
N 
C 
C 
D 
ON 
Ü 
`- N CO -0 
(ID Q) L-o 
UC 
7O , y .r fU 
a2i 
. 
c cn 15 0)M 
w r 
U 
° ,M E' 
a) 
. 13 ea m 
a) 
-° 
c2m 
.° 
ü) Nw "- .9 > 0) 
.. Co o> U) 
m 'Z (o U) 
c 
a) 
E °'>, to C- L v> z. CD 
d ao c Ec 
ö' ° 
0" 
c 
E- i 
c`o v) yý (3) Eý3 
aý c o 
Fn 
0 E 
u 
co. ýc 
() > Y ui oco 
rn U °O0)n a) (D u)o 3ý iiý. EC'U) 
Ü 
°' 
Ü Ü O 
EC 
tom/) v 0 
C E 
`° `Ö U' m :3 
mö 
x 
_ a) 4) m 
- Ut 'C a c w j` m uj EE o :3 aý ea 0> a (1) oa .. a) Ana 
a) 
a X w 
, In c 
o o 0 arnE> 
p° m ý(D 
"ý `- rn o 0 ° 
"O 
Ö 
Oo 
ÖM 
00 co 
MM 
ti00 
00 
ti ti 
(D U') 
ä a) rnrn rnrn r rnrn rr 
rnrn 
r 
(p 
ÜC 
O 
.+ 
0) ~ 
CQ 
O 
C CY) 
lp N 
E 
F 0 t/1 
QwN 
C4 
M t// 
N'0 -, E co 
-p 
No -w 00 V U) 
V) U) c 
U) 
. 92 
N NOm7 
= V 
H U! 
(n win 
NCM 
"a 
0 
ý«. U 
° 
d 
C- > N -0 0). Ln Q 
c->Xp cN 
N 
ý- a 
pcQ 
G) (a. 
N "- O rn '- rn 
o cD a- c0 ° 
iii pvO 
Ec Ci _ 
O 
U) 
N 
. 
co cä 
UZUJU 
Q cn 
cý 
O 
E 
OO 
co ääY 
OO 06 CM 
o'E 
O` 
EO 4=Y cc N f0 N m- 
() .-i; -- 
NO 
CO uOwwQZ E .«U ZY U) dU 
U) m 
C-4 ýN Uo 8 
p .-ctC 
cove oo 
E 
(i 
cCC 
""- 
OO 
" 
Ü 
O 
0 
Lc 
C 
'Fu 
°W 0_t °mU 9- 
E 
° L 9- ° -i6 u v) 
N t 
VI 
V CC CO U CCO CCC 
l 
CCa 
Y 
C >. C" C) 
- 
mCN 
u :EQ 
jm fA 
Ewa 
j Ca O 
u w 
jN(, ) 
- 
m (p 
d 
'jn > 
, . . - u Cl w m<M 
a 
cý C 
c 0 
c i 
EL 
-E 
' 
o 
0 
1i c O L 
c 
v i cl) 1- D O 
` 
E ° cvQ 
o :=c o0 a) a) a-C 
c 
m 
. '- U) "C 
cý- Nc O° ä 
+ 
(1) of 
No to 
uý 
`° 
af0i a) 
Eý° ¬ L°¬ -'. 6E Q)äE wcv 
oc (1) LMac t N 
C 
c 
o- N N$ 
'C C 
-ö CL 
o O 
CCO 
> äC 
O c c> C "C C 
CNNC ro° 
ý>0 xU Eýi-o 
:3 t 
°6 
4) 
EOýawmö 
t 
Em m üýNNE 
O OONO 
na C cb 
XX 
ºý 
p 
06 tt 
X CO> O >0 0 i . v, m (n wa(DmL) wAim > SE° 
CO 
Cý 
0) 06 
c 
LOm 
°)C > 
c 
tcN 
ý. C > 
. - rn rn LL r Qp N 
O 
t 
:3 
CO'ov 
JN7 
=3 
(0vD 
J a) 7 
c 
L 
c Q° 
-Q 
C .c A 
cc 
0 
Ut«-'n UL to N 
0 
72 
j L- EC 
i> n> ? ?ý ? ° O a 
ti `I-° N- o) 
ý 0 
00 
cli 
Cl) 
c 
D 
i) 
.0 
(5 
}I JW 
xc CO U 
"ý 
ýö 
m 
r Ö 
W 
(U 
ý L) m 
(D> 
O 
I 
^` ^ 
U) 
p 
>, 
N 
N U) 
rnM 
u m 
(13 a 
N 
m 1 o > m 
ov 16 'ý c0 ( 
öý E 0) 
c w a) 
ä0xä' te 
O 
4 
. 
Y 
N na co O 
m 
2? (1) N 
m 
(a 
ONO n 
CU Cp 
JC L- 
j 
L% U) Y 
Em üi J M- c .ýo 2 N--7, OUN f0 
2' L 
a 
pOC 
ß TL ) F- O 
pU 
äv 
` 
c: 2 ýC 
ömo j CO 22c N> 
Cý -2 `ý C C. 
N 
Cl) ON 
° 
O`O 
f0 Oy3 
o ý " a 
CU 7 LEN 
)N ' 
N 
NNOm :v aý 
s L) como ýT aý oýýaý(D *v N 
> ;=N xN >otj EocEct 
i 
nö 2 
a 
cap ÖäÖ, 
0) cn i ýX v U) 
ýä to °ä°c- vä , 1 
M. Ü E 3c (1) o :3vc 
4) CD 
O 
c 
O 
_0 
CF) 
c0 
m 
E 
ýO 
D> O J 
.0 L 0) 
L 
m ,_ Q) 
rn CO 
ö0) CD N :: 3 (D 
rn 0rn 
0 r- :3 
Co ° 
IL 
ö rn 0 
N 
c0 
ýp 
O 
(A (D CO 
-N 
0O 
C 
c f0 c CO 
Ü 
F- >' Ym c Y 
Or M 
=ET= fa 
'I '; - m a 
oNZ 
oEc 
CO m 
v O 
caE c= c 
O rn Om c7 o °M r- 
M 
COMO 
N chUCL vco (Da-, 0t-L-U 
m 
C 
ÖN 
CY) 
N 
u- 
C U) 
"V 
UN 
0 V 0 U) (1) 
C: E 
N 
W 
°mü 
Q ý 0 °, i- )LL 
W 
m LA cu 
N 
rT, 
Lc 
. E 
> ä. 
, CL 
Co 
m 
m'O 
ýN c ý 
cu a) 4) 
t5 = (n O 0 N 
f0tr Nm n 
N 
C 
yý c0 
Uf. ýl :3 NL c 
fU 
D 
>1 (gyp ON 
C7 
0 
OL a) 2NODN 
6E Im 
N in C_ N 
CL 
NN jp 
c: 
NO 
:3 (n 
fm 
> 0 
N "C L4 (D "D (O 
E E in E C 
a(ý U 
V N 
X f0 a(p 
a 
N L7 NA 
C 
Q m ' U l Q L w U f- ( :DN 
ý I 
p p 
i 
O o 
C p 
t ' OO 
m Y 
N 
c C 
m 
M M p om (nN O a n 
( pa 
co O Cl) DO 
N 
00 
N 
C 
C 
D 
Z' 
p)L- 
- 
N 
- 
W 
N. 
Co 
:3 g _ 
i co 
C 0Na4 
(o 
U fý _ 
.ý cl 
p >C . 0 
U f° co > ai 
EN N° ýý 
M 
ýp 
U Ya) Np NÜjC U) 
° 
O) 
'a mc F tj (0 
`nE -o ° °v 
-W- 
(D a; a; E 
°- 
p 
c2Yýn o ü U) 
U) 
v ý" Ea 
ý_ ý Ec LI) U) 0 L O O 
C 
c0 
O 
yN in 
=ON 
(0 4) O 
O0> 
O 
c __ E, 
O EC C CNY 
Ui 
ý> hoc 
aas 
3 
O ° 
ä, 2 >. c°a mQ E 
ý 
-- C Hb b 
c 
m 0 m 0 
E 
w 
0 
0 
_ cG 
¬ 
¬ Ü 
4) UV 
C 
CN 
a 
Q1 N p 
C 
Q 
o 
0 
't 
C 
a) 
m 
.. 
ýw 
E '5 a 
Yp 
o 't Ö> O0 ä 0) H0 
01D 4) 2 
0 ä 
ö ° 
O O 
0000) 
° 
00 (3) 
rn rnvo0 
0 
rnrn °' 0) cri rn 
d rnrn% rr Ll rnrn r- rn rnc0) r Co r rnrn c- e-- )0) rn i-"" r- rn a r e"- 
ý-° x N mE 
wU) w Co --c Eaýimy V) (n -o 
(D z a) 
(n N CA c1o 
LLi (D 
rn 
CD kr- .äac U) 
CL 
- 
u0 E 
W 
_ 
70 
X 0 CO % a 
CM - O ° w 
c) 
Q 
U) 
N- Y U) 
O 
Cl) 7NCNZ 
r C. C) L CQZ0 D Cý 0) 
0 N ON 
N 
Ö 
^7` 
ÖC 
C^` 
W 
of 
Ö 06 V 
C 
p 9E . 6- 
a) 
c0 U 
N 
c0 p_ 
.-N 
Q) N 
O) Q) 
f0 cU 
E 
p 
Na : 
Co O) 
NE 
cý 
p E >m ýý O 
CUC> 
>c(U ý ý E: 
&2C 
C ECc 
-°ý °ii °w ink 0 - 
COU . <W 0 
:1cm :3 
oü 
w 
. 
c C C°' o 
ro 
E c 
C a (U CN 
ý{ v o C 
ý 
C 
c 
(U 
25 
`0 ar E 
° 
ö °ý'D ov 
CL aý ¬ 
(n t .° ' 0 
öö 
N O M 
ö 
:E 
C 
m 
O 
V 
ýÖ M 
c iNc 
(0 MO 
C N 
-- 
w n. > L) 
NC 
Cja 
o 
O 4) > E 06 
N 
COE "N aO 
ýý ümo n (fi tsý' 
to 
c E'°cco Eý M 
d 0c 
Jm 
ýs t ý 2 'ö 
NU 
xC ät 
W 
ca0mp ýN 
U to - :. = N c) U co N 
L c 
p t 0 
UU 
f0 
ýp - V 'C O r. 
C rn 06 ca N 0 LL m 
Q) 
_ 
m c > M 06 06 aö 
M 
E 
°6 
O c 
mE 
Cu 
r0) 
co c .co 0)C14 cý cö r cmg 
N 
U) M _ C) 04 Z - 
r- 
CO 
co 
co co O0) 0) ON) Qý 
ff) 
00 
N 
(1) 
C 
D 
O 
0O OON 
N t CE>. C N L fp 
_ 
y 
> f0 Cc .nl 
> 8 
00 o f0 O " 
-0 M 
y 000 
Q 
(n Z 
>j CM C C CL OCj 
mocUO-V 10 
O 
rn 
C. 
T) -0 
N 
C 
C 
c 
-8 
m» u' Cl Nc 
le - 
Q) 
to N c0 
O 
.. Rf OO i- 
c0 - 
O_ 
co NN 
N7 
(D CL 
iö D 
r C: 0 M ý'rn 
L) 0 0 2amai 
> d 
.ýV 0 
cu -cu VL.. VC7 f0 . -. N (0 7 (0 .C n -N dj 
16. 
t (n ä c M -0 Ü 'm >amQOm o c I. cu Nm c o. nx a> c CNx 
C 
C 
4) 
OC 
.2m .0 
N cO 
c 
° 
to 
` 4) öý N p 
LýcnýE8 
o 
C]> Ana o Q U)2ooc u, 
co 
N- 
O 
.C L*) 
C) 
N- 00 
N 
N- 
CO 00 
co (7) 
N- 00 O) 
Q) O) 10 ( 
U) fr M 
MV -D N- 00 
4) C) O) a) ( 0) a) C) C( 
(v r 
0) a) C Q) C) 
.- .-mr r- 
°_) , - -0 w= 
Co U) - 41 c U) m °) m 
(A -0 Z' .C N (A y fl 0 _ C- 4) 
CL : Z5 NE2o N 
>. v2 T v 
1 
Z) 2 
0 
Co ° 
tr: 
a> O .2o "C 
c r- 
N- 
OIOo Z) 
rn 
C 4c 
Oc . 
16 
=v 
f/) ca o L) U- D COOUZZ 
06 
Ü 
>+C m 
O CO C CO 
4 
N 
M Q) NC 
C 
U- 
U) 
O 
_ 
c c° cm m C- wCO E 
jmÖ mC - MC 'N V ý MC 
-ý 
0liw lid I-ýmW -Q liw j 
EN 
CY) ° 
CL -D LN 
U) co 
_C p) o 
(U 
N 
N 
Nu 
C 
Qm ca 
w 
0C m 
C! 
ý 
Lmý 
° 
N a¬ 
° 
ý_ m 
> c 
M fA 
CL ý 
° öaý 
öa O 
mw 
ýý 
rn. °t'5 
H rn 
ý 
o 
EE wU `° 
N Ö m Ncy OC Ö yy 
Op ONOYO L W co t_ 
W owe 
cnwv 
X a1 N 
4) ow 
O 13 äam >a ýL ý c 
U 
Q C) U 
t Nj 0uß 
g 
N 
aö 
M 
06 
NN N 
Off) 4) 
a) co 
00 
r4 
C_ 
C 
Jcý a) N -o C 
Z Z. o LOccM 
m 
N 
c 
O S. 2 
rn o > NO 
r 
coE 
ai äN (n 4E 
Q) U) 
N 
NC 
=r 
) 
Nc 
o 
NCpC (A 
_ 
f0 C (1) NCO 
Ü 
ý, 7 t6 
N 
ý a 
C 
-> 
pN 
°' 
N 
m y >. C (Cp ul 
-2 1 ýv 0 ON - 
v N E N WOo .4 
6 
N- ' 
4) 
p) 
Ny 
L N wN 
N 
y 
z 0 
> cu - 
,0 fp 
a pý 
m 
a) 
Cl) LÜU2N QI 
W> 
> U'C 
,Y 0 0 
U) XN E 
lº- C D) 4) 
0 Cu cU 
NNCCY 
cu (1) 
a) 
ONXCWOOc 
aid a coý°ý w aE amL; -- mý 
S m-D 
c N 
CG N 
L 
(A- p. 
¬ 0) 
O 
C r- 't 
0 
c-¬>C 
U 
Q 'd 'C 
O0 D6 
c 
=U 
:3 a 
f0 
a) 
C) m 
c> 
O 
n 
opOp 
Jv ýUü 
co aä ä.. N 
(p - 
U Ü! 
> > 
0 t O 
O ° 
0 
.= N00 Co Co 
r" 0N 
f- 0 co 
q0 
rn O 
000 a) ' 
C) 
IL 
6) Q) C) 0) C) 0 a) O (3) 
06 > 
D ü"7 
CO NO U Q" Ul 
N 
OC C (O O Dv C 
ÖY 
p U 8) a> 
CCOXO E - 
E 
fC 
:3OCL w (d u 
N uý C tl f. U ýe) (U 
- 
to 
= 
(I)) 
G (ß w+ Qi o Vl 
L 
U) 
v= 
v) ° u1 
ßO 
EE Cý 
4) L 
C 
70 h ll U) 
Y 
m u 
u) 
HH u 
v QE ýcn 
) 4) C E T; _a 
ju 
, 
U 
C 
0 
0- 
-3 f0 >' Ö 
a 
L 
Cu 
c 
04- p_ L 
ro äYö Luv 3-@ E 
c 
NU 
Gm 
ödö ým 
r_ 
N 
O a `ý>ä8o N 
Emtan 
C O UU 
(/) OW 
O. 
C 
q. U CfiQ W 
o _N ýLL 
Cl. > 
(O 
y 
N 
0 
'6 - ö 
-I 
' 
Ö 
M (1) 
c0 
U) 
°¬ C 4) º-rn. 4 ý 
ii 
aua 
a 
öm 
3Mý 
t 
Li- . ýýcchvº ý Yv y. C t 
) 
nL `p' cU OO 
N to N 
IU C E 
: a 0 != 
06 
a to N N 
Ö 4) C 
Cu 
N Ch 
C n CMNC 
(L) (n CF) U) 
M 
rn 
c :3 
ä> c ý EE > > LC o < -a 
äE cs 
.. 
2 i 0-0 4) 
2 Q an -ýZ ýL- C co v, 
U) 
N 
O 
dL 
6 3: 
. m 
ýý pn. c 
0 Cy) E 00 ö v 
'a ~ ~ N ? QQN 
o) 
Ö 
O 
NO 
_--Ö 
Q) r r r- 
VI) 
00 
N 
(1) 
t_ _[ Y 
CC m -C) 
O 
aý+ 
OO 
N O 
7 
_N 
'ý fÄ % 
NOCOt 
U) i=" 
O 4) U) 
C 
tj- Q f0 
.0 tj C fý f/1 
.a to 
mc cl u c co 
woxü 
vet c rn 2ýN 
ö 
o 
O 
c_ ONC T2O n 
0 2. - 
Um 
(D C: vNc a 
-O Q 
C 
d c 01 0p 
NV C 
f9 VCC 
(3) 0 
' 
D) o 
CL 
d 10 (O N yö 
c 0 EO 
O 
> 
0 
w C- EC o w-o '«. N. C (0 
N 
D 
N 
4 
.0 O 
0 NO 
CD C) 
U) 
m 
O 
a Z 
Ö 
r- N 
O) O) 
w 
C 
C V Q > (D 
0) 
._ 
7 Cl. 
= 
" 
m 
E 
Q. c (D Q 
13 O W ö'a 
.c 
cm 
ý 
Co 
m 
U rn 
oE 
(a O Lo (/) c) 
¬ 
u, c to . Cl) .D 
CC 
º- 
N 
- 
ajj 
.] 
N 
U 
` IAA > 
7O 
E- C Ec C>. 
(U fa (p 
aj cg 
C 
cc 0ä cw' ýLL0 Ü-, w 
OU 
' -. 
V. 
r- Ü 
m 
5C f`ný 
Y 
a N L 
M 
C 
U 
.Ný D7 OCU UyCo (0 TC m Ch N- 
,8C 
(D CO 
c N (0 C 
m öU 
C 
`°L N*0"ýý ¬ U) 
- 
ra .2U>. (0 ö L ö ä¬ ä)c ä'pt co 
N > O 
om 
cOU 
ae 0)ö > 
0 4) 
¬ 
C 
O 
p . 
mC0C mý - U) 
N 
t0 - 
CC fl cM 
4) 
f0 jp m 
cMo 5) a) °' 
$cO 
OONO 
O¬ c 
OOD 
Ecmi U) c 7ý 
ot 
=3 
`n DC 
U) v 
OO Ei 
w 
rný x ai EEm 
(1) o- mT)I WEöö 
Em 
Q E' -mT 
w d $w 
r- 
O 
c 
4) 0 
C 
0 
(1) 0 
N 
U. O 0) 
0 0 
ad N 
t 
0 C_ 
E 
0 c 
C: ) 
° 0) 
m 
X 
N 
ý 
O 
r 
O 
r 
N- 
O 
r 
110 00 
N 
Cl) 
C 
Appendix 2: DataStream calculations and descriptions 
WC08221 Total debt % total capital: LEVERAGE RATIO is described as (Long Term Debt 
+ Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) / (Total Capital + Short Term Debt 
& Current Portion of Long Term Debt) * 100 
WC 03998 Total capital: TOTAL CAPITAL represents the total investment in the company. It 
is the sum of common equity (WC03501), preferred stock, minority interest, long-term debt, 
non-equity reserves and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. For insurance companies 
policyholders' equity is also included. 
WC03255 Total debt: TOTAL DEBT represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease 
obligations. It is the sum of long- and short-term debt. 
WC03995 Total shareholder's equity: TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY represents the 
sum of Preferred Stock and Common Shareholders' Equity. 
WC03501 Common equity: Shareholders' Equity: COMMON EQUITY represents common 
shareholders' investment in a company. 
It includes but is not restricted to: 
Common stock value 
Retained earnings 
Capital surplus 
Capital stock premium 
Cumulative gain or loss of foreign currency translation, if included in equity per FASB 52 
treatment 
Monetary correction-capital 03L, 482) 
Goodwill written off 03(^ 491) 
For Non-U. S. Corporations preference stock which participates with the common/ordinary 
shares in the profits of the company 
UnIS 287 
For Non-U. S. Corporations, if shareholders equity section is not delineated then the following 
additional accounts are included: 
Appropriated and inappropriate retained earnings 
Net income for the year, if not included in retained earnings (majority share of income is only 
included) 
Compulsory statutory/legal reserves without specific purpose 
Discretionary Reserves if other companies in that country include in their delineated 
shareholders' equity 
Negative Goodwill 
It excludes: 
Common treasury stocks 
Accumulated unpaid preferred dividends 
For U. S. Corporations, excess of involuntary liquidating value for outstanding preferred stock 
over stated value is deducted 
Redeemable common stock (treated as preferred) 
Footnotes 
A. Common shareholders' equity is not delineated 
B. Preferred stock cannot be separated 
C. Treasury stock appears on asset side and cannot be separated 
D. Minority interest in current year's income and/or the entire minority interest cannot be 
separated 
F. A small amount of special reserves cannot be separated (Germany) 
G. Common shareholders' equity is not delineated and is not comparable 
H. Policyholders equity cannot be separated 
1. Includes non-equity reserves and/or other provisions which cannot be separated 
J. Before appropriation on net income for the year 
UniS 288 
K. Increase/Decrease due to revaluation of assets 
L. No standard text 
M. No standard text 
N. Adjusted to include foreign currency translation gains/losses 
0. Adjusted to exclude treasury stock 
P. Adjusted to include inappropriate net loss 
Q. Adjusted to include unrealized gain/loss on marketable securities 
R. Includes equity portion of untaxed reserves 
T. Includes consolidation adjustments 
UniS 289 
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